| /* | 
 |  * Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2014 - 2017 | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Design | 
 |  * ====== | 
 |  * | 
 |  * See documentation in doc/ folder. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Interface | 
 |  * ========= | 
 |  * | 
 |  * See documentation in doc/ folder. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * License | 
 |  * ======= | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | 
 |  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | 
 |  * are met: | 
 |  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | 
 |  *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, | 
 |  *    including the disclaimer of warranties. | 
 |  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | 
 |  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | 
 |  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | 
 |  * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote | 
 |  *    products derived from this software without specific prior | 
 |  *    written permission. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of | 
 |  * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 are | 
 |  * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is | 
 |  * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and | 
 |  * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) | 
 |  * | 
 |  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED | 
 |  * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES | 
 |  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF | 
 |  * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE | 
 |  * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR | 
 |  * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT | 
 |  * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR | 
 |  * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF | 
 |  * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT | 
 |  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE | 
 |  * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH | 
 |  * DAMAGE. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Modifications by the Fuchsia Authors, 2017 | 
 |  * ======= | 
 |  * | 
 |  * - Add #include lines for stdlib.h, string.h, and internal.h. | 
 |  * - Change #include line for Zircon file conventions. | 
 |  * - Remove CONFIG_CRYPTO_CPU_JITTERENTROPY_STAT flag. | 
 |  * - Add jent_entropy_collector_init definition. | 
 |  * - Remove '#pragma GCC optimize ("O0")' (not recognized by clang) | 
 |  * - Replace 'min' parameter by 'lfsr_loops_override' and 'mem_loops_override' | 
 |  *   in jent_lfsr_var_stat, and moved comment for jent_lfsr_var_stat to | 
 |  *   jitterentropy.h. | 
 |  * - Add jent_have_clock check to jent_entropy_init. | 
 |  */ | 
 |  | 
 | #undef _FORTIFY_SOURCE | 
 |  | 
 | #include <assert.h> | 
 | #include <lib/jitterentropy/jitterentropy.h> | 
 | #include "internal.h" | 
 | #include <stdlib.h> | 
 | #include <string.h> | 
 |  | 
 |  /* only check optimization in a compilation for real work */ | 
 |  #ifdef __OPTIMIZE__ | 
 |   #error "The CPU Jitter random number generator must not be compiled with optimizations. See documentation. Use the compiler switch -O0 for compiling jitterentropy-base.c." | 
 |  #endif | 
 |  | 
 | #define MAJVERSION 2 /* API / ABI incompatible changes, functional changes that | 
 | 		      * require consumer to be updated (as long as this number | 
 | 		      * is zero, the API is not considered stable and can | 
 | 		      * change without a bump of the major version) */ | 
 | #define MINVERSION 1 /* API compatible, ABI may change, functional | 
 | 		      * enhancements only, consumer can be left unchanged if | 
 | 		      * enhancements are not considered */ | 
 | #define PATCHLEVEL 0 /* API / ABI compatible, no functional changes, no | 
 | 		      * enhancements, bug fixes only */ | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * jent_version() - Return machine-usable version number of jent library | 
 |  * | 
 |  * The function returns a version number that is monotonic increasing | 
 |  * for newer versions. The version numbers are multiples of 100. For example, | 
 |  * version 1.2.3 is converted to 1020300 -- the last two digits are reserved | 
 |  * for future use. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * The result of this function can be used in comparing the version number | 
 |  * in a calling program if version-specific calls need to be make. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Return: Version number of kcapi library | 
 |  */ | 
 | JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC | 
 | unsigned int jent_version(void) | 
 | { | 
 | 	unsigned int version = 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 	version =  MAJVERSION * 1000000; | 
 | 	version += MINVERSION * 10000; | 
 | 	version += PATCHLEVEL * 100; | 
 |  | 
