vendor/github.com/cloudflare/cfssl/signer/signer.go - third_party/github.com/docker/docker - Git at Google

 // Package signer implements certificate signature functionality for CFSSL.
 package signer

 import (
 	"crypto"
 	"crypto/ecdsa"
 	"crypto/elliptic"
 	"crypto/rsa"
 	"crypto/sha1"
 	"crypto/x509"
 	"crypto/x509/pkix"
 	"encoding/asn1"
 	"errors"
 	"math/big"
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
 	"time"

 	"github.com/cloudflare/cfssl/certdb"
 	"github.com/cloudflare/cfssl/config"
 	"github.com/cloudflare/cfssl/csr"
 	cferr "github.com/cloudflare/cfssl/errors"
 	"github.com/cloudflare/cfssl/info"
 )

 // Subject contains the information that should be used to override the
 // subject information when signing a certificate.
 type Subject struct {
 	CN           string
 	Names        []csr.Name `json:"names"`
 	SerialNumber string
 }

 // Extension represents a raw extension to be included in the certificate.  The
 // "value" field must be hex encoded.
 type Extension struct {
 	ID       config.OID `json:"id"`
 	Critical bool       `json:"critical"`
 	Value    string     `json:"value"`
 }

 // SignRequest stores a signature request, which contains the hostname,
 // the CSR, optional subject information, and the signature profile.
 //
 // Extensions provided in the signRequest are copied into the certificate, as
 // long as they are in the ExtensionWhitelist for the signer's policy.
 // Extensions requested in the CSR are ignored, except for those processed by
 // ParseCertificateRequest (mainly subjectAltName).
 type SignRequest struct {
 	Hosts       []string    `json:"hosts"`
 	Request     string      `json:"certificate_request"`
 	Subject     *Subject    `json:"subject,omitempty"`
 	Profile     string      `json:"profile"`
 	CRLOverride string      `json:"crl_override"`
 	Label       string      `json:"label"`
 	Serial      *big.Int    `json:"serial,omitempty"`
 	Extensions  []Extension `json:"extensions,omitempty"`
 	// If provided, NotBefore will be used without modification (except
 	// for canonicalization) as the value of the notBefore field of the
 	// certificate. In particular no backdating adjustment will be made
 	// when NotBefore is provided.
 	NotBefore time.Time
 	// If provided, NotAfter will be used without modification (except
 	// for canonicalization) as the value of the notAfter field of the
 	// certificate.
 	NotAfter time.Time
 	// If ReturnPrecert is true a certificate with the CT poison extension
 	// will be returned from the Signer instead of attempting to retrieve
 	// SCTs and populate the tbsCert with them itself. This precert can then
 	// be passed to SignFromPrecert with the SCTs in order to create a
 	// valid certificate.
 	ReturnPrecert bool
 }

 // appendIf appends to a if s is not an empty string.
 func appendIf(s string, a *[]string) {
 	if s != "" {
 		*a = append(*a, s)
 	}
 }

 // Name returns the PKIX name for the subject.
 func (s *Subject) Name() pkix.Name {
 	var name pkix.Name
 	name.CommonName = s.CN

 	for _, n := range s.Names {
 		appendIf(n.C, &name.Country)
 		appendIf(n.ST, &name.Province)
 		appendIf(n.L, &name.Locality)
 		appendIf(n.O, &name.Organization)
 		appendIf(n.OU, &name.OrganizationalUnit)
 	}
 	name.SerialNumber = s.SerialNumber
 	return name
 }

 // SplitHosts takes a comma-spearated list of hosts and returns a slice
 // with the hosts split
 func SplitHosts(hostList string) []string {
 	if hostList == "" {
 		return nil
 	}

 	return strings.Split(hostList, ",")
 }

 // A Signer contains a CA's certificate and private key for signing
 // certificates, a Signing policy to refer to and a SignatureAlgorithm.
 type Signer interface {
 	Info(info.Req) (*info.Resp, error)
 	Policy() *config.Signing
 	SetDBAccessor(certdb.Accessor)
 	GetDBAccessor() certdb.Accessor
 	SetPolicy(*config.Signing)
 	SigAlgo() x509.SignatureAlgorithm
 	Sign(req SignRequest) (cert []byte, err error)
 	SetReqModifier(func(*http.Request, []byte))
 }

