blob: 83ed0c6b2feb7e77d0b4716b04c75a6dea75e5a8 [file] [log] [blame]
package chrootarchive // import "github.com/docker/docker/pkg/chrootarchive"
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"net"
"os"
"os/user"
"path/filepath"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/idtools"
)
func init() {
// initialize nss libraries in Glibc so that the dynamic libraries are loaded in the host
// environment not in the chroot from untrusted files.
_, _ = user.Lookup("docker")
_, _ = net.LookupHost("localhost")
}
// NewArchiver returns a new Archiver which uses chrootarchive.Untar
func NewArchiver(idMapping *idtools.IdentityMapping) *archive.Archiver {
if idMapping == nil {
idMapping = &idtools.IdentityMapping{}
}
return &archive.Archiver{
Untar: Untar,
IDMapping: idMapping,
}
}
// Untar reads a stream of bytes from `archive`, parses it as a tar archive,
// and unpacks it into the directory at `dest`.
// The archive may be compressed with one of the following algorithms:
// identity (uncompressed), gzip, bzip2, xz.
func Untar(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions) error {
return untarHandler(tarArchive, dest, options, true, dest)
}
// UntarWithRoot is the same as `Untar`, but allows you to pass in a root directory
// The root directory is the directory that will be chrooted to.
// `dest` must be a path within `root`, if it is not an error will be returned.
//
// `root` should set to a directory which is not controlled by any potentially
// malicious process.
//
// This should be used to prevent a potential attacker from manipulating `dest`
// such that it would provide access to files outside of `dest` through things
// like symlinks. Normally `ResolveSymlinksInScope` would handle this, however
// sanitizing symlinks in this manner is inherrently racey:
// ref: CVE-2018-15664
func UntarWithRoot(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions, root string) error {
return untarHandler(tarArchive, dest, options, true, root)
}
// UntarUncompressed reads a stream of bytes from `archive`, parses it as a tar archive,
// and unpacks it into the directory at `dest`.
// The archive must be an uncompressed stream.
func UntarUncompressed(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions) error {
return untarHandler(tarArchive, dest, options, false, dest)
}
// Handler for teasing out the automatic decompression
func untarHandler(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions, decompress bool, root string) error {
if tarArchive == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Empty archive")
}
if options == nil {
options = &archive.TarOptions{}
}
if options.ExcludePatterns == nil {
options.ExcludePatterns = []string{}
}
idMapping := idtools.NewIDMappingsFromMaps(options.UIDMaps, options.GIDMaps)
rootIDs := idMapping.RootPair()
dest = filepath.Clean(dest)
if _, err := os.Stat(dest); os.IsNotExist(err) {
if err := idtools.MkdirAllAndChownNew(dest, 0755, rootIDs); err != nil {
return err
}
}
r := ioutil.NopCloser(tarArchive)
if decompress {
decompressedArchive, err := archive.DecompressStream(tarArchive)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer decompressedArchive.Close()
r = decompressedArchive
}
return invokeUnpack(r, dest, options, root)
}
// Tar tars the requested path while chrooted to the specified root.
func Tar(srcPath string, options *archive.TarOptions, root string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
if options == nil {
options = &archive.TarOptions{}
}
return invokePack(srcPath, options, root)
}