 | 	return version; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * Update of the loop count used for the next round of | 
 |  * an entropy collection. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Input: | 
 |  * @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL | 
 |  * @bits is the number of low bits of the timer to consider | 
 |  * @min is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at | 
 |  * 	the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @return Newly calculated loop counter | 
 |  */ | 
 | static uint64_t jent_loop_shuffle(struct rand_data *ec, | 
 | 				  unsigned int bits, unsigned int min) | 
 | { | 
 | 	uint64_t time = 0; | 
 | 	uint64_t shuffle = 0; | 
 | 	unsigned int i = 0; | 
 | 	unsigned int mask = (1<<bits) - 1; | 
 |  | 
 | 	jent_get_nstime(&time); | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Mix the current state of the random number into the shuffle | 
 | 	 * calculation to balance that shuffle a bit more. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (ec) | 
 | 		time ^= ec->data; | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * We fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many | 
 | 	 * bits of the time stamp are included as possible. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	for (i = 0; (DATA_SIZE_BITS / bits) > i; i++) { | 
 | 		shuffle ^= time & mask; | 
 | 		time = time >> bits; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * We add a lower boundary value to ensure we have a minimum | 
 | 	 * RNG loop count. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	return (shuffle + (1<<min)); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /*************************************************************************** | 
 |  * Noise sources | 
 |  ***************************************************************************/ | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * CPU Jitter noise source -- this is the noise source based on the CPU | 
 |  * 			      execution time jitter | 
 |  * | 
 |  * This function injects the individual bits of the time value into the | 
 |  * entropy pool using an LFSR. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * The code is deliberately inefficient with respect to the bit shifting | 
 |  * and shall stay that way. This function is the root cause why the code | 
 |  * shall be compiled without optimization. This function not only acts as | 
 |  * folding operation, but this function's execution is used to measure | 
 |  * the CPU execution time jitter. Any change to the loop in this function | 
 |  * implies that careful retesting must be done. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Input: | 
 |  * @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL | 
 |  * @time time stamp to be injected | 
 |  * @loop_cnt if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as number of | 
 |  *	     loops to perform the folding | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Output: | 
 |  * updated ec->data | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @return Number of loops the folding operation is performed | 
 |  */ | 
 | static uint64_t jent_lfsr_time(struct rand_data *ec, uint64_t time, | 
 | 			       uint64_t loop_cnt) | 
 | { | 
 | 	unsigned int i; | 
 | 	uint64_t j = 0; | 
 | 	uint64_t new = 0; | 
 | #define MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 4 | 
 | #define MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 0 | 
 |  | 
 | 	// loop_cnt is normally passed as 0, where a loop_cnt is decided by a function | 
 | 	// based on current time. This may trick the entropy estimate program to | 
 | 	// overestimate entropy. So it is not used in Fuchsia. Instead loop_cnt | 
 | 	// is set by caller. | 
 | 	uint64_t fold_loop_cnt = loop_cnt; | 
 | 	if (fold_loop_cnt == 0) { | 
 | 		fold_loop_cnt = jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT, MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	for (j = 0; j < fold_loop_cnt; j++) { | 
 | 		new = ec->data; | 
 | 		for (i = 1; (DATA_SIZE_BITS) >= i; i++) { | 
 | 			uint64_t tmp = time << (DATA_SIZE_BITS - i); | 
 |  | 
 | 			tmp = tmp >> (DATA_SIZE_BITS - 1); | 
 |  | 
 | 			/* | 
 | 			* Fibonacci LSFR with polynomial of | 
 | 			*  x^64 + x^61 + x^56 + x^31 + x^28 + x^23 + 1 which is | 
 | 			*  primitive according to | 
 | 			*   http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~ezivkovm/publications/primpol1.pdf | 
 | 			* (the shift values are the polynomial values minus one | 
 | 			* due to counting bits from 0 to 63). As the current | 
 | 			* position is always the LSB, the polynomial only needs | 
 | 			* to shift data in from the left without wrap. | 
 | 			*/ | 
 | 			new ^= tmp; | 
 | 			new ^= ((new >> 63) & 1); | 
 | 			new ^= ((new >> 60) & 1); | 
 | 			new ^= ((new >> 55) & 1); | 
 | 			new ^= ((new >> 30) & 1); | 
 | 			new ^= ((new >> 27) & 1); | 
 | 			new ^= ((new >> 22) & 1); | 
 | 			new = rol64(new, 1); | 
 | 		} | 