 // Profile gets the specific profile from the signer
 func Profile(s Signer, profile string) (*config.SigningProfile, error) {
 	var p *config.SigningProfile
 	policy := s.Policy()
 	if policy != nil && policy.Profiles != nil && profile != "" {
 		p = policy.Profiles[profile]
 	}

 	if p == nil && policy != nil {
 		p = policy.Default
 	}

 	if p == nil {
 		return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.APIClientError, cferr.ClientHTTPError, errors.New("profile must not be nil"))
 	}
 	return p, nil
 }

 // DefaultSigAlgo returns an appropriate X.509 signature algorithm given
 // the CA's private key.
 func DefaultSigAlgo(priv crypto.Signer) x509.SignatureAlgorithm {
 	pub := priv.Public()
 	switch pub := pub.(type) {
 	case *rsa.PublicKey:
 		keySize := pub.N.BitLen()
 		switch {
 		case keySize >= 4096:
 			return x509.SHA512WithRSA
 		case keySize >= 3072:
 			return x509.SHA384WithRSA
 		case keySize >= 2048:
 			return x509.SHA256WithRSA
 		default:
 			return x509.SHA1WithRSA
 		}
 	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
 		switch pub.Curve {
 		case elliptic.P256():
 			return x509.ECDSAWithSHA256
 		case elliptic.P384():
 			return x509.ECDSAWithSHA384
 		case elliptic.P521():
 			return x509.ECDSAWithSHA512
 		default:
 			return x509.ECDSAWithSHA1
 		}
 	default:
 		return x509.UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
 	}
 }

 // ParseCertificateRequest takes an incoming certificate request and
 // builds a certificate template from it.
 func ParseCertificateRequest(s Signer, csrBytes []byte) (template *x509.Certificate, err error) {
 	csrv, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(csrBytes)
 	if err != nil {
 		err = cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError, cferr.ParseFailed, err)
 		return
 	}

 	err = csrv.CheckSignature()
 	if err != nil {
 		err = cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError, cferr.KeyMismatch, err)
 		return
 	}

 	template = &x509.Certificate{
 		Subject:            csrv.Subject,
 		PublicKeyAlgorithm: csrv.PublicKeyAlgorithm,
 		PublicKey:          csrv.PublicKey,
 		SignatureAlgorithm: s.SigAlgo(),
 		DNSNames:           csrv.DNSNames,
 		IPAddresses:        csrv.IPAddresses,
 		EmailAddresses:     csrv.EmailAddresses,
 	}

 	for _, val := range csrv.Extensions {
 		// Check the CSR for the X.509 BasicConstraints (RFC 5280, 4.2.1.9)
 		// extension and append to template if necessary
 		if val.Id.Equal(asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 19}) {
 			var constraints csr.BasicConstraints
 			var rest []byte

 			if rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(val.Value, &constraints); err != nil {
 				return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError, cferr.ParseFailed, err)
 			} else if len(rest) != 0 {
 				return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError, cferr.ParseFailed, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 BasicConstraints"))
 			}

 			template.BasicConstraintsValid = true
 			template.IsCA = constraints.IsCA
 			template.MaxPathLen = constraints.MaxPathLen
 			template.MaxPathLenZero = template.MaxPathLen == 0
 		}
 	}

 	return
 }

 type subjectPublicKeyInfo struct {
 	Algorithm        pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
 	SubjectPublicKey asn1.BitString
 }

