blob: 846fa80e1a3fed8ce99b519242f9d60848c4feaa [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright 2018 The Fuchsia Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "src/connectivity/bluetooth/core/bt-host/public/pw_bluetooth_sapphire/internal/host/sm/util.h"
#include <endian.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <optional>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/cmac.h>
#include "src/connectivity/bluetooth/core/bt-host/public/pw_bluetooth_sapphire/internal/host/common/assert.h"
#include "src/connectivity/bluetooth/core/bt-host/public/pw_bluetooth_sapphire/internal/host/common/byte_buffer.h"
#include "src/connectivity/bluetooth/core/bt-host/public/pw_bluetooth_sapphire/internal/host/common/device_address.h"
#include "src/connectivity/bluetooth/core/bt-host/public/pw_bluetooth_sapphire/internal/host/common/random.h"
#include "src/connectivity/bluetooth/core/bt-host/public/pw_bluetooth_sapphire/internal/host/common/uint128.h"
#include "src/connectivity/bluetooth/core/bt-host/public/pw_bluetooth_sapphire/internal/host/common/uint256.h"
#include "src/connectivity/bluetooth/core/bt-host/public/pw_bluetooth_sapphire/internal/host/sm/error.h"
#include "src/connectivity/bluetooth/core/bt-host/public/pw_bluetooth_sapphire/internal/host/sm/smp.h"
#include "src/connectivity/bluetooth/core/bt-host/public/pw_bluetooth_sapphire/internal/host/sm/types.h"
#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wswitch-enum"
namespace bt::sm::util {
namespace {
constexpr size_t kPreqSize = 7;
constexpr uint32_t k24BitMax = 0xFFFFFF;
// F5 parameters are stored in little-endian
const auto kF5Salt = UInt128{0xBE,
0x83,
0x60,
0x5A,
0xDB,
0x0B,
0x37,
0x60,
0x38,
0xA5,
0xF5,
0xAA,
0x91,
0x83,
0x88,
0x6C};
const auto kF5KeyId = std::array<uint8_t, 4>{0x65, 0x6C, 0x74, 0x62};
// Swap the endianness of a 128-bit integer. |in| and |out| should not be backed
// by the same buffer.
void Swap128(const UInt128& in, UInt128* out) {
BT_DEBUG_ASSERT(out);
for (size_t i = 0; i < in.size(); ++i) {
(*out)[i] = in[in.size() - i - 1];
}
}
// XOR two 128-bit integers and return the result in |out|. It is possible to
// pass a pointer to one of the inputs as |out|.
void Xor128(const UInt128& int1, const UInt128& int2, UInt128* out) {
BT_DEBUG_ASSERT(out);
for (size_t i = 0; i < kUInt128Size; ++i) {
out->at(i) = int1.at(i) ^ int2.at(i);
}
}
// Writes |data| to |output_data_loc| & returns a view of the remainder of
// |output_data_loc|.
template <typename InputType>
MutableBufferView WriteToBuffer(InputType data,
MutableBufferView output_data_loc) {
output_data_loc.WriteObj(data);
return output_data_loc.mutable_view(sizeof(data));
}
// Converts |addr| into the 56-bit format used by F5/F6 and writes that data to
// a BufferView. Returns a buffer view pointing just past the last byte written.