 | 	} | 
 | 	ec->data = new; | 
 |  | 
 | 	return fold_loop_cnt; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * Memory Access noise source -- this is a noise source based on variations in | 
 |  * 				 memory access times | 
 |  * | 
 |  * This function performs memory accesses which will add to the timing | 
 |  * variations due to an unknown amount of CPU wait states that need to be | 
 |  * added when accessing memory. The memory size should be larger than the L1 | 
 |  * caches as outlined in the documentation and the associated testing. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * The L1 cache has a very high bandwidth, albeit its access rate is  usually | 
 |  * slower than accessing CPU registers. Therefore, L1 accesses only add minimal | 
 |  * variations as the CPU has hardly to wait. Starting with L2, significant | 
 |  * variations are added because L2 typically does not belong to the CPU any more | 
 |  * and therefore a wider range of CPU wait states is necessary for accesses. | 
 |  * L3 and real memory accesses have even a wider range of wait states. However, | 
 |  * to reliably access either L3 or memory, the ec->mem memory must be quite | 
 |  * large which is usually not desirable. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Input: | 
 |  * @ec Reference to the entropy collector with the memory access data -- if | 
 |  *     the reference to the memory block to be accessed is NULL, this noise | 
 |  *     source is disabled | 
 |  * @loop_cnt if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as number of | 
 |  *	     loops to perform the folding | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @return Number of memory access operations | 
 |  */ | 
 | static unsigned int jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, uint64_t loop_cnt) | 
 | { | 
 | 	unsigned int wrap = 0; | 
 | 	uint64_t i = 0; | 
 | #define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7 | 
 | #define MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT 0 | 
 |  | 
 | 	// loop_cnt is normally passed as 0, where a loop_cnt is decided by a function | 
 | 	// based on current time. This may trick the entropy estimate program to | 
 | 	// overestimate entropy. So it is not used in Fuchsia. Instead loop_cnt | 
 | 	// is set by caller. | 
 | 	uint64_t acc_loop_cnt = loop_cnt; | 
 | 	if (acc_loop_cnt == 0) { | 
 | 		acc_loop_cnt = jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (NULL == ec || NULL == ec->mem) | 
 | 		return 0; | 
 | 	wrap = ec->memblocksize * ec->memblocks; | 
 |  | 
 | 	for (i = 0; i < (ec->memaccessloops + acc_loop_cnt); i++) { | 
 | 		unsigned char *tmpval = ec->mem + ec->memlocation; | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * memory access: just add 1 to one byte, | 
 | 		 * wrap at 255 -- memory access implies read | 
 | 		 * from and write to memory location | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		*tmpval = (*tmpval + 1) & 0xff; | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * Addition of memblocksize - 1 to pointer | 
 | 		 * with wrap around logic to ensure that every | 
 | 		 * memory location is hit evenly | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation + ec->memblocksize - 1; | 
 | 		ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation % wrap; | 
 | 	} | 
 | 	return i; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /*************************************************************************** | 
 |  * Start of entropy processing logic | 
 |  ***************************************************************************/ | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * Stuck test by checking the: | 
 |  * 	1st derivation of the jitter measurement (time delta) | 
 |  * 	2nd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of time deltas) | 
 |  * 	3rd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of delta of time deltas) | 
 |  * | 
 |  * All values must always be non-zero. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Input: | 
 |  * @ec Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  * @current_delta Jitter time delta | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @return | 
 |  * 	0 jitter measurement not stuck (good bit) | 
 |  * 	1 jitter measurement stuck (reject bit) | 
 |  */ | 
 | static int jent_stuck(struct rand_data *ec, uint64_t current_delta) | 
 | { | 
 | 	int64_t delta2 = ec->last_delta - current_delta; | 
 | 	int64_t delta3 = delta2 - ec->last_delta2; | 
 |  | 
 | 	ec->last_delta = current_delta; | 
 | 	ec->last_delta2 = delta2; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!current_delta || !delta2 || !delta3) | 
 | 		return 1; | 
 |  | 
 | 	return 0; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * This is the heart of the entropy generation: calculate time deltas and | 
 |  * use the CPU jitter in the time deltas. The jitter is injected into the | 