 // ComputeSKI derives an SKI from the certificate's public key in a
 // standard manner. This is done by computing the SHA-1 digest of the
 // SubjectPublicKeyInfo component of the certificate.
 func ComputeSKI(template *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, error) {
 	pub := template.PublicKey
 	encodedPub, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}

 	var subPKI subjectPublicKeyInfo
 	_, err = asn1.Unmarshal(encodedPub, &subPKI)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}

 	pubHash := sha1.Sum(subPKI.SubjectPublicKey.Bytes)
 	return pubHash[:], nil
 }

 // FillTemplate is a utility function that tries to load as much of
 // the certificate template as possible from the profiles and current
 // template. It fills in the key uses, expiration, revocation URLs
 // and SKI.
 func FillTemplate(template *x509.Certificate, defaultProfile, profile *config.SigningProfile, notBefore time.Time, notAfter time.Time) error {
 	ski, err := ComputeSKI(template)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

 	var (
 		eku             []x509.ExtKeyUsage
 		ku              x509.KeyUsage
 		backdate        time.Duration
 		expiry          time.Duration
 		crlURL, ocspURL string
 		issuerURL       = profile.IssuerURL
 	)

 	// The third value returned from Usages is a list of unknown key usages.
 	// This should be used when validating the profile at load, and isn't used
 	// here.
 	ku, eku, _ = profile.Usages()
 	if profile.IssuerURL == nil {
 		issuerURL = defaultProfile.IssuerURL
 	}

 	if ku == 0 && len(eku) == 0 {
 		return cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.NoKeyUsages)
 	}

 	if expiry = profile.Expiry; expiry == 0 {
 		expiry = defaultProfile.Expiry
 	}

 	if crlURL = profile.CRL; crlURL == "" {
 		crlURL = defaultProfile.CRL
 	}
 	if ocspURL = profile.OCSP; ocspURL == "" {
 		ocspURL = defaultProfile.OCSP
 	}

 	if notBefore.IsZero() {
 		if !profile.NotBefore.IsZero() {
 			notBefore = profile.NotBefore
 		} else {
 			if backdate = profile.Backdate; backdate == 0 {
 				backdate = -5 * time.Minute
 			} else {
 				backdate = -1 * profile.Backdate
 			}
 			notBefore = time.Now().Round(time.Minute).Add(backdate)
 		}
 	}
 	notBefore = notBefore.UTC()

 	if notAfter.IsZero() {
 		if !profile.NotAfter.IsZero() {
 			notAfter = profile.NotAfter
 		} else {
 			notAfter = notBefore.Add(expiry)
 		}
 	}
 	notAfter = notAfter.UTC()

 	template.NotBefore = notBefore
 	template.NotAfter = notAfter
 	template.KeyUsage = ku
 	template.ExtKeyUsage = eku
 	template.BasicConstraintsValid = true
 	template.IsCA = profile.CAConstraint.IsCA
 	if template.IsCA {
 		template.MaxPathLen = profile.CAConstraint.MaxPathLen
 		if template.MaxPathLen == 0 {
 			template.MaxPathLenZero = profile.CAConstraint.MaxPathLenZero
 		}
 		template.DNSNames = nil
 		template.EmailAddresses = nil
 	}
 	template.SubjectKeyId = ski

 	if ocspURL != "" {
 		template.OCSPServer = []string{ocspURL}
 	}
 	if crlURL != "" {
 		template.CRLDistributionPoints = []string{crlURL}
 	}

 	if len(issuerURL) != 0 {
 		template.IssuingCertificateURL = issuerURL
 	}
 	if len(profile.Policies) != 0 {
 		err = addPolicies(template, profile.Policies)
 		if err != nil {
 			return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy, err)
 		}
 	}
 	if profile.OCSPNoCheck {
 		ocspNoCheckExtension := pkix.Extension{
 			Id:       asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1, 5},
 			Critical: false,
 			Value:    []byte{0x05, 0x00},
 		}
 		template.ExtraExtensions = append(template.ExtraExtensions, ocspNoCheckExtension)
 	}

 	return nil
 }

 type policyInformation struct {
 	PolicyIdentifier asn1.ObjectIdentifier
 	Qualifiers       []interface{} `asn1:"tag:optional,omitempty"`
 }

 type cpsPolicyQualifier struct {
 	PolicyQualifierID asn1.ObjectIdentifier
 	Qualifier         string `asn1:"tag:optional,ia5"`
 }

 type userNotice struct {
 	ExplicitText string `asn1:"tag:optional,utf8"`
 }
 type userNoticePolicyQualifier struct {
 	PolicyQualifierID asn1.ObjectIdentifier
 	Qualifier         userNotice
 }

 var (
 	// Per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3280.html#page-106, this represents:
 	// iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
 	//   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-qt(2) id-qt-cps(1)
 	iDQTCertificationPracticeStatement = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 2, 1}
 	// iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
 	//   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-qt(2) id-qt-unotice(2)
 	iDQTUserNotice = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 2, 2}