MutableBufferView WriteCryptoDeviceAddr(const DeviceAddress& addr,
const MutableBufferView& out) {
std::array<uint8_t, sizeof(addr.value()) + 1> little_endian_addr_buffer;
BufferView addr_bytes = addr.value().bytes();
std::copy(
addr_bytes.begin(), addr_bytes.end(), little_endian_addr_buffer.data());
little_endian_addr_buffer[6] = addr.IsPublic() ? 0x00 : 0x01;
return WriteToBuffer(little_endian_addr_buffer, out);
}
} // namespace
std::string IOCapabilityToString(IOCapability capability) {
switch (capability) {
case IOCapability::kDisplayOnly:
return "Display Only";
case IOCapability::kDisplayYesNo:
return "Display w/ Confirmation";
case IOCapability::kKeyboardOnly:
return "Keyboard";
case IOCapability::kNoInputNoOutput:
return "No I/O";
case IOCapability::kKeyboardDisplay:
return "Keyboard w/ Display";
default:
break;
}
return "(unknown)";
}
pw::bluetooth::emboss::IoCapability IOCapabilityForHci(
IOCapability capability) {
switch (capability) {
case IOCapability::kDisplayOnly:
return pw::bluetooth::emboss::IoCapability::DISPLAY_ONLY;
case IOCapability::kDisplayYesNo:
return pw::bluetooth::emboss::IoCapability::DISPLAY_YES_NO;
case IOCapability::kKeyboardOnly:
return pw::bluetooth::emboss::IoCapability::KEYBOARD_ONLY;
case IOCapability::kNoInputNoOutput:
return pw::bluetooth::emboss::IoCapability::NO_INPUT_NO_OUTPUT;
// There's no dedicated HCI "Keyboard w/ Display" IO Capability. Use
// DisplayYesNo for devices with keyboard input and numeric output. See Core
// Spec v5.0 Vol 3, Part C, Section 5.2.2.5 (Table 5.5).
case IOCapability::kKeyboardDisplay:
return pw::bluetooth::emboss::IoCapability::DISPLAY_YES_NO;
default:
break;
}
return pw::bluetooth::emboss::IoCapability::NO_INPUT_NO_OUTPUT;
}
std::string PairingMethodToString(PairingMethod method) {
switch (method) {
case PairingMethod::kJustWorks:
return "Just Works";
case PairingMethod::kPasskeyEntryInput:
return "Passkey Entry (input)";
case PairingMethod::kPasskeyEntryDisplay:
return "Passkey Entry (display)";
case PairingMethod::kNumericComparison:
return "Numeric Comparison";
case PairingMethod::kOutOfBand:
return "OOB";
default:
break;
}
return "(unknown)";
}
std::string DisplayMethodToString(Delegate::DisplayMethod method) {
switch (method) {
case Delegate::DisplayMethod::kComparison:
return "Numeric Comparison";
case Delegate::DisplayMethod::kPeerEntry:
return "Peer Passkey Entry";
default:
return "(unknown)";
}
}
MutableByteBufferPtr NewPdu(size_t param_size) {
// TODO(https://fxbug.dev/42083692): Remove unique_ptr->DynamicByteBuffer
// double indirection once sufficient progress has been made on the attached
// bug (specifically re:l2cap::Channel::Send).
return std::make_unique<DynamicByteBuffer>(sizeof(Header) + param_size);
}
PairingMethod SelectPairingMethod(bool sec_conn,
bool local_oob,
bool peer_oob,
bool mitm_required,
IOCapability local_ioc,
IOCapability peer_ioc,
bool local_initiator) {
if ((sec_conn && (local_oob || peer_oob)) ||
(!sec_conn && local_oob && peer_oob)) {
return PairingMethod::kOutOfBand;
}
// If neither device requires MITM protection or if the peer has not I/O
// capable, we select Just Works.
if (!mitm_required || peer_ioc == IOCapability::kNoInputNoOutput) {
return PairingMethod::kJustWorks;
}
// Select the pairing method by comparing I/O capabilities. The switch
// statement will return if an authenticated entry method is selected.
// Otherwise, we'll break out and default to Just Works below.
switch (local_ioc) {
case IOCapability::kNoInputNoOutput:
break;
case IOCapability::kDisplayOnly:
switch (peer_ioc) {
case IOCapability::kKeyboardOnly:
case IOCapability::kKeyboardDisplay:
return PairingMethod::kPasskeyEntryDisplay;
default:
break;
}
break;
case IOCapability::kDisplayYesNo:
switch (peer_ioc) {
case IOCapability::kDisplayYesNo:
return sec_conn ? PairingMethod::kNumericComparison
: PairingMethod::kJustWorks;
case IOCapability::kKeyboardDisplay:
return sec_conn ? PairingMethod::kNumericComparison
: PairingMethod::kPasskeyEntryDisplay;
case IOCapability::kKeyboardOnly:
return PairingMethod::kPasskeyEntryDisplay;
default:
break;
}
break;
case IOCapability::kKeyboardOnly:
return PairingMethod::kPasskeyEntryInput;
case IOCapability::kKeyboardDisplay:
switch (peer_ioc) {
case IOCapability::kKeyboardOnly:
return PairingMethod::kPasskeyEntryDisplay;
case IOCapability::kDisplayOnly:
return PairingMethod::kPasskeyEntryInput;
case IOCapability::kDisplayYesNo:
return sec_conn ? PairingMethod::kNumericComparison
: PairingMethod::kPasskeyEntryInput;
default:
break;
}
// If both devices have KeyboardDisplay then use Numeric Comparison
// if S.C. is supported. Otherwise, the initiator always displays and the
// responder inputs a passkey.
