blob: 0886624160c081f07bff74bbcb53e91af61bf11e [file] [log] [blame]
#![cfg_attr(test, allow(dead_code))]
use self::imp::{drop_handler, make_handler};
pub use self::imp::cleanup;
pub use self::imp::init;
pub struct Handler {
data: *mut libc::c_void,
}
impl Handler {
pub unsafe fn new() -> Handler {
make_handler(false)
}
fn null() -> Handler {
Handler { data: crate::ptr::null_mut() }
}
}
impl Drop for Handler {
fn drop(&mut self) {
unsafe {
drop_handler(self.data);
}
}
}
#[cfg(any(
target_os = "linux",
target_os = "freebsd",
target_os = "hurd",
target_os = "macos",
target_os = "netbsd",
target_os = "openbsd",
target_os = "solaris"
))]
mod imp {
use super::Handler;
use crate::cell::Cell;
use crate::io;
use crate::mem;
use crate::ops::Range;
use crate::ptr;
use crate::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicPtr, AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use crate::sys::pal::unix::os;
use crate::thread;
#[cfg(not(all(target_os = "linux", target_env = "gnu")))]
use libc::{mmap as mmap64, mprotect, munmap};
#[cfg(all(target_os = "linux", target_env = "gnu"))]
use libc::{mmap64, mprotect, munmap};
use libc::{sigaction, sighandler_t, SA_ONSTACK, SA_SIGINFO, SIGBUS, SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL};
use libc::{sigaltstack, SS_DISABLE};
use libc::{MAP_ANON, MAP_FAILED, MAP_FIXED, MAP_PRIVATE, PROT_NONE, PROT_READ, PROT_WRITE};
// We use a TLS variable to store the address of the guard page. While TLS
// variables are not guaranteed to be signal-safe, this works out in practice
// since we make sure to write to the variable before the signal stack is
// installed, thereby ensuring that the variable is always allocated when
// the signal handler is called.
thread_local! {
// FIXME: use `Range` once that implements `Copy`.
static GUARD: Cell<(usize, usize)> = const { Cell::new((0, 0)) };
}
// Signal handler for the SIGSEGV and SIGBUS handlers. We've got guard pages
// (unmapped pages) at the end of every thread's stack, so if a thread ends
// up running into the guard page it'll trigger this handler. We want to
// detect these cases and print out a helpful error saying that the stack
// has overflowed. All other signals, however, should go back to what they
// were originally supposed to do.
//
// This handler currently exists purely to print an informative message
// whenever a thread overflows its stack. We then abort to exit and
// indicate a crash, but to avoid a misleading SIGSEGV that might lead
// users to believe that unsafe code has accessed an invalid pointer; the
// SIGSEGV encountered when overflowing the stack is expected and
// well-defined.
//
// If this is not a stack overflow, the handler un-registers itself and
// then returns (to allow the original signal to be delivered again).
// Returning from this kind of signal handler is technically not defined
// to work when reading the POSIX spec strictly, but in practice it turns
// out many large systems and all implementations allow returning from a
// signal handler to work. For a more detailed explanation see the
// comments on #26458.
/// SIGSEGV/SIGBUS entry point
/// # Safety
/// Rust doesn't call this, it *gets called*.
#[forbid(unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn)]
unsafe extern "C" fn signal_handler(
signum: libc::c_int,
info: *mut libc::siginfo_t,
_data: *mut libc::c_void,
) {
let (start, end) = GUARD.get();
// SAFETY: this pointer is provided by the system and will always point to a valid `siginfo_t`.
let addr = unsafe { (*info).si_addr().addr() };
// If the faulting address is within the guard page, then we print a
// message saying so and abort.
if start <= addr && addr < end {
rtprintpanic!(
"\nthread '{}' has overflowed its stack\n",
thread::current().name().unwrap_or("<unknown>")
);
rtabort!("stack overflow");
} else {
// Unregister ourselves by reverting back to the default behavior.