 	// CTPoisonOID is the object ID of the critical poison extension for precertificates
 	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#page-9
 	CTPoisonOID = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 11129, 2, 4, 3}

 	// SCTListOID is the object ID for the Signed Certificate Timestamp certificate extension
 	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#page-14
 	SCTListOID = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 11129, 2, 4, 2}
 )

 // addPolicies adds Certificate Policies and optional Policy Qualifiers to a
 // certificate, based on the input config. Go's x509 library allows setting
 // Certificate Policies easily, but does not support nested Policy Qualifiers
 // under those policies. So we need to construct the ASN.1 structure ourselves.
 func addPolicies(template *x509.Certificate, policies []config.CertificatePolicy) error {
 	asn1PolicyList := []policyInformation{}

 	for _, policy := range policies {
 		pi := policyInformation{
 			// The PolicyIdentifier is an OID assigned to a given issuer.
 			PolicyIdentifier: asn1.ObjectIdentifier(policy.ID),
 		}
 		for _, qualifier := range policy.Qualifiers {
 			switch qualifier.Type {
 			case "id-qt-unotice":
 				pi.Qualifiers = append(pi.Qualifiers,
 					userNoticePolicyQualifier{
 						PolicyQualifierID: iDQTUserNotice,
 						Qualifier: userNotice{
 							ExplicitText: qualifier.Value,
 						},
 					})
 			case "id-qt-cps":
 				pi.Qualifiers = append(pi.Qualifiers,
 					cpsPolicyQualifier{
 						PolicyQualifierID: iDQTCertificationPracticeStatement,
 						Qualifier:         qualifier.Value,
 					})
 			default:
 				return errors.New("Invalid qualifier type in Policies " + qualifier.Type)
 			}
 		}
 		asn1PolicyList = append(asn1PolicyList, pi)
 	}

 	asn1Bytes, err := asn1.Marshal(asn1PolicyList)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

 	template.ExtraExtensions = append(template.ExtraExtensions, pkix.Extension{
 		Id:       asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 32},
 		Critical: false,
 		Value:    asn1Bytes,
 	})
 	return nil
 }
	// Package signer implements certificate signature functionality for CFSSL.
	package signer

	import (
	"crypto"
	"crypto/ecdsa"
	"crypto/elliptic"
	"crypto/rsa"
	"crypto/sha1"
	"crypto/x509"
	"crypto/x509/pkix"
	"encoding/asn1"
	"errors"
	"math/big"
	"net/http"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"github.com/cloudflare/cfssl/certdb"
	"github.com/cloudflare/cfssl/config"
	"github.com/cloudflare/cfssl/csr"
	cferr "github.com/cloudflare/cfssl/errors"
	"github.com/cloudflare/cfssl/info"
	)

	// Subject contains the information that should be used to override the
	// subject information when signing a certificate.
	type Subject struct {
	CN string
	Names []csr.Name `json:"names"`
	SerialNumber string
	}

	// Extension represents a raw extension to be included in the certificate. The
	// "value" field must be hex encoded.
	type Extension struct {
	ID config.OID `json:"id"`
	Critical bool `json:"critical"`
	Value string `json:"value"`
	}