if (sec_conn) {
return PairingMethod::kNumericComparison;
}
return local_initiator ? PairingMethod::kPasskeyEntryDisplay
: PairingMethod::kPasskeyEntryInput;
}
return PairingMethod::kJustWorks;
}
void Encrypt(const UInt128& key,
const UInt128& plaintext_data,
UInt128* out_encrypted_data) {
// Swap the bytes since "the most significant octet of key corresponds to
// key[0], the most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to in[0]
// and the most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to out[0] using
// the notation specified in FIPS-197" for the security function "e" (Vol 3,
// Part H, 2.2.1).
UInt128 be_k, be_pt, be_enc;
Swap128(key, &be_k);
Swap128(plaintext_data, &be_pt);
AES_KEY k;
AES_set_encrypt_key(be_k.data(), 128, &k);
AES_encrypt(be_pt.data(), be_enc.data(), &k);
Swap128(be_enc, out_encrypted_data);
}
void C1(const UInt128& tk,
const UInt128& rand,
const ByteBuffer& preq,
const ByteBuffer& pres,
const DeviceAddress& initiator_addr,
const DeviceAddress& responder_addr,
UInt128* out_confirm_value) {
BT_DEBUG_ASSERT(preq.size() == kPreqSize);
BT_DEBUG_ASSERT(pres.size() == kPreqSize);
BT_DEBUG_ASSERT(out_confirm_value);
UInt128 p1, p2;
// Calculate p1 = pres || preq || rat’ || iat’
pw::bluetooth::emboss::LEAddressType iat =
DeviceAddress::DeviceAddrToLeAddr(initiator_addr.type());
pw::bluetooth::emboss::LEAddressType rat =
DeviceAddress::DeviceAddrToLeAddr(responder_addr.type());
p1[0] = static_cast<uint8_t>(iat);
p1[1] = static_cast<uint8_t>(rat);
std::memcpy(p1.data() + 2, preq.data(), preq.size()); // Bytes [2-8]
std::memcpy(p1.data() + 2 + preq.size(), pres.data(), pres.size()); // [9-15]
// Calculate p2 = padding || ia || ra
BufferView ia = initiator_addr.value().bytes();
BufferView ra = responder_addr.value().bytes();
std::memcpy(p2.data(), ra.data(), ra.size()); // Lowest 6 bytes
std::memcpy(p2.data() + ra.size(), ia.data(), ia.size()); // Next 6 bytes
std::memset(p2.data() + ra.size() + ia.size(),
0,
p2.size() - ra.size() - ia.size()); // Pad 0s for the remainder
// Calculate the confirm value: e(tk, e(tk, rand XOR p1) XOR p2)
UInt128 tmp;
Xor128(rand, p1, &p1);
Encrypt(tk, p1, &tmp);
Xor128(tmp, p2, &tmp);
Encrypt(tk, tmp, out_confirm_value);
}
void S1(const UInt128& tk,
const UInt128& r1,
const UInt128& r2,
UInt128* out_stk) {
BT_DEBUG_ASSERT(out_stk);
UInt128 r_prime;
// Take the lower 64-bits of r1 and r2 and concatanate them to produce
// r’ = r1’ || r2’, where r2' contains the LSB and r1' the MSB.
constexpr size_t kHalfSize = sizeof(UInt128) / 2;
std::memcpy(r_prime.data(), r2.data(), kHalfSize);
std::memcpy(r_prime.data() + kHalfSize, r1.data(), kHalfSize);
// Calculate the STK: e(tk, r’)
Encrypt(tk, r_prime, out_stk);
}
uint32_t Ah(const UInt128& k, uint32_t r) {
BT_DEBUG_ASSERT(r <= k24BitMax);
// r' = padding || r.