 |  * entropy pool. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * WARNING: ensure that ->prev_time is primed before using the output | 
 |  * 	    of this function! This can be done by calling this function | 
 |  * 	    and not using its result. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Input: | 
 |  * @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @return: result of stuck test | 
 |  */ | 
 | static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec) | 
 | { | 
 | 	uint64_t time = 0; | 
 | 	uint64_t current_delta = 0; | 
 | 	int stuck; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* Invoke one noise source before time measurement to add variations */ | 
 | 	jent_memaccess(ec, 0); | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Get time stamp and calculate time delta to previous | 
 | 	 * invocation to measure the timing variations | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	jent_get_nstime(&time); | 
 | 	current_delta = time - ec->prev_time; | 
 | 	ec->prev_time = time; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* Now call the next noise sources which also injects the data */ | 
 | 	jent_lfsr_time(ec, current_delta, 0); | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* Check whether we have a stuck measurement. */ | 
 | 	stuck = jent_stuck(ec, current_delta); | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Rotate the data buffer by a prime number (any odd number would | 
 | 	 * do) to ensure that every bit position of the input time stamp | 
 | 	 * has an even chance of being merged with a bit position in the | 
 | 	 * entropy pool. We do not use one here as the adjacent bits in | 
 | 	 * successive time deltas may have some form of dependency. The | 
 | 	 * chosen value of 7 implies that the low 7 bits of the next | 
 | 	 * time delta value is concatenated with the current time delta. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (!stuck) | 
 | 		ec->data = rol64(ec->data, 7); | 
 |  | 
 | 	return stuck; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * Shuffle the pool a bit by mixing some value with a bijective function (XOR) | 
 |  * into the pool. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * The function generates a mixer value that depends on the bits set and the | 
 |  * location of the set bits in the random number generated by the entropy | 
 |  * source. Therefore, based on the generated random number, this mixer value | 
 |  * can have 2**64 different values. That mixer value is initialized with the | 
 |  * first two SHA-1 constants. After obtaining the mixer value, it is XORed into | 
 |  * the random number. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * The mixer value is not assumed to contain any entropy. But due to the XOR | 
 |  * operation, it can also not destroy any entropy present in the entropy pool. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Input: | 
 |  * @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  */ | 
 | static void jent_stir_pool(struct rand_data *entropy_collector) | 
 | { | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * to shut up GCC on 32 bit, we have to initialize the 64 variable | 
 | 	 * with two 32 bit variables | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	union c { | 
 | 		uint64_t uint64; | 
 | 		uint32_t uint32[2]; | 
 | 	}; | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * This constant is derived from the first two 32 bit initialization | 
 | 	 * vectors of SHA-1 as defined in FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1 | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	union c constant; | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * The start value of the mixer variable is derived from the third | 
 | 	 * and fourth 32 bit initialization vector of SHA-1 as defined in | 
 | 	 * FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1 | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	union c mixer; | 
 | 	unsigned int i = 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* Ensure that the function implements a constant time operation. */ | 
 | 	union c throw_away; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Store the SHA-1 constants in reverse order to make up the 64 bit | 
 | 	 * value -- this applies to a little endian system, on a big endian | 
 | 	 * system, it reverses as expected. But this really does not matter | 
 | 	 * as we do not rely on the specific numbers. We just pick the SHA-1 | 
 | 	 * constants as they have a good mix of bit set and unset. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	constant.uint32[1] = 0x67452301; | 
 | 	constant.uint32[0] = 0xefcdab89; | 
 | 	mixer.uint32[1] = 0x98badcfe; | 
 | 	mixer.uint32[0] = 0x10325476; | 
 |  | 
 | 	for (i = 0; i < DATA_SIZE_BITS; i++) { | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * get the i-th bit of the input random number and only XOR | 