	// SignRequest stores a signature request, which contains the hostname,
	// the CSR, optional subject information, and the signature profile.
	//
	// Extensions provided in the signRequest are copied into the certificate, as
	// long as they are in the ExtensionWhitelist for the signer's policy.
	// Extensions requested in the CSR are ignored, except for those processed by
	// ParseCertificateRequest (mainly subjectAltName).
	type SignRequest struct {
	Hosts []string `json:"hosts"`
	Request string `json:"certificate_request"`
	Subject *Subject `json:"subject,omitempty"`
	Profile string `json:"profile"`
	CRLOverride string `json:"crl_override"`
	Label string `json:"label"`
	Serial *big.Int `json:"serial,omitempty"`
	Extensions []Extension `json:"extensions,omitempty"`
	// If provided, NotBefore will be used without modification (except
	// for canonicalization) as the value of the notBefore field of the
	// certificate. In particular no backdating adjustment will be made
	// when NotBefore is provided.
	NotBefore time.Time
	// If provided, NotAfter will be used without modification (except
	// for canonicalization) as the value of the notAfter field of the
	// certificate.
	NotAfter time.Time
	// If ReturnPrecert is true a certificate with the CT poison extension
	// will be returned from the Signer instead of attempting to retrieve
	// SCTs and populate the tbsCert with them itself. This precert can then
	// be passed to SignFromPrecert with the SCTs in order to create a
	// valid certificate.
	ReturnPrecert bool
	}

	// appendIf appends to a if s is not an empty string.
	func appendIf(s string, a *[]string) {
	if s != "" {
	a = append(a, s)
	}
	}

	// Name returns the PKIX name for the subject.
	func (s *Subject) Name() pkix.Name {
	var name pkix.Name
	name.CommonName = s.CN

	for _, n := range s.Names {
	appendIf(n.C, &name.Country)
	appendIf(n.ST, &name.Province)
	appendIf(n.L, &name.Locality)
	appendIf(n.O, &name.Organization)
	appendIf(n.OU, &name.OrganizationalUnit)
	}
	name.SerialNumber = s.SerialNumber
	return name
	}

	// SplitHosts takes a comma-spearated list of hosts and returns a slice
	// with the hosts split
	func SplitHosts(hostList string) []string {
	if hostList == "" {
	return nil
	}

	return strings.Split(hostList, ",")
	}

	// A Signer contains a CA's certificate and private key for signing
	// certificates, a Signing policy to refer to and a SignatureAlgorithm.
	type Signer interface {
	Info(info.Req) (*info.Resp, error)
	Policy() *config.Signing
	SetDBAccessor(certdb.Accessor)
	GetDBAccessor() certdb.Accessor
	SetPolicy(*config.Signing)
	SigAlgo() x509.SignatureAlgorithm
	Sign(req SignRequest) (cert []byte, err error)
	SetReqModifier(func(*http.Request, []byte))
	}

	// Profile gets the specific profile from the signer
	func Profile(s Signer, profile string) (*config.SigningProfile, error) {
	var p *config.SigningProfile
	policy := s.Policy()
	if policy != nil && policy.Profiles != nil && profile != "" {
	p = policy.Profiles[profile]
	}

	if p == nil && policy != nil {
	p = policy.Default
	}

	if p == nil {
	return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.APIClientError, cferr.ClientHTTPError, errors.New("profile must not be nil"))
	}
	return p, nil
	}

	// DefaultSigAlgo returns an appropriate X.509 signature algorithm given
	// the CA's private key.
	func DefaultSigAlgo(priv crypto.Signer) x509.SignatureAlgorithm {
	pub := priv.Public()
	switch pub := pub.(type) {
	case *rsa.PublicKey:
	keySize := pub.N.BitLen()
	switch {
	case keySize >= 4096:
	return x509.SHA512WithRSA
	case keySize >= 3072:
	return x509.SHA384WithRSA
	case keySize >= 2048:
	return x509.SHA256WithRSA
	default:
	return x509.SHA1WithRSA
	}
	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
	switch pub.Curve {
	case elliptic.P256():
	return x509.ECDSAWithSHA256
	case elliptic.P384():
	return x509.ECDSAWithSHA384
	case elliptic.P521():
	return x509.ECDSAWithSHA512
	default:
	return x509.ECDSAWithSHA1
	}
	default:
	return x509.UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
	}
	}