UInt128 r_prime;
r_prime.fill(0);
*reinterpret_cast<uint32_t*>(r_prime.data()) = htole32(r & k24BitMax);
UInt128 hash128;
Encrypt(k, r_prime, &hash128);
return le32toh(*reinterpret_cast<uint32_t*>(hash128.data())) & k24BitMax;
}
bool IrkCanResolveRpa(const UInt128& irk, const DeviceAddress& rpa) {
if (!rpa.IsResolvablePrivate()) {
return false;
}
// The |rpa_hash| and |prand| values generated below should match the least
// and most significant 3 bytes of |rpa|, respectively.
BufferView rpa_bytes = rpa.value().bytes();
// Lower 24-bits (in host order).
uint32_t rpa_hash = le32toh(rpa_bytes.To<uint32_t>()) & k24BitMax;
// Upper 24-bits (we avoid a cast to uint32_t to prevent an invalid access
// since the buffer would be too short).
BufferView prand_bytes = rpa_bytes.view(3);
uint32_t prand = prand_bytes[0];
prand |= static_cast<uint32_t>(prand_bytes[1]) << 8;
prand |= static_cast<uint32_t>(prand_bytes[2]) << 16;
return Ah(irk, prand) == rpa_hash;
}
DeviceAddress GenerateRpa(const UInt128& irk) {
// 24-bit prand value in little-endian order.
constexpr auto k24BitSize = 3;
uint32_t prand_le = 0;
static_assert(k24BitSize == sizeof(uint32_t) - 1);
MutableBufferView prand_bytes(&prand_le, k24BitSize);
// The specification requires that at least one bit of the address is 1 and at
// least one bit is 0. We expect that zx_cprng_draw() satisfies these
// requirements.
// TODO(https://fxbug.dev/42099048): Maybe generate within a range to enforce
// this?
random_generator()->Get(prand_bytes.mutable_subspan());
// Make sure that the highest two bits are 0 and 1 respectively.
prand_bytes[2] |= 0b01000000;
prand_bytes[2] &= ~0b10000000;
// 24-bit hash value in little-endian order.
uint32_t hash_le = htole32(Ah(irk, le32toh(prand_le)));
BufferView hash_bytes(&hash_le, k24BitSize);
// The |rpa_hash| and |prand| values generated below take up the least
// and most significant 3 bytes of |rpa|, respectively.
StaticByteBuffer<kDeviceAddressSize> addr_bytes;
addr_bytes.Write(hash_bytes);
addr_bytes.Write(prand_bytes, hash_bytes.size());
return DeviceAddress(DeviceAddress::Type::kLERandom,
DeviceAddressBytes(addr_bytes));
}
DeviceAddress GenerateRandomAddress(bool is_static) {
StaticByteBuffer<kDeviceAddressSize> addr_bytes;
// The specification requires that at least one bit of the address is 1 and at
// least one bit is 0. We expect that zx_cprng_draw() satisfies these
// requirements.
// TODO(https://fxbug.dev/42099048): Maybe generate within a range to enforce
// this?
random_generator()->Get(addr_bytes.mutable_subspan());
if (is_static) {
// The highest two bits of a static random address are both 1 (see Vol 3,
// Part B, 1.3.2.1).
addr_bytes[kDeviceAddressSize - 1] |= 0b11000000;
} else {
// The highest two bits of a NRPA are both 0 (see Vol 3, Part B, 1.3.2.2).
addr_bytes[kDeviceAddressSize - 1] &= ~0b11000000;
}
return DeviceAddress(DeviceAddress::Type::kLERandom,
DeviceAddressBytes(addr_bytes));
}
std::optional<UInt128> AesCmac(const UInt128& hash_key, const ByteBuffer& msg) {
// Reverse little-endian input parameters to the big-endian format expected by
// BoringSSL.