 | 		 * the constant into the mixer value when that bit is set | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if ((entropy_collector->data >> i) & 1) | 
 | 			mixer.uint64 ^= constant.uint64; | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			throw_away.uint64 ^= constant.uint64; | 
 | 		mixer.uint64 = rol64(mixer.uint64, 1); | 
 | 	} | 
 | 	entropy_collector->data ^= mixer.uint64; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * Generator of one 64 bit random number | 
 |  * Function fills rand_data->data | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Input: | 
 |  * @ec Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  */ | 
 | static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand_data *ec) | 
 | { | 
 | 	unsigned int k = 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* priming of the ->prev_time value */ | 
 | 	jent_measure_jitter(ec); | 
 |  | 
 | 	while (1) { | 
 | 		/* If a stuck measurement is received, repeat measurement */ | 
 | 		if (jent_measure_jitter(ec)) | 
 | 			continue; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * We multiply the loop value with ->osr to obtain the | 
 | 		 * oversampling rate requested by the caller | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if (++k >= (DATA_SIZE_BITS * ec->osr)) | 
 | 			break; | 
 | 	} | 
 | 	if (ec->stir) | 
 | 		jent_stir_pool(ec); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * The continuous test required by FIPS 140-2 -- the function automatically | 
 |  * primes the test if needed. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Return: | 
 |  * 0 if FIPS test passed | 
 |  * < 0 if FIPS test failed | 
 |  */ | 
 | static int jent_fips_test(struct rand_data *ec) | 
 | { | 
 | 	if (ec->fips_enabled == -1) | 
 | 		return 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (ec->fips_enabled == 0) { | 
 | 		if (!jent_fips_enabled()) { | 
 | 			ec->fips_enabled = -1; | 
 | 			return 0; | 
 | 		} else | 
 | 			ec->fips_enabled = 1; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* prime the FIPS test */ | 
 | 	if (!ec->old_data) { | 
 | 		ec->old_data = ec->data; | 
 | 		jent_gen_entropy(ec); | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (ec->data == ec->old_data) | 
 | 		return -1; | 
 |  | 
 | 	ec->old_data = ec->data; | 
 |  | 
 | 	return 0; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /** | 
 |  * Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * This function invokes the entropy gathering logic as often to generate | 
 |  * as many bytes as requested by the caller. The entropy gathering logic | 
 |  * creates 64 bit per invocation. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * This function truncates the last 64 bit entropy value output to the exact | 
 |  * size specified by the caller. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Input: | 
 |  * @ec Reference to entropy collector | 
 |  * @data pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must already | 
 |  *        exist | 
 |  * @len size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random | 
 |  *       in bytes | 
 |  * | 
 |  * @return number of bytes returned when request is fulfilled or an error | 
 |  * | 
 |  * The following error codes can occur: | 
 |  *	-1	entropy_collector is NULL | 
 |  *	-2	FIPS test failed | 
 |  */ | 
 | JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC | 
 | ssize_t jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, char *data, size_t len) | 
 | { | 
 | 	char *p = data; | 
 | 	size_t orig_len = len; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (NULL == ec) | 
 | 		return -1; | 
 |  | 
 | 	while (0 < len) { | 
 | 		size_t tocopy; | 
 |  | 
 | 		jent_gen_entropy(ec); | 
 | 		if (jent_fips_test(ec)) | 
 | 			return -2; | 
 |  | 
 | 		if ((DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8) < len) | 
 | 			tocopy = (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8); | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			tocopy = len; | 
 | 		memcpy(p, &ec->data, tocopy); | 
 |  | 
 | 		len -= tocopy; | 
 | 		p += tocopy; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * To be on the safe side, we generate one more round of entropy | 
 | 	 * which we do not give out to the caller. That round shall ensure | 
 | 	 * that in case the calling application crashes, memory dumps, pages | 
 | 	 * out, or due to the CPU Jitter RNG lingering in memory for long | 
 | 	 * time without being moved and an attacker cracks the application, | 
 | 	 * all he reads in the entropy pool is a value that is NEVER EVER | 
 | 	 * being used for anything. Thus, he does NOT see the previous value | 
 | 	 * that was returned to the caller for cryptographic purposes. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * If we use secured memory, do not use that precaution as the secure | 
 | 	 * memory protects the entropy pool. Moreover, note that using this | 
 | 	 * call reduces the speed of the RNG by up to half | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | #ifndef CONFIG_CRYPTO_CPU_JITTERENTROPY_SECURE_MEMORY | 