	// ParseCertificateRequest takes an incoming certificate request and
	// builds a certificate template from it.
	func ParseCertificateRequest(s Signer, csrBytes []byte) (template *x509.Certificate, err error) {
	csrv, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(csrBytes)
	if err != nil {
	err = cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError, cferr.ParseFailed, err)
	return
	}

	err = csrv.CheckSignature()
	if err != nil {
	err = cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError, cferr.KeyMismatch, err)
	return
	}

	template = &x509.Certificate{
	Subject: csrv.Subject,
	PublicKeyAlgorithm: csrv.PublicKeyAlgorithm,
	PublicKey: csrv.PublicKey,
	SignatureAlgorithm: s.SigAlgo(),
	DNSNames: csrv.DNSNames,
	IPAddresses: csrv.IPAddresses,
	EmailAddresses: csrv.EmailAddresses,
	}

	for _, val := range csrv.Extensions {
	// Check the CSR for the X.509 BasicConstraints (RFC 5280, 4.2.1.9)
	// extension and append to template if necessary
	if val.Id.Equal(asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 19}) {
	var constraints csr.BasicConstraints
	var rest []byte

	if rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(val.Value, &constraints); err != nil {
	return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError, cferr.ParseFailed, err)
	} else if len(rest) != 0 {
	return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError, cferr.ParseFailed, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 BasicConstraints"))
	}

	template.BasicConstraintsValid = true
	template.IsCA = constraints.IsCA
	template.MaxPathLen = constraints.MaxPathLen
	template.MaxPathLenZero = template.MaxPathLen == 0
	}
	}

	return
	}

	type subjectPublicKeyInfo struct {
	Algorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
	SubjectPublicKey asn1.BitString
	}

	// ComputeSKI derives an SKI from the certificate's public key in a
	// standard manner. This is done by computing the SHA-1 digest of the
	// SubjectPublicKeyInfo component of the certificate.
	func ComputeSKI(template *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, error) {
	pub := template.PublicKey
	encodedPub, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub)
	if err != nil {
	return nil, err
	}

	var subPKI subjectPublicKeyInfo
	_, err = asn1.Unmarshal(encodedPub, &subPKI)
	if err != nil {
	return nil, err
	}

	pubHash := sha1.Sum(subPKI.SubjectPublicKey.Bytes)
	return pubHash[:], nil
	}

	// FillTemplate is a utility function that tries to load as much of
	// the certificate template as possible from the profiles and current
	// template. It fills in the key uses, expiration, revocation URLs
	// and SKI.
	func FillTemplate(template x509.Certificate, defaultProfile, profile config.SigningProfile, notBefore time.Time, notAfter time.Time) error {
	ski, err := ComputeSKI(template)
	if err != nil {
	return err
	}

	var (
	eku []x509.ExtKeyUsage
	ku x509.KeyUsage
	backdate time.Duration
	expiry time.Duration
	crlURL, ocspURL string
	issuerURL = profile.IssuerURL
	)

	// The third value returned from Usages is a list of unknown key usages.
	// This should be used when validating the profile at load, and isn't used
	// here.
	ku, eku, _ = profile.Usages()
	if profile.IssuerURL == nil {
	issuerURL = defaultProfile.IssuerURL
	}

	if ku == 0 && len(eku) == 0 {
	return cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.NoKeyUsages)
	}

	if expiry = profile.Expiry; expiry == 0 {
	expiry = defaultProfile.Expiry
	}

	if crlURL = profile.CRL; crlURL == "" {
	crlURL = defaultProfile.CRL
	}
	if ocspURL = profile.OCSP; ocspURL == "" {
	ocspURL = defaultProfile.OCSP
	}

	if notBefore.IsZero() {
	if !profile.NotBefore.IsZero() {
	notBefore = profile.NotBefore
	} else {
	if backdate = profile.Backdate; backdate == 0 {
	backdate = -5 * time.Minute
	} else {
	backdate = -1 * profile.Backdate
	}
	notBefore = time.Now().Round(time.Minute).Add(backdate)
	}
	}
	notBefore = notBefore.UTC()

	if notAfter.IsZero() {
	if !profile.NotAfter.IsZero() {
	notAfter = profile.NotAfter
	} else {
	notAfter = notBefore.Add(expiry)
	}
	}
	notAfter = notAfter.UTC()

