blob: 24989e9f5346a482a55c5e8f5e905a8d5c0f68d2 [file] [log] [blame]
package configs
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"os/exec"
"time"
"github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/specs-go"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
type Rlimit struct {
Type int `json:"type"`
Hard uint64 `json:"hard"`
Soft uint64 `json:"soft"`
}
// IDMap represents UID/GID Mappings for User Namespaces.
type IDMap struct {
ContainerID int `json:"container_id"`
HostID int `json:"host_id"`
Size int `json:"size"`
}
// Seccomp represents syscall restrictions
// By default, only the native architecture of the kernel is allowed to be used
// for syscalls. Additional architectures can be added by specifying them in
// Architectures.
type Seccomp struct {
DefaultAction Action `json:"default_action"`
Architectures []string `json:"architectures"`
Syscalls []*Syscall `json:"syscalls"`
}
// Action is taken upon rule match in Seccomp
type Action int
const (
Kill Action = iota + 1
Errno
Trap
Allow
Trace
Log
)
// Operator is a comparison operator to be used when matching syscall arguments in Seccomp
type Operator int
const (
EqualTo Operator = iota + 1
NotEqualTo
GreaterThan
GreaterThanOrEqualTo
LessThan
LessThanOrEqualTo
MaskEqualTo
)
// Arg is a rule to match a specific syscall argument in Seccomp
type Arg struct {
Index uint `json:"index"`
Value uint64 `json:"value"`
ValueTwo uint64 `json:"value_two"`
Op Operator `json:"op"`
}
// Syscall is a rule to match a syscall in Seccomp
type Syscall struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Action Action `json:"action"`
Args []*Arg `json:"args"`
}
// TODO Windows. Many of these fields should be factored out into those parts
// which are common across platforms, and those which are platform specific.
// Config defines configuration options for executing a process inside a contained environment.
type Config struct {
// NoPivotRoot will use MS_MOVE and a chroot to jail the process into the container's rootfs
// This is a common option when the container is running in ramdisk
NoPivotRoot bool `json:"no_pivot_root"`
// ParentDeathSignal specifies the signal that is sent to the container's process in the case
// that the parent process dies.
ParentDeathSignal int `json:"parent_death_signal"`
// Path to a directory containing the container's root filesystem.
Rootfs string `json:"rootfs"`
// Readonlyfs will remount the container's rootfs as readonly where only externally mounted
// bind mounts are writtable.
Readonlyfs bool `json:"readonlyfs"`
// Specifies the mount propagation flags to be applied to /.
RootPropagation int `json:"rootPropagation"`
// Mounts specify additional source and destination paths that will be mounted inside the container's
// rootfs and mount namespace if specified
Mounts []*Mount `json:"mounts"`
// The device nodes that should be automatically created within the container upon container start. Note, make sure that the node is marked as allowed in the cgroup as well!
Devices []*Device `json:"devices"`
MountLabel string `json:"mount_label"`
// Hostname optionally sets the container's hostname if provided
Hostname string `json:"hostname"`
// Namespaces specifies the container's namespaces that it should setup when cloning the init process
// If a namespace is not provided that namespace is shared from the container's parent process
Namespaces Namespaces `json:"namespaces"`
// Capabilities specify the capabilities to keep when executing the process inside the container
// All capabilities not specified will be dropped from the processes capability mask
Capabilities *Capabilities `json:"capabilities"`
// Networks specifies the container's network setup to be created
Networks []*Network `json:"networks"`
// Routes can be specified to create entries in the route table as the container is started
Routes []*Route `json:"routes"`
// Cgroups specifies specific cgroup settings for the various subsystems that the container is
// placed into to limit the resources the container has available
Cgroups *Cgroup `json:"cgroups"`
// AppArmorProfile specifies the profile to apply to the process running in the container and is
// change at the time the process is execed
AppArmorProfile string `json:"apparmor_profile,omitempty"`
// ProcessLabel specifies the label to apply to the process running in the container. It is
// commonly used by selinux
ProcessLabel string `json:"process_label,omitempty"`
// Rlimits specifies the resource limits, such as max open files, to set in the container
// If Rlimits are not set, the container will inherit rlimits from the parent process
Rlimits []Rlimit `json:"rlimits,omitempty"`
// OomScoreAdj specifies the adjustment to be made by the kernel when calculating oom scores
// for a process. Valid values are between the range [-1000, '1000'], where processes with
// higher scores are preferred for being killed. If it is unset then we don't touch the current
// value.
// More information about kernel oom score calculation here: https://lwn.net/Articles/317814/
OomScoreAdj *int `json:"oom_score_adj,omitempty"`
// UidMappings is an array of User ID mappings for User Namespaces
UidMappings []IDMap `json:"uid_mappings"`
// GidMappings is an array of Group ID mappings for User Namespaces
GidMappings []IDMap `json:"gid_mappings"`
// MaskPaths specifies paths within the container's rootfs to mask over with a bind
// mount pointing to /dev/null as to prevent reads of the file.
MaskPaths []string `json:"mask_paths"`
// ReadonlyPaths specifies paths within the container's rootfs to remount as read-only
// so that these files prevent any writes.
