Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/mbedtls-2.16' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
* origin/mbedtls-2.16:
Changelog entry
Check for zero length and NULL buffer pointer
ssl-opt.sh: wait for proxy to start before running the script further
Adapt ChangeLog
Fix mpi_bigendian_to_host() on bigendian systems
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index c3d4efd..0293eb3 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -2,6 +2,26 @@
= mbed TLS x.x.x branch released xxxx-xx-xx
+Security
+ * Fix a missing error detection in ECJPAKE. This could have caused a
+ predictable shared secret if a hardware accelerator failed and the other
+ side of the key exchange had a similar bug.
+ * The deterministic ECDSA calculation reused the scheme's HMAC-DRBG to
+ implement blinding. Because of this for the same key and message the same
+ blinding value was generated. This reduced the effectiveness of the
+ countermeasure and leaked information about the private key through side
+ channels. Reported by Jack Lloyd.
+ * When writing a private EC key, use a constant size for the private
+ value, as specified in RFC 5915. Previously, the value was written
+ as an ASN.1 INTEGER, which caused the size of the key to leak
+ about 1 bit of information on average and could cause the value to be
+ 1 byte too large for the output buffer.
+
+API Changes
+ * The new function mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() is similar to
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() but allows passing an external RNG for the
+ purpose of blinding.
+
Bugfix
* Fix to allow building test suites with any warning that detects unused
functions. Fixes #1628.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
index 0f72c17..6eabcc8 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) && \
@@ -134,7 +134,9 @@
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) ) )
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) ) )
#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index 6f523be..5df962e 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -440,6 +440,16 @@
* dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests
* and ciphers instead.
*
+ * \warning If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are
+ * enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the
+ * the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore
+ * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating
+ * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then
+ * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative
+ * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext()
+ * (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is
+ * desirable).
+ *
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT
//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
index f8b2850..932acc6 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
@@ -175,6 +175,19 @@
* (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
* 4.1.3, step 5.
*
+ * \warning Since the output of the internal RNG is always the same for
+ * the same key and message, this limits the efficiency of
+ * blinding and leaks information through side channels. For
+ * secure behavior use mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() instead.
+ *
+ * (Optimally the blinding is a random value that is different
+ * on every execution. In this case the blinding is still
+ * random from the attackers perspective, but is the same on
+ * each execution. This means that this blinding does not
+ * prevent attackers from recovering secrets by combining
+ * several measurement traces, but may prevent some attacks
+ * that exploit relationships between secret data.)
+ *
* \see ecp.h
*
* \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use.
@@ -200,6 +213,52 @@
mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
+/**
+ * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a
+ * previously-hashed message, deterministic version.
+ *
+ * For more information, see <em>RFC-6979: Deterministic
+ * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic
+ * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
+ *
+ * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
+ * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as
+ * defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
+ * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
+ * 4.1.3, step 5.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized
+ * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey().
+ * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ * \p blen is zero.
+ * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be
+ * \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX
+ * error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
/**
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
index 91950f9..1364275 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
@@ -416,6 +416,10 @@
*
* \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0.
* For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE.
+ *
+ * \note In order to ensure enough space for the signature, the
+ * \p sig buffer size must be of at least
+ * `max(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)` bytes.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
@@ -430,6 +434,10 @@
* \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC
* operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_sign().
*
+ * \note In order to ensure enough space for the signature, the
+ * \p sig buffer size must be of at least
+ * `max(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)` bytes.
+ *
* \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up
* with a private key.
* \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes)
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
index 4ff5bdd..35bacd8 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
@@ -904,7 +904,8 @@
* the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg.
* \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable
* buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
- * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of
+ * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
*
* \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
@@ -951,7 +952,8 @@
* the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg.
* \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable
* buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
- * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of
+ * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
*
* \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
@@ -1012,7 +1014,8 @@
* the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg.
* \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable
* buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
- * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of
+ * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
*
* \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c
index 58e1a5f..2b48006 100644
--- a/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -254,6 +254,8 @@
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries;
@@ -323,7 +325,9 @@
mul:
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &R, pk, &grp->G,
- f_rng, p_rng, ECDSA_RS_ECP ) );
+ f_rng_blind,
+ p_rng_blind,
+ ECDSA_RS_ECP ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pr, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( pr, 0 ) == 0 );
@@ -349,7 +353,8 @@
* Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
* avoiding a potential timing leak.