	template.NotBefore = notBefore
	template.NotAfter = notAfter
	template.KeyUsage = ku
	template.ExtKeyUsage = eku
	template.BasicConstraintsValid = true
	template.IsCA = profile.CAConstraint.IsCA
	if template.IsCA {
	template.MaxPathLen = profile.CAConstraint.MaxPathLen
	if template.MaxPathLen == 0 {
	template.MaxPathLenZero = profile.CAConstraint.MaxPathLenZero
	}
	template.DNSNames = nil
	template.EmailAddresses = nil
	}
	template.SubjectKeyId = ski

	if ocspURL != "" {
	template.OCSPServer = []string{ocspURL}
	}
	if crlURL != "" {
	template.CRLDistributionPoints = []string{crlURL}
	}

	if len(issuerURL) != 0 {
	template.IssuingCertificateURL = issuerURL
	}
	if len(profile.Policies) != 0 {
	err = addPolicies(template, profile.Policies)
	if err != nil {
	return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy, err)
	}
	}
	if profile.OCSPNoCheck {
	ocspNoCheckExtension := pkix.Extension{
	Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1, 5},
	Critical: false,
	Value: []byte{0x05, 0x00},
	}
	template.ExtraExtensions = append(template.ExtraExtensions, ocspNoCheckExtension)
	}

	return nil
	}

	type policyInformation struct {
	PolicyIdentifier asn1.ObjectIdentifier
	Qualifiers []interface{} `asn1:"tag:optional,omitempty"`
	}

	type cpsPolicyQualifier struct {
	PolicyQualifierID asn1.ObjectIdentifier
	Qualifier string `asn1:"tag:optional,ia5"`
	}

	type userNotice struct {
	ExplicitText string `asn1:"tag:optional,utf8"`
	}
	type userNoticePolicyQualifier struct {
	PolicyQualifierID asn1.ObjectIdentifier
	Qualifier userNotice
	}

	var (
	// Per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3280.html#page-106, this represents:
	// iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
	// mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-qt(2) id-qt-cps(1)
	iDQTCertificationPracticeStatement = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 2, 1}
	// iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
	// mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-qt(2) id-qt-unotice(2)
	iDQTUserNotice = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 2, 2}

	// CTPoisonOID is the object ID of the critical poison extension for precertificates
	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#page-9
	CTPoisonOID = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 11129, 2, 4, 3}

	// SCTListOID is the object ID for the Signed Certificate Timestamp certificate extension
	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#page-14
	SCTListOID = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 11129, 2, 4, 2}
	)

	// addPolicies adds Certificate Policies and optional Policy Qualifiers to a
	// certificate, based on the input config. Go's x509 library allows setting
	// Certificate Policies easily, but does not support nested Policy Qualifiers
	// under those policies. So we need to construct the ASN.1 structure ourselves.
	func addPolicies(template *x509.Certificate, policies []config.CertificatePolicy) error {
	asn1PolicyList := []policyInformation{}

	for _, policy := range policies {
	pi := policyInformation{
	// The PolicyIdentifier is an OID assigned to a given issuer.
	PolicyIdentifier: asn1.ObjectIdentifier(policy.ID),
	}
	for _, qualifier := range policy.Qualifiers {
	switch qualifier.Type {
	case "id-qt-unotice":
	pi.Qualifiers = append(pi.Qualifiers,
	userNoticePolicyQualifier{
	PolicyQualifierID: iDQTUserNotice,
	Qualifier: userNotice{
	ExplicitText: qualifier.Value,
	},
	})
	case "id-qt-cps":
	pi.Qualifiers = append(pi.Qualifiers,
	cpsPolicyQualifier{
	PolicyQualifierID: iDQTCertificationPracticeStatement,
	Qualifier: qualifier.Value,
	})
	default:
	return errors.New("Invalid qualifier type in Policies " + qualifier.Type)
	}
	}
	asn1PolicyList = append(asn1PolicyList, pi)
	}

	asn1Bytes, err := asn1.Marshal(asn1PolicyList)
	if err != nil {
	return err
	}

	template.ExtraExtensions = append(template.ExtraExtensions, pkix.Extension{
	Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 32},
	Critical: false,
	Value: asn1Bytes,
	})
	return nil
	}