 | 	jent_gen_entropy(ec); | 
 | #endif | 
 | 	return orig_len; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /*************************************************************************** | 
 |  * Initialization logic | 
 |  ***************************************************************************/ | 
 |  | 
 | JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC | 
 | struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr, | 
 | 					       unsigned int flags) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct rand_data *entropy_collector; | 
 |  | 
 | 	entropy_collector = jent_zalloc(sizeof(struct rand_data)); | 
 | 	if (NULL == entropy_collector) | 
 | 		return NULL; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) { | 
 | 		/* Allocate memory for adding variations based on memory | 
 | 		 * access | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		entropy_collector->mem =  | 
 | 			(unsigned char *)jent_zalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE); | 
 | 		if (NULL == entropy_collector->mem) { | 
 | 			jent_zfree(entropy_collector, sizeof(struct rand_data)); | 
 | 			return NULL; | 
 | 		} | 
 | 		entropy_collector->memblocksize = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE; | 
 | 		entropy_collector->memblocks = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS; | 
 | 		entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* verify and set the oversampling rate */ | 
 | 	if (0 == osr) | 
 | 		osr = 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */ | 
 | 	entropy_collector->osr = osr; | 
 |  | 
 | 	entropy_collector->stir = 1; | 
 | 	if (flags & JENT_DISABLE_STIR) | 
 | 		entropy_collector->stir = 0; | 
 | 	if (flags & JENT_DISABLE_UNBIAS) | 
 | 		entropy_collector->disable_unbias = 1; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* fill the data pad with non-zero values */ | 
 | 	jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector); | 
 |  | 
 | 	return entropy_collector; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC | 
 | void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector) | 
 | { | 
 | 	if (NULL != entropy_collector) { | 
 | 		if (NULL != entropy_collector->mem) { | 
 | 			jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem, JENT_MEMORY_SIZE); | 
 | 			entropy_collector->mem = NULL; | 
 | 		} | 
 | 		jent_zfree(entropy_collector, sizeof(struct rand_data)); | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC | 
 | int jent_entropy_init(void) | 
 | { | 
 | 	int i; | 
 | 	uint64_t delta_sum = 0; | 
 | 	uint64_t old_delta = 0; | 
 | 	int time_backwards = 0; | 
 | 	int count_mod = 0; | 
 | 	int count_stuck = 0; | 
 | 	struct rand_data ec; | 
 |  | 
 | 	if (!jent_have_clock()) { | 
 | 		return ENOTIME; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is | 
 | 	 * that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These | 
 | 	 * loop counts may show some slight skew and we produce | 
 | 	 * false positives. | 
 | 	 * | 
 | 	 * Moreover, only old systems show potentially problematic | 
 | 	 * jitter entropy that could potentially be caught here. But | 
 | 	 * the RNG is intended for hardware that is available or widely | 
 | 	 * used, but not old systems that are long out of favor. Thus, | 
 | 	 * no statistical tests. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * We could add a check for system capabilities such as clock_getres or | 
 | 	 * check for CONFIG_X86_TSC, but it does not make much sense as the | 
 | 	 * following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution | 
 | 	 * timer. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge systems. 100 is | 
 | 	 * definitely too little. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | #define TESTLOOPCOUNT 300 | 
 | #define CLEARCACHE 100 | 
 | 	for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) { | 
 | 		uint64_t time = 0; | 
 | 		uint64_t time2 = 0; | 
 | 		uint64_t delta = 0; | 
 | 		unsigned int lowdelta = 0; | 
 | 		int stuck; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* Invoke core entropy collection logic */ | 
 | 		jent_get_nstime(&time); | 
 | 		ec.prev_time = time; | 
 | 		jent_lfsr_time(&ec, time, 0); | 
 | 		jent_get_nstime(&time2); | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* test whether timer works */ | 
 | 		if (!time || !time2) | 
 | 			return ENOTIME; | 
 | 		delta = time2 - time; | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide | 
 | 		 * delta even when called shortly after each other -- this | 
 | 		 * implies that we also have a high resolution timer | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if (!delta) | 
 | 			return ECOARSETIME; | 
 |  | 
 | 		stuck = jent_stuck(&ec, delta); | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * up to here we did not modify any variable that will be | 
 | 		 * evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we | 