UInt128 big_endian_key;
Swap128(hash_key, &big_endian_key);
DynamicByteBuffer big_endian_msg(msg);
uint8_t* msg_begin = big_endian_msg.mutable_data();
std::reverse(msg_begin, msg_begin + big_endian_msg.size());
UInt128 big_endian_out, little_endian_out;
// 0 is the failure error code for AES_CMAC
if (AES_CMAC(big_endian_out.data(),
big_endian_key.data(),
big_endian_key.size(),
msg_begin,
big_endian_msg.size()) == 0) {
return std::nullopt;
}
Swap128(big_endian_out, &little_endian_out);
return little_endian_out;
}
std::optional<UInt128> F4(const UInt256& u,
const UInt256& v,
const UInt128& x,
const uint8_t z) {
constexpr size_t kDataLength = 2 * kUInt256Size + 1;
StaticByteBuffer<kDataLength> data_to_encrypt;
// Write to buffer in reverse of human-readable spec format as all parameters
// are little-endian.
MutableBufferView current_view =
WriteToBuffer(z, data_to_encrypt.mutable_view());
current_view = WriteToBuffer(v, current_view);
current_view = WriteToBuffer(u, current_view);
// Ensures |current_view| is at the end of data_to_encrypt
BT_DEBUG_ASSERT(current_view.size() == 0);
return AesCmac(x, data_to_encrypt);
}
std::optional<F5Results> F5(const UInt256& dhkey,
const UInt128& initiator_nonce,
const UInt128& responder_nonce,
const DeviceAddress& initiator_addr,
const DeviceAddress& responder_addr) {
// Get the T key value
StaticByteBuffer<kUInt256Size> dhkey_buffer;
WriteToBuffer(dhkey, dhkey_buffer.mutable_view());
std::optional<UInt128> maybe_cmac = AesCmac(kF5Salt, dhkey_buffer);
if (!maybe_cmac.has_value()) {
return std::nullopt;
}
UInt128 t_key = maybe_cmac.value();
// Create the MacKey and LTK using the T Key value.
uint8_t counter = 0x00;
const std::array<uint8_t, 2> length = {0x00, 0x01}; // 256 in little-endian
constexpr size_t kDataLength = sizeof(counter) + kF5KeyId.size() +
2 * kUInt128Size +
2 * (1 + kDeviceAddressSize) + length.size();
StaticByteBuffer<kDataLength> data_to_encrypt;
// Write to buffer in reverse of human-readable spec format as all parameters
// are little-endian.
MutableBufferView current_view =
WriteToBuffer(length, data_to_encrypt.mutable_view());
current_view = WriteCryptoDeviceAddr(responder_addr, current_view);
current_view = WriteCryptoDeviceAddr(initiator_addr, current_view);
current_view = WriteToBuffer(responder_nonce, current_view);
current_view = WriteToBuffer(initiator_nonce, current_view);
current_view = WriteToBuffer(kF5KeyId, current_view);
current_view = WriteToBuffer(counter, current_view);
// Ensures |current_view| is at the end of data_to_encrypt
BT_DEBUG_ASSERT(current_view.size() == 0);
maybe_cmac = AesCmac(t_key, data_to_encrypt);
if (!maybe_cmac.has_value()) {
return std::nullopt;
}
F5Results results{.mac_key = *maybe_cmac, .ltk = {0}};
// Overwrite counter value only for LTK calculation.
counter = 0x01;
data_to_encrypt.Write(&counter, 1, kDataLength - 1);
maybe_cmac = AesCmac(t_key, data_to_encrypt);
if (!maybe_cmac.has_value()) {
return std::nullopt;
}
results.ltk = *maybe_cmac;
return results;
}
std::optional<UInt128> F6(const UInt128& mackey,
const UInt128& n1,
const UInt128& n2,
const UInt128& r,
AuthReqField auth_req,
OOBDataFlag oob,
IOCapability io_cap,
const DeviceAddress& a1,
const DeviceAddress& a2) {
constexpr size_t kDataLength = 3 * kUInt128Size + sizeof(AuthReqField) +
sizeof(OOBDataFlag) + sizeof(IOCapability) +
2 * (1 + kDeviceAddressSize);
StaticByteBuffer<kDataLength> data_to_encrypt;
// Write to buffer in reverse of human-readable spec format as all parameters
// are little-endian.
