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// Copyright 2015 Brian Smith.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR
// ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
// ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
// OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
//! Utilities for efficiently embedding trust anchors in programs.
use super::der;
use crate::{
cert::{certificate_serial_number, parse_cert_internal, Cert, EndEntityOrCA},
Error, TrustAnchor,
};
/// Interprets the given DER-encoded certificate as a `TrustAnchor`. The
/// certificate is not validated. In particular, there is no check that the
/// certificate is self-signed or even that the certificate has the cA basic
/// constraint.
pub fn cert_der_as_trust_anchor(cert_der: &[u8]) -> Result<TrustAnchor, Error> {
let cert_der = untrusted::Input::from(cert_der);
// XXX: `EndEntityOrCA::EndEntity` is used instead of `EndEntityOrCA::CA`
// because we don't have a reference to a child cert, which is needed for
// `EndEntityOrCA::CA`. For this purpose, it doesn't matter.
//
// v1 certificates will result in `Error::BadDER` because `parse_cert` will
// expect a version field that isn't there. In that case, try to parse the
// certificate using a special parser for v1 certificates. Notably, that
// parser doesn't allow extensions, so there's no need to worry about
// embedded name constraints in a v1 certificate.
match parse_cert_internal(
cert_der,
EndEntityOrCA::EndEntity,
possibly_invalid_certificate_serial_number,
) {
Ok(cert) => Ok(trust_anchor_from_cert(cert)),
Err(Error::BadDER) => parse_cert_v1(cert_der).or(Err(Error::BadDER)),
Err(err) => Err(err),
}
}
fn possibly_invalid_certificate_serial_number<'a>(
input: &mut untrusted::Reader<'a>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.2:
// * Conforming CAs MUST NOT use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets."
// * "The serial number MUST be a positive integer [...]"
//
// However, we don't enforce these constraints on trust anchors, as there
// are widely-deployed trust anchors that violate these constraints.
skip(input, der::Tag::Integer)
}
/// Generates code for hard-coding the given trust anchors into a program. This
/// is designed to be used in a build script. `name` is the name of the public
/// static variable that will contain the TrustAnchor array.
pub fn generate_code_for_trust_anchors(name: &str, trust_anchors: &[TrustAnchor]) -> String {
let decl = format!(
"static {}: [TrustAnchor<'static>; {}] = ",
name,
trust_anchors.len()
);
// "{:?}" formats the array of trust anchors as Rust code, approximately,
// except that it drops the leading "&" on slices.
let value = str::replace(&format!("{:?};\n", trust_anchors), ": [", ": &[");
decl + &value
}
fn trust_anchor_from_cert<'a>(cert: Cert<'a>) -> TrustAnchor<'a> {
TrustAnchor {
subject: cert.subject.as_slice_less_safe(),
spki: cert.spki.as_slice_less_safe(),
name_constraints: cert.name_constraints.map(|nc| nc.as_slice_less_safe()),
}
}
/// Parses a v1 certificate directly into a TrustAnchor.
fn parse_cert_v1<'a>(cert_der: untrusted::Input<'a>) -> Result<TrustAnchor<'a>, Error> {
// X.509 Certificate: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.
cert_der.read_all(Error::BadDER, |cert_der| {
der::nested(cert_der, der::Tag::Sequence, Error::BadDER, |cert_der| {
let anchor = der::nested(cert_der, der::Tag::Sequence, Error::BadDER, |tbs| {
// The version number field does not appear in v1 certificates.
certificate_serial_number(tbs)?;
skip(tbs, der::Tag::Sequence)?; // signature.
skip(tbs, der::Tag::Sequence)?; // issuer.
skip(tbs, der::Tag::Sequence)?; // validity.
let subject = der::expect_tag_and_get_value(tbs, der::Tag::Sequence)?;
let spki = der::expect_tag_and_get_value(tbs, der::Tag::Sequence)?;
Ok(TrustAnchor {
subject: subject.as_slice_less_safe(),
spki: spki.as_slice_less_safe(),
name_constraints: None,
})
});
// read and discard signatureAlgorithm + signature
skip(cert_der, der::Tag::Sequence)?;
skip(cert_der, der::Tag::BitString)?;
anchor
})
})
}
fn skip(input: &mut untrusted::Reader, tag: der::Tag) -> Result<(), Error> {
der::expect_tag_and_get_value(input, tag).map(|_| ())
}