 | 		 * already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction, | 
 | 		 * etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case | 
 | 		 * measurements. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if (CLEARCACHE > i) | 
 | 			continue; | 
 |  | 
 | 		if (stuck) | 
 | 			count_stuck++; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* test whether we have an increasing timer */ | 
 | 		if (!(time2 > time)) | 
 | 			time_backwards++; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* use 32 bit value to ensure compilation on 32 bit arches */ | 
 | 		lowdelta = time2 - time; | 
 | 		if (!(lowdelta % 100)) | 
 | 			count_mod++; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* | 
 | 		 * ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary | 
 | 		 * for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check | 
 | 		 * only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime | 
 | 		 * the old_data value | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		if (delta > old_delta) | 
 | 			delta_sum += (delta - old_delta); | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			delta_sum += (old_delta - delta); | 
 | 		old_delta = delta; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * we allow up to three times the time running backwards. | 
 | 	 * CLOCK_REALTIME is affected by adjtime and NTP operations. Thus, | 
 | 	 * if such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it | 
 | 	 * should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being | 
 | 	 * performed during our test run. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (3 < time_backwards) | 
 | 		return ENOMONOTONIC; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger | 
 | 	 * than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation | 
 | 	 * implied with 1 is preserved | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if ((delta_sum) <= 1) | 
 | 		return EMINVARVAR; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at least | 
 | 	 * 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter increments in | 
 | 	 * multiples of 100, but not always | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_mod) | 
 | 		return ECOARSETIME; | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* | 
 | 	 * If we have more than 90% stuck results, then this Jitter RNG is | 
 | 	 * likely to not work well. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	if (JENT_STUCK_INIT_THRES(TESTLOOPCOUNT) < count_stuck) | 
 | 		return ESTUCK; | 
 |  | 
 | 	return 0; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /*************************************************************************** | 
 |  * Statistical test logic not compiled for regular operation | 
 |  ***************************************************************************/ | 
 |  | 
 | JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC | 
 | uint64_t jent_lfsr_var_stat(struct rand_data *ec, | 
 |                             unsigned int lfsr_loops_override, | 
 |                             unsigned int mem_loops_override) | 
 | { | 
 | 	uint64_t time = 0; | 
 | 	uint64_t time2 = 0; | 
 |  | 
 | 	jent_get_nstime(&time); | 
 | 	jent_memaccess(ec, mem_loops_override); | 
 | 	jent_lfsr_time(ec, time, lfsr_loops_override); | 
 | 	jent_get_nstime(&time2); | 
 | 	return ((time2 - time)); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /*************************************************************************** | 
 |  * Zircon interface | 
 |  ***************************************************************************/ | 
 |  | 
 | void jent_entropy_collector_init( | 
 |         struct rand_data* ec, uint8_t* mem, size_t mem_size, | 
 |         unsigned int mem_block_size, unsigned int mem_block_count, | 
 |         unsigned int mem_loops, bool stir) { | 
 |     DEBUG_ASSERT(((size_t)mem_block_size) * mem_block_count <= mem_size); | 
 |     memset(ec, 0, sizeof(*ec)); | 
 |     /* Oversample rate. The jitterentropy man page (not included with Zircon) | 
 |      * suggests a value of 1. Higher values cause jitterentropy to discount its | 
 |      * entropy estimates by a factor of osr, so that more random bytes are | 
 |      * collected than would be with osr == 1. */ | 
 |     ec->osr = 1; | 
 |     /* For now, we don't enable the FIPS 140-2 test mode built into | 
 |      * jitterentropy. Zircon should handle entropy source health tests itself, | 
 |      * to ensure uniform testing of all entropy sources. */ | 
 |     ec->fips_enabled = 0; | 
 |     ec->stir = stir; | 
 |     /* von Neumann unbiasing is never performed, and the disable_unbias flag is | 
 |      * never even checked. To avoid confusion, always set the flag to true. */ | 
 |     ec->disable_unbias = true; | 
 |     ec->mem = mem; | 
 |     ec->memlocation = 0; | 
 |     ec->memblocks = mem_block_count; | 
 |     ec->memblocksize = mem_block_size; | 
 |     ec->memaccessloops = mem_loops; | 
 | } |