// SAFETY: assuming all platforms define struct sigaction as "zero-initializable"
let mut action: sigaction = unsafe { mem::zeroed() };
action.sa_sigaction = SIG_DFL;
// SAFETY: pray this is a well-behaved POSIX implementation of fn sigaction
unsafe { sigaction(signum, &action, ptr::null_mut()) };
// See comment above for why this function returns.
}
}
static PAGE_SIZE: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
static MAIN_ALTSTACK: AtomicPtr<libc::c_void> = AtomicPtr::new(ptr::null_mut());
static NEED_ALTSTACK: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
pub unsafe fn init() {
PAGE_SIZE.store(os::page_size(), Ordering::Relaxed);
// Always write to GUARD to ensure the TLS variable is allocated.
let guard = install_main_guard().unwrap_or(0..0);
GUARD.set((guard.start, guard.end));
let mut action: sigaction = mem::zeroed();
for &signal in &[SIGSEGV, SIGBUS] {
sigaction(signal, ptr::null_mut(), &mut action);
// Configure our signal handler if one is not already set.
if action.sa_sigaction == SIG_DFL {
action.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_ONSTACK;
action.sa_sigaction = signal_handler as sighandler_t;
sigaction(signal, &action, ptr::null_mut());
NEED_ALTSTACK.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
}
let handler = make_handler(true);
MAIN_ALTSTACK.store(handler.data, Ordering::Relaxed);
mem::forget(handler);
}
pub unsafe fn cleanup() {
drop_handler(MAIN_ALTSTACK.load(Ordering::Relaxed));
}
unsafe fn get_stack() -> libc::stack_t {
// OpenBSD requires this flag for stack mapping
// otherwise the said mapping will fail as a no-op on most systems
// and has a different meaning on FreeBSD
#[cfg(any(
target_os = "openbsd",
target_os = "netbsd",
target_os = "linux",
target_os = "dragonfly",
))]
let flags = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON | libc::MAP_STACK;
#[cfg(not(any(
target_os = "openbsd",
target_os = "netbsd",
target_os = "linux",
target_os = "dragonfly",
)))]
let flags = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON;
let sigstack_size = sigstack_size();
let page_size = PAGE_SIZE.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let stackp = mmap64(
ptr::null_mut(),
sigstack_size + page_size,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
flags,
-1,
0,
);
if stackp == MAP_FAILED {
panic!("failed to allocate an alternative stack: {}", io::Error::last_os_error());
}
let guard_result = libc::mprotect(stackp, page_size, PROT_NONE);
if guard_result != 0 {
panic!("failed to set up alternative stack guard page: {}", io::Error::last_os_error());
}
let stackp = stackp.add(page_size);
libc::stack_t { ss_sp: stackp, ss_flags: 0, ss_size: sigstack_size }
}
pub unsafe fn make_handler(main_thread: bool) -> Handler {
if !NEED_ALTSTACK.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
return Handler::null();
}
if !main_thread {
// Always write to GUARD to ensure the TLS variable is allocated.
let guard = current_guard().unwrap_or(0..0);
GUARD.set((guard.start, guard.end));
}
let mut stack = mem::zeroed();
sigaltstack(ptr::null(), &mut stack);
// Configure alternate signal stack, if one is not already set.
if stack.ss_flags & SS_DISABLE != 0 {
stack = get_stack();
sigaltstack(&stack, ptr::null_mut());
Handler { data: stack.ss_sp as *mut libc::c_void }
} else {
Handler::null()
}
}
pub unsafe fn drop_handler(data: *mut libc::c_void) {
if !data.is_null() {
let sigstack_size = sigstack_size();
let page_size = PAGE_SIZE.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let stack = libc::stack_t {
ss_sp: ptr::null_mut(),
ss_flags: SS_DISABLE,
// Workaround for bug in macOS implementation of sigaltstack
// UNIX2003 which returns ENOMEM when disabling a stack while
// passing ss_size smaller than MINSIGSTKSZ. According to POSIX
// both ss_sp and ss_size should be ignored in this case.
ss_size: sigstack_size,
};
sigaltstack(&stack, ptr::null_mut());
// We know from `get_stackp` that the alternate stack we installed is part of a mapping
// that started one page earlier, so walk back a page and unmap from there.
munmap(data.sub(page_size), sigstack_size + page_size);
}
}
/// Modern kernels on modern hardware can have dynamic signal stack sizes.