MutableBufferView current_view =
WriteCryptoDeviceAddr(a2, data_to_encrypt.mutable_view());
current_view = WriteCryptoDeviceAddr(a1, current_view);
current_view = WriteToBuffer(static_cast<uint8_t>(io_cap), current_view);
current_view = WriteToBuffer(static_cast<uint8_t>(oob), current_view);
current_view = WriteToBuffer(auth_req, current_view);
current_view = WriteToBuffer(r, current_view);
current_view = WriteToBuffer(n2, current_view);
current_view = WriteToBuffer(n1, current_view);
// Ensures |current_view| is at the end of data_to_encrypt
BT_DEBUG_ASSERT(current_view.size() == 0);
return AesCmac(mackey, data_to_encrypt);
}
std::optional<uint32_t> G2(const UInt256& initiator_pubkey_x,
const UInt256& responder_pubkey_x,
const UInt128& initiator_nonce,
const UInt128& responder_nonce) {
constexpr size_t kDataLength = 2 * kUInt256Size + kUInt128Size;
StaticByteBuffer<kDataLength> data_to_encrypt;
// Write to buffer in reverse of human-readable spec format as all parameters
// are little-endian.
MutableBufferView current_view =
WriteToBuffer(responder_nonce, data_to_encrypt.mutable_view());
current_view = WriteToBuffer(responder_pubkey_x, current_view);
current_view = WriteToBuffer(initiator_pubkey_x, current_view);
BT_DEBUG_ASSERT(current_view.size() == 0);
std::optional<UInt128> maybe_cmac = AesCmac(initiator_nonce, data_to_encrypt);
if (!maybe_cmac.has_value()) {
return std::nullopt;
}
UInt128 cmac_output = *maybe_cmac;
// Implements the "mod 32" part of G2 on the little-endian output of AES-CMAC.
return uint32_t{cmac_output[3]} << 24 | uint32_t{cmac_output[2]} << 16 |
uint32_t{cmac_output[1]} << 8 | uint32_t{cmac_output[0]};
}
std::optional<UInt128> H6(const UInt128& w, uint32_t key_id) {
StaticByteBuffer<sizeof(key_id)> data_to_encrypt;
data_to_encrypt.WriteObj(key_id);
return AesCmac(w, data_to_encrypt);
}
std::optional<UInt128> H7(const UInt128& salt, const UInt128& w) {
StaticByteBuffer<kUInt128Size> data_to_encrypt;
data_to_encrypt.WriteObj(w);
return AesCmac(salt, data_to_encrypt);
}
std::optional<UInt128> LeLtkToBrEdrLinkKey(
const UInt128& le_ltk, CrossTransportKeyAlgo hash_function) {
std::optional<UInt128> intermediate_key;
if (hash_function == CrossTransportKeyAlgo::kUseH7) {
const UInt128 salt = {0x31,
0x70,
0x6D,
0x74,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00};
intermediate_key = H7(salt, le_ltk);
} else if (hash_function == CrossTransportKeyAlgo::kUseH6) {
// The string "tmp1" mapped into extended ASCII per spec v5.2 Vol. 3 Part
// H 2.4.2.4.
const uint32_t tmp1_key_id = 0x746D7031;
intermediate_key = H6(le_ltk, tmp1_key_id);
} else {
bt_log(WARN,
"sm",
"unexpected CrossTransportKeyAlgo passed to link key generation!");
}
if (!intermediate_key.has_value()) {
return std::nullopt;
}
// The string "lebr" mapped into extended ASCII per spec v5.2 Vol. 3 Part
// H 2.4.2.4.
const uint32_t lebr_key_id = 0x6C656272;
return H6(*intermediate_key, lebr_key_id);
}
} // namespace bt::sm::util