blob: eed6fbf13b7d2f416c9548a9d833c5c57eac50fb [file] [log] [blame]
use crate::mem;
use crate::slice;
pub fn hashmap_random_keys() -> (u64, u64) {
let mut v = (0, 0);
unsafe {
let view = slice::from_raw_parts_mut(&mut v as *mut _ as *mut u8, mem::size_of_val(&v));
imp::fill_bytes(view);
}
v
}
#[cfg(all(
unix,
not(target_os = "macos"),
not(target_os = "ios"),
not(target_os = "openbsd"),
not(target_os = "freebsd"),
not(target_os = "netbsd"),
not(target_os = "fuchsia"),
not(target_os = "redox")
))]
mod imp {
use crate::fs::File;
use crate::io::Read;
#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "android"))]
fn getrandom(buf: &mut [u8]) -> libc::c_long {
unsafe {
libc::syscall(libc::SYS_getrandom, buf.as_mut_ptr(), buf.len(), libc::GRND_NONBLOCK)
}
}
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "android")))]
fn getrandom_fill_bytes(_buf: &mut [u8]) -> bool {
false
}
#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "android"))]
fn getrandom_fill_bytes(v: &mut [u8]) -> bool {
use crate::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use crate::sys::os::errno;
static GETRANDOM_UNAVAILABLE: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
if GETRANDOM_UNAVAILABLE.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
return false;
}
let mut read = 0;
while read < v.len() {
let result = getrandom(&mut v[read..]);
if result == -1 {
let err = errno() as libc::c_int;
if err == libc::EINTR {
continue;
} else if err == libc::ENOSYS || err == libc::EPERM {
// Fall back to reading /dev/urandom if `getrandom` is not
// supported on the current kernel.
//
// Also fall back in case it is disabled by something like
// seccomp or inside of virtual machines.
GETRANDOM_UNAVAILABLE.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
return false;
} else if err == libc::EAGAIN {
return false;
} else {
panic!("unexpected getrandom error: {}", err);
}
} else {
read += result as usize;
}
}
true
}
pub fn fill_bytes(v: &mut [u8]) {
// getrandom_fill_bytes here can fail if getrandom() returns EAGAIN,
// meaning it would have blocked because the non-blocking pool (urandom)
// has not initialized in the kernel yet due to a lack of entropy. The
// fallback we do here is to avoid blocking applications which could
// depend on this call without ever knowing they do and don't have a
// work around. The PRNG of /dev/urandom will still be used but over a
// possibly predictable entropy pool.
if getrandom_fill_bytes(v) {
return;
}
// getrandom failed because it is permanently or temporarily (because
// of missing entropy) unavailable. Open /dev/urandom, read from it,
// and close it again.
let mut file = File::open("/dev/urandom").expect("failed to open /dev/urandom");
file.read_exact(v).expect("failed to read /dev/urandom")
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
mod imp {
use crate::fs::File;
use crate::io::Read;
use crate::sys::os::errno;
use libc::{c_int, c_void, size_t};
fn getentropy_fill_bytes(v: &mut [u8]) -> bool {
weak!(fn getentropy(*mut c_void, size_t) -> c_int);
getentropy
.get()
.map(|f| {
// getentropy(2) permits a maximum buffer size of 256 bytes
for s in v.chunks_mut(256) {
let ret = unsafe { f(s.as_mut_ptr() as *mut c_void, s.len()) };
if ret == -1 {
panic!("unexpected getentropy error: {}", errno());
}
}
true
})
.unwrap_or(false)
}
pub fn fill_bytes(v: &mut [u8]) {
if getentropy_fill_bytes(v) {
return;
}
// for older macos which doesn't support getentropy
let mut file = File::open("/dev/urandom").expect("failed to open /dev/urandom");
file.read_exact(v).expect("failed to read /dev/urandom")
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "openbsd")]
mod imp {
use crate::sys::os::errno;
pub fn fill_bytes(v: &mut [u8]) {
// getentropy(2) permits a maximum buffer size of 256 bytes
for s in v.chunks_mut(256) {
let ret = unsafe { libc::getentropy(s.as_mut_ptr() as *mut libc::c_void, s.len()) };
if ret == -1 {
panic!("unexpected getentropy error: {}", errno());
}
}
}
}
// On iOS and MacOS `SecRandomCopyBytes` calls `CCRandomCopyBytes` with
// `kCCRandomDefault`. `CCRandomCopyBytes` manages a CSPRNG which is seeded
// from `/dev/random` and which runs on its own thread accessed via GCD.
// This seems needlessly heavyweight for the purposes of generating two u64s
// once per thread in `hashmap_random_keys`. Therefore `SecRandomCopyBytes` is
// only used on iOS where direct access to `/dev/urandom` is blocked by the
// sandbox.
#[cfg(target_os = "ios")]
mod imp {
use crate::io;
use crate::ptr;
use libc::{c_int, size_t};
enum SecRandom {}
#[allow(non_upper_case_globals)]
const kSecRandomDefault: *const SecRandom = ptr::null();
extern "C" {
fn SecRandomCopyBytes(rnd: *const SecRandom, count: size_t, bytes: *mut u8) -> c_int;
}
pub fn fill_bytes(v: &mut [u8]) {
let ret = unsafe { SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, v.len(), v.as_mut_ptr()) };
if ret == -1 {
panic!("couldn't generate random bytes: {}", io::Error::last_os_error());
}
}
}
#[cfg(any(target_os = "freebsd", target_os = "netbsd"))]
mod imp {
use crate::ptr;
pub fn fill_bytes(v: &mut [u8]) {
let mib = [libc::CTL_KERN, libc::KERN_ARND];
// kern.arandom permits a maximum buffer size of 256 bytes
for s in v.chunks_mut(256) {
let mut s_len = s.len();
let ret = unsafe {
libc::sysctl(
mib.as_ptr(),
mib.len() as libc::c_uint,
s.as_mut_ptr() as *mut _,
&mut s_len,
ptr::null(),
0,
)
};
if ret == -1 || s_len != s.len() {
panic!(
"kern.arandom sysctl failed! (returned {}, s.len() {}, oldlenp {})",
ret,
s.len(),
s_len
);
}
}
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "fuchsia")]
mod imp {
#[link(name = "zircon")]
extern "C" {
fn zx_cprng_draw(buffer: *mut u8, len: usize);
}
pub fn fill_bytes(v: &mut [u8]) {
unsafe { zx_cprng_draw(v.as_mut_ptr(), v.len()) }
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "redox")]
mod imp {
use crate::fs::File;
use crate::io::Read;
pub fn fill_bytes(v: &mut [u8]) {
// Open rand:, read from it, and close it again.
let mut file = File::open("rand:").expect("failed to open rand:");
file.read_exact(v).expect("failed to read rand:")
}
}