#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "android"))]
fn sigstack_size() -> usize {
// FIXME: reuse const from libc when available?
const AT_MINSIGSTKSZ: crate::ffi::c_ulong = 51;
let dynamic_sigstksz = unsafe { libc::getauxval(AT_MINSIGSTKSZ) };
// If getauxval couldn't find the entry, it returns 0,
// so take the higher of the "constant" and auxval.
// This transparently supports older kernels which don't provide AT_MINSIGSTKSZ
libc::SIGSTKSZ.max(dynamic_sigstksz as _)
}
/// Not all OS support hardware where this is needed.
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "android")))]
fn sigstack_size() -> usize {
libc::SIGSTKSZ
}
#[cfg(target_os = "solaris")]
unsafe fn get_stack_start() -> Option<*mut libc::c_void> {
let mut current_stack: libc::stack_t = crate::mem::zeroed();
assert_eq!(libc::stack_getbounds(&mut current_stack), 0);
Some(current_stack.ss_sp)
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
unsafe fn get_stack_start() -> Option<*mut libc::c_void> {
let th = libc::pthread_self();
let stackptr = libc::pthread_get_stackaddr_np(th);
Some(stackptr.map_addr(|addr| addr - libc::pthread_get_stacksize_np(th)))
}
#[cfg(target_os = "openbsd")]
unsafe fn get_stack_start() -> Option<*mut libc::c_void> {
let mut current_stack: libc::stack_t = crate::mem::zeroed();
assert_eq!(libc::pthread_stackseg_np(libc::pthread_self(), &mut current_stack), 0);
let stack_ptr = current_stack.ss_sp;
let stackaddr = if libc::pthread_main_np() == 1 {
// main thread
stack_ptr.addr() - current_stack.ss_size + PAGE_SIZE.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
} else {
// new thread
stack_ptr.addr() - current_stack.ss_size
};
Some(stack_ptr.with_addr(stackaddr))
}
#[cfg(any(
target_os = "android",
target_os = "freebsd",
target_os = "netbsd",
target_os = "hurd",
target_os = "linux",
target_os = "l4re"
))]
unsafe fn get_stack_start() -> Option<*mut libc::c_void> {
let mut ret = None;
let mut attr: libc::pthread_attr_t = crate::mem::zeroed();
#[cfg(target_os = "freebsd")]
assert_eq!(libc::pthread_attr_init(&mut attr), 0);
#[cfg(target_os = "freebsd")]
let e = libc::pthread_attr_get_np(libc::pthread_self(), &mut attr);
#[cfg(not(target_os = "freebsd"))]
let e = libc::pthread_getattr_np(libc::pthread_self(), &mut attr);
if e == 0 {
let mut stackaddr = crate::ptr::null_mut();
let mut stacksize = 0;
assert_eq!(libc::pthread_attr_getstack(&attr, &mut stackaddr, &mut stacksize), 0);
ret = Some(stackaddr);
}
if e == 0 || cfg!(target_os = "freebsd") {
assert_eq!(libc::pthread_attr_destroy(&mut attr), 0);
}
ret
}
unsafe fn get_stack_start_aligned() -> Option<*mut libc::c_void> {
let page_size = PAGE_SIZE.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let stackptr = get_stack_start()?;
let stackaddr = stackptr.addr();
// Ensure stackaddr is page aligned! A parent process might
// have reset RLIMIT_STACK to be non-page aligned. The
// pthread_attr_getstack() reports the usable stack area
// stackaddr < stackaddr + stacksize, so if stackaddr is not
// page-aligned, calculate the fix such that stackaddr <
// new_page_aligned_stackaddr < stackaddr + stacksize
let remainder = stackaddr % page_size;
Some(if remainder == 0 {
stackptr
} else {
stackptr.with_addr(stackaddr + page_size - remainder)
})
}
unsafe fn install_main_guard() -> Option<Range<usize>> {
let page_size = PAGE_SIZE.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
if cfg!(all(target_os = "linux", not(target_env = "musl"))) {
// Linux doesn't allocate the whole stack right away, and
// the kernel has its own stack-guard mechanism to fault
// when growing too close to an existing mapping. If we map
// our own guard, then the kernel starts enforcing a rather
// large gap above that, rendering much of the possible
// stack space useless. See #43052.
