WARNING.RNG - third_party/openssh-portable - Git at Google

 This document contains a description of portable OpenSSH's random
 number collection code. An alternate reading of this text could
 well be titled "Why I should pressure my system vendor to supply
 /dev/random in their OS".

 Why is this important? OpenSSH depends on good, unpredictable numbers
 for generating keys, performing digital signatures and forming
 cryptographic challenges. If the random numbers that it uses are
 predictable, then the strength of the whole system is compromised.

 A particularly pernicious problem arises with DSA keys (used by the
 ssh2 protocol). Performing a DSA signature (which is required for
 authentication), entails the use of a 160 bit random number.  If an
 attacker can predict this number, then they can deduce your *private*
 key and impersonate you or your hosts.

 If you are using the builtin random number support (configure will
 tell you if this is the case), then read this document in its entirety.
 Alternately, you can use Lutz Jaenicke's PRNGd - a small daemon which
 collects random numbers and makes them available by a socket.

 Please also request that your OS vendor provides a kernel-based random
 number collector (/dev/random) in future versions of your operating
 systems by default.

 On to the description...

 The portable OpenSSH contains random number collection support for
 systems which lack a kernel entropy pool (/dev/random).

 This collector operates by executing the programs listed in
 ($etcdir)/ssh_prng_cmds, reading their output and adding it to the
 PRNG supplied by OpenSSL (which is hash-based). It also stirs in the
 output of several system calls and timings from the execution of the
 programs that it runs.

 The ssh_prng_cmds file also specifies a 'rate' for each program. This
 represents the number of bits of randomness per byte of output from
 the specified program.

 The random number code will also read and save a seed file to
 ~/.ssh/prng_seed. This contents of this file are added to the random
 number generator at startup. The goal here is to maintain as much
 randomness between sessions as possible.

 The entropy collection code has two main problems:

 1. It is slow.

 Executing each program in the list can take a large amount of time,
 especially on slower machines. Additionally some program can take a
 disproportionate time to execute.

 This can be tuned by the administrator. To debug the entropy
 collection is great detail, turn on full debugging ("ssh -v -v -v" or
 "sshd -d -d -d"). This will list each program as it is executed, how
 long it took to execute, its exit status and whether and how much data
 it generated. You can the find the culprit programs which are causing
 the real slow-downs.

 The entropy collector will timeout programs which take too long
 to execute, the actual timeout used can be adjusted with the
 --with-entropy-timeout configure option. OpenSSH will not try to
 re-execute programs which have not been found, have had a non-zero
 exit status or have timed out more than a couple of times.

 2. Estimating the real 'rate' of program outputs is non-trivial

 The shear volume of the task is problematic: there are currently
 around 50 commands in the ssh_prng_cmds list, portable OpenSSH
 supports at least 12 different OSs. That is already 600 sets of data
 to be analysed, without taking into account the numerous differences
 between versions of each OS.

 On top of this, the different commands can produce varying amounts of
 usable data depending on how busy the machine is, how long it has been
 up and various other factors.

 To make matters even more complex, some of the commands are reporting
 largely the same data as other commands (eg. the various "ps" calls).

 $Id: WARNING.RNG,v 1.4 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $
	This document contains a description of portable OpenSSH's random
	number collection code. An alternate reading of this text could
	well be titled "Why I should pressure my system vendor to supply
	/dev/random in their OS".

	Why is this important? OpenSSH depends on good, unpredictable numbers
	for generating keys, performing digital signatures and forming
	cryptographic challenges. If the random numbers that it uses are
	predictable, then the strength of the whole system is compromised.

	A particularly pernicious problem arises with DSA keys (used by the
	ssh2 protocol). Performing a DSA signature (which is required for
	authentication), entails the use of a 160 bit random number. If an
	attacker can predict this number, then they can deduce your private
	key and impersonate you or your hosts.

	If you are using the builtin random number support (configure will
	tell you if this is the case), then read this document in its entirety.
	Alternately, you can use Lutz Jaenicke's PRNGd - a small daemon which
	collects random numbers and makes them available by a socket.

	Please also request that your OS vendor provides a kernel-based random
	number collector (/dev/random) in future versions of your operating
	systems by default.

	On to the description...

	The portable OpenSSH contains random number collection support for
	systems which lack a kernel entropy pool (/dev/random).

	This collector operates by executing the programs listed in
	($etcdir)/ssh_prng_cmds, reading their output and adding it to the
	PRNG supplied by OpenSSL (which is hash-based). It also stirs in the
	output of several system calls and timings from the execution of the
	programs that it runs.

	The ssh_prng_cmds file also specifies a 'rate' for each program. This
	represents the number of bits of randomness per byte of output from
	the specified program.

	The random number code will also read and save a seed file to
	~/.ssh/prng_seed. This contents of this file are added to the random
	number generator at startup. The goal here is to maintain as much
	randomness between sessions as possible.

	The entropy collection code has two main problems:

	1. It is slow.

	Executing each program in the list can take a large amount of time,
	especially on slower machines. Additionally some program can take a
	disproportionate time to execute.

	This can be tuned by the administrator. To debug the entropy
	collection is great detail, turn on full debugging ("ssh -v -v -v" or
	"sshd -d -d -d"). This will list each program as it is executed, how
	long it took to execute, its exit status and whether and how much data
	it generated. You can the find the culprit programs which are causing
	the real slow-downs.

	The entropy collector will timeout programs which take too long
	to execute, the actual timeout used can be adjusted with the
	--with-entropy-timeout configure option. OpenSSH will not try to
	re-execute programs which have not been found, have had a non-zero
	exit status or have timed out more than a couple of times.

	2. Estimating the real 'rate' of program outputs is non-trivial

	The shear volume of the task is problematic: there are currently
	around 50 commands in the ssh_prng_cmds list, portable OpenSSH
	supports at least 12 different OSs. That is already 600 sets of data
	to be analysed, without taking into account the numerous differences
	between versions of each OS.

	On top of this, the different commands can produce varying amounts of
	usable data depending on how busy the machine is, how long it has been
	up and various other factors.

	To make matters even more complex, some of the commands are reporting
	largely the same data as other commands (eg. the various "ps" calls).

	$Id: WARNING.RNG,v 1.4 2001/02/09 01:55:36 djm Exp $