ReadonlyPaths []string `json:"readonly_paths"`
// Sysctl is a map of properties and their values. It is the equivalent of using
// sysctl -w my.property.name value in Linux.
Sysctl map[string]string `json:"sysctl"`
// Seccomp allows actions to be taken whenever a syscall is made within the container.
// A number of rules are given, each having an action to be taken if a syscall matches it.
// A default action to be taken if no rules match is also given.
Seccomp *Seccomp `json:"seccomp"`
// NoNewPrivileges controls whether processes in the container can gain additional privileges.
NoNewPrivileges bool `json:"no_new_privileges,omitempty"`
// Hooks are a collection of actions to perform at various container lifecycle events.
// CommandHooks are serialized to JSON, but other hooks are not.
Hooks *Hooks
// Version is the version of opencontainer specification that is supported.
Version string `json:"version"`
// Labels are user defined metadata that is stored in the config and populated on the state
Labels []string `json:"labels"`
// NoNewKeyring will not allocated a new session keyring for the container. It will use the
// callers keyring in this case.
NoNewKeyring bool `json:"no_new_keyring"`
// IntelRdt specifies settings for Intel RDT group that the container is placed into
// to limit the resources (e.g., L3 cache, memory bandwidth) the container has available
IntelRdt *IntelRdt `json:"intel_rdt,omitempty"`
// RootlessEUID is set when the runc was launched with non-zero EUID.
// Note that RootlessEUID is set to false when launched with EUID=0 in userns.
// When RootlessEUID is set, runc creates a new userns for the container.
// (config.json needs to contain userns settings)
RootlessEUID bool `json:"rootless_euid,omitempty"`
// RootlessCgroups is set when unlikely to have the full access to cgroups.
// When RootlessCgroups is set, cgroups errors are ignored.
RootlessCgroups bool `json:"rootless_cgroups,omitempty"`
}
type Hooks struct {
// Prestart commands are executed after the container namespaces are created,
// but before the user supplied command is executed from init.
Prestart []Hook
// Poststart commands are executed after the container init process starts.
Poststart []Hook
// Poststop commands are executed after the container init process exits.
Poststop []Hook
}
type Capabilities struct {
// Bounding is the set of capabilities checked by the kernel.
Bounding []string
// Effective is the set of capabilities checked by the kernel.
Effective []string
// Inheritable is the capabilities preserved across execve.
Inheritable []string
// Permitted is the limiting superset for effective capabilities.
Permitted []string
// Ambient is the ambient set of capabilities that are kept.
Ambient []string
}
func (hooks *Hooks) UnmarshalJSON(b []byte) error {
var state struct {
Prestart []CommandHook
Poststart []CommandHook
Poststop []CommandHook
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &state); err != nil {
return err
}
deserialize := func(shooks []CommandHook) (hooks []Hook) {
for _, shook := range shooks {
hooks = append(hooks, shook)
}
return hooks
}
hooks.Prestart = deserialize(state.Prestart)
hooks.Poststart = deserialize(state.Poststart)
hooks.Poststop = deserialize(state.Poststop)
return nil
}
func (hooks Hooks) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
serialize := func(hooks []Hook) (serializableHooks []CommandHook) {
for _, hook := range hooks {
switch chook := hook.(type) {
case CommandHook:
serializableHooks = append(serializableHooks, chook)
default:
logrus.Warnf("cannot serialize hook of type %T, skipping", hook)
}
}
return serializableHooks
}
return json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{
"prestart": serialize(hooks.Prestart),
"poststart": serialize(hooks.Poststart),
"poststop": serialize(hooks.Poststop),
})
}
type Hook interface {
// Run executes the hook with the provided state.
Run(*specs.State) error
}
// NewFunctionHook will call the provided function when the hook is run.
func NewFunctionHook(f func(*specs.State) error) FuncHook {
return FuncHook{
run: f,
}
}
type FuncHook struct {
run func(*specs.State) error
}
func (f FuncHook) Run(s *specs.State) error {
return f.run(s)
}
type Command struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Args []string `json:"args"`
Env []string `json:"env"`
Dir string `json:"dir"`
Timeout *time.Duration `json:"timeout"`
}
// NewCommandHook will execute the provided command when the hook is run.
func NewCommandHook(cmd Command) CommandHook {
return CommandHook{
Command: cmd,
}
}
type CommandHook struct {
Command
}
func (c Command) Run(s *specs.State) error {
b, err := json.Marshal(s)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
cmd := exec.Cmd{
Path: c.Path,
Args: c.Args,
Env: c.Env,
Stdin: bytes.NewReader(b),
Stdout: &stdout,
Stderr: &stderr,
}
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
return err
}
errC := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
err := cmd.Wait()
if err != nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("error running hook: %v, stdout: %s, stderr: %s", err, stdout.String(), stderr.String())
}
errC <- err
}()
var timerCh <-chan time.Time
if c.Timeout != nil {
timer := time.NewTimer(*c.Timeout)
defer timer.Stop()
timerCh = timer.C
}
select {
case err := <-errC:
return err
case <-timerCh:
cmd.Process.Kill()
cmd.Wait()
return fmt.Errorf("hook ran past specified timeout of %.1fs", c.Timeout.Seconds())
}
}