//
// Instead, we'll just note where we expect rlimit to start
// faulting, so our handler can report "stack overflow", and
// trust that the kernel's own stack guard will work.
let stackptr = get_stack_start_aligned()?;
let stackaddr = stackptr.addr();
Some(stackaddr - page_size..stackaddr)
} else if cfg!(all(target_os = "linux", target_env = "musl")) {
// For the main thread, the musl's pthread_attr_getstack
// returns the current stack size, rather than maximum size
// it can eventually grow to. It cannot be used to determine
// the position of kernel's stack guard.
None
} else if cfg!(target_os = "freebsd") {
// FreeBSD's stack autogrows, and optionally includes a guard page
// at the bottom. If we try to remap the bottom of the stack
// ourselves, FreeBSD's guard page moves upwards. So we'll just use
// the builtin guard page.
let stackptr = get_stack_start_aligned()?;
let guardaddr = stackptr.addr();
// Technically the number of guard pages is tunable and controlled
// by the security.bsd.stack_guard_page sysctl.
// By default it is 1, checking once is enough since it is
// a boot time config value.
static PAGES: crate::sync::OnceLock<usize> = crate::sync::OnceLock::new();
let pages = PAGES.get_or_init(|| {
use crate::sys::weak::dlsym;
dlsym!(fn sysctlbyname(*const libc::c_char, *mut libc::c_void, *mut libc::size_t, *const libc::c_void, libc::size_t) -> libc::c_int);
let mut guard: usize = 0;
let mut size = crate::mem::size_of_val(&guard);
let oid = crate::ffi::CStr::from_bytes_with_nul(
b"security.bsd.stack_guard_page\0",
)
.unwrap();
match sysctlbyname.get() {
Some(fcn) => {
if fcn(oid.as_ptr(), core::ptr::addr_of_mut!(guard) as *mut _, core::ptr::addr_of_mut!(size) as *mut _, crate::ptr::null_mut(), 0) == 0 {
guard
} else {
1
}
},
_ => 1,
}
});
Some(guardaddr..guardaddr + pages * page_size)
} else if cfg!(any(target_os = "openbsd", target_os = "netbsd")) {
// OpenBSD stack already includes a guard page, and stack is
// immutable.
// NetBSD stack includes the guard page.
//
// We'll just note where we expect rlimit to start
// faulting, so our handler can report "stack overflow", and
// trust that the kernel's own stack guard will work.
let stackptr = get_stack_start_aligned()?;
let stackaddr = stackptr.addr();
Some(stackaddr - page_size..stackaddr)
} else {
// Reallocate the last page of the stack.
// This ensures SIGBUS will be raised on
// stack overflow.
// Systems which enforce strict PAX MPROTECT do not allow
// to mprotect() a mapping with less restrictive permissions
// than the initial mmap() used, so we mmap() here with
// read/write permissions and only then mprotect() it to
// no permissions at all. See issue #50313.
let stackptr = get_stack_start_aligned()?;
let result = mmap64(
stackptr,
page_size,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON | MAP_FIXED,
-1,
0,
);
if result != stackptr || result == MAP_FAILED {
panic!("failed to allocate a guard page: {}", io::Error::last_os_error());
}
let result = mprotect(stackptr, page_size, PROT_NONE);
if result != 0 {
panic!("failed to protect the guard page: {}", io::Error::last_os_error());
}
let guardaddr = stackptr.addr();
Some(guardaddr..guardaddr + page_size)
}
}
#[cfg(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "openbsd", target_os = "solaris"))]
unsafe fn current_guard() -> Option<Range<usize>> {
let stackptr = get_stack_start()?;
let stackaddr = stackptr.addr();
Some(stackaddr - PAGE_SIZE.load(Ordering::Relaxed)..stackaddr)
}
#[cfg(any(
target_os = "android",
target_os = "freebsd",
target_os = "hurd",
target_os = "linux",
target_os = "netbsd",
target_os = "l4re"
))]
unsafe fn current_guard() -> Option<Range<usize>> {
let mut ret = None;
let mut attr: libc::pthread_attr_t = crate::mem::zeroed();
#[cfg(target_os = "freebsd")]
assert_eq!(libc::pthread_attr_init(&mut attr), 0);
#[cfg(target_os = "freebsd")]
let e = libc::pthread_attr_get_np(libc::pthread_self(), &mut attr);
#[cfg(not(target_os = "freebsd"))]
let e = libc::pthread_getattr_np(libc::pthread_self(), &mut attr);
if e == 0 {
let mut guardsize = 0;
assert_eq!(libc::pthread_attr_getguardsize(&attr, &mut guardsize), 0);
if guardsize == 0 {
if cfg!(all(target_os = "linux", target_env = "musl")) {
// musl versions before 1.1.19 always reported guard
// size obtained from pthread_attr_get_np as zero.
// Use page size as a fallback.
guardsize = PAGE_SIZE.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
} else {
panic!("there is no guard page");
}
}
let mut stackptr = crate::ptr::null_mut::<libc::c_void>();
let mut size = 0;
assert_eq!(libc::pthread_attr_getstack(&attr, &mut stackptr, &mut size), 0);
let stackaddr = stackptr.addr();
ret = if cfg!(any(target_os = "freebsd", target_os = "netbsd", target_os = "hurd")) {
Some(stackaddr - guardsize..stackaddr)
} else if cfg!(all(target_os = "linux", target_env = "musl")) {
Some(stackaddr - guardsize..stackaddr)
} else if cfg!(all(target_os = "linux", any(target_env = "gnu", target_env = "uclibc")))
{
// glibc used to include the guard area within the stack, as noted in the BUGS
// section of `man pthread_attr_getguardsize`. This has been corrected starting
// with glibc 2.27, and in some distro backports, so the guard is now placed at the
// end (below) the stack. There's no easy way for us to know which we have at
// runtime, so we'll just match any fault in the range right above or below the
// stack base to call that fault a stack overflow.
Some(stackaddr - guardsize..stackaddr + guardsize)
} else {
Some(stackaddr..stackaddr + guardsize)
};
}
if e == 0 || cfg!(target_os = "freebsd") {
assert_eq!(libc::pthread_attr_destroy(&mut attr), 0);
}
ret
}
}
// This is intentionally not enabled on iOS/tvOS/watchOS/visionOS, as it uses
// several symbols that might lead to rejections from the App Store, namely
// `sigaction`, `sigaltstack`, `sysctlbyname`, `mmap`, `munmap` and `mprotect`.
//
// This might be overly cautious, though it is also what Swift does (and they
// usually have fewer qualms about forwards compatibility, since the runtime
// is shipped with the OS):
// <https://github.com/apple/swift/blob/swift-5.10-RELEASE/stdlib/public/runtime/CrashHandlerMacOS.cpp>
#[cfg(not(any(
target_os = "linux",
target_os = "freebsd",
target_os = "hurd",
target_os = "macos",
target_os = "netbsd",
target_os = "openbsd",
target_os = "solaris"
)))]
mod imp {
pub unsafe fn init() {}
pub unsafe fn cleanup() {}
pub unsafe fn make_handler(_main_thread: bool) -> super::Handler {
super::Handler::null()
}
pub unsafe fn drop_handler(_data: *mut libc::c_void) {}
}