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &t, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &t, f_rng_blind,
+ p_rng_blind ) );
/*
* Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
@@ -392,8 +397,9 @@
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
+ /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
return( ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
- f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
+ f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
@@ -405,6 +411,8 @@
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
@@ -451,8 +459,70 @@
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng );
#else
- ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, rs_ctx );
+ if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
+ ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx );
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng_blind_det;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ /*
+ * To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
+ * second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
+ * reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
+ * risk that they leak this way.
+ */
+ const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );
+ p_rng_blind_det = &rng_ctx_blind;
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng_blind_det, md_info,
+ data, 2 * grp_len );
+ ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( p_rng_blind_det,
+ (const unsigned char*) blind_label,
+ strlen( blind_label ) );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+#else
+ /*
+ * In the case of restartable computations we would either need to store
+ * the second RNG in the restart context too or set it up at every
+ * restart. The first option would penalize the correct application of
+ * the function and the second would defeat the purpose of the
+ * restartable feature.
+ *
+ * Therefore in this case we reuse the original RNG. This comes with the
+ * price that the resulting signature might not be a valid deterministic
+ * ECDSA signature with a very low probability (same magnitude as
+ * successfully guessing the private key). However even then it is still
+ * a valid ECDSA signature.
+ */
+ p_rng_blind_det = p_rng;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+ /*
+ * Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
+ * message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
+ * through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
+ * won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
+ * be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
+ */
+ ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng_blind_det,
+ rs_ctx );
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
+#endif
+ }
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
cleanup:
@@ -465,11 +535,12 @@
}
/*
- * Deterministic signature wrapper
+ * Deterministic signature wrappers
*/
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
- const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
@@ -477,7 +548,27 @@
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
- return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, NULL ) );
+ return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL ) );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind )
+{
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng_blind != NULL );
+
+ return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
@@ -656,11 +747,9 @@
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
- (void) f_rng;
- (void) p_rng;
-
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
- hash, hlen, md_alg, rs_ctx ) );
+ hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng,
+ p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
@@ -668,8 +757,10 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#else
+ /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
- hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
+ hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng,
+ p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
diff --git a/library/ecjpake.c b/library/ecjpake.c
index b276514..1845c93 100644
--- a/library/ecjpake.c
+++ b/library/ecjpake.c
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
p += id_len;
/* Compute hash */
- mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, p - buf, hash );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, p - buf, hash ) );
/* Turn it into an integer mod n */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( h, hash,
diff --git a/library/pkwrite.c b/library/pkwrite.c
index 8d1da2f..03d14f2 100644
--- a/library/pkwrite.c
+++ b/library/pkwrite.c
@@ -38,7 +38,9 @@
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
@@ -150,6 +152,26 @@
return( (int) len );
}
+
+/*
+ * privateKey OCTET STRING -- always of length ceil(log2(n)/8)
+ */
+static int pk_write_ec_private( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec )
+{
+ int ret;
+ size_t byte_length = ( ec->grp.pbits + 7 ) / 8;
+ unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
+
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ec->d, tmp, byte_length );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( p, start, tmp, byte_length );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, byte_length );
+ return( ret );
+}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
@@ -364,9 +386,8 @@
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) );
len += par_len;
- /* privateKey: write as MPI then fix tag */
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &ec->d ) );
- *c = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ /* privateKey */
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_ec_private( &c, buf, ec ) );
/* version */
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, 1 ) );
diff --git a/library/x509write_crt.c b/library/x509write_crt.c
index 10497e7..61d7ba4 100644
--- a/library/x509write_crt.c
+++ b/library/x509write_crt.c
@@ -45,6 +45,16 @@
#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
+/*
+ * For the currently used signature algorithms the buffer to store any signature
+ * must be at least of size MAX(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN
+#else
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+
void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_cert ) );
@@ -334,7 +344,7 @@
size_t sig_oid_len = 0;
unsigned char *c, *c2;
unsigned char hash[64];
- unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char sig[SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char tmp_buf[2048];
size_t sub_len = 0, pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len;
size_t len = 0;
diff --git a/library/x509write_csr.c b/library/x509write_csr.c
index d70ba0e..b65a11c 100644
--- a/library/x509write_csr.c
+++ b/library/x509write_csr.c
@@ -44,6 +44,16 @@
#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
#endif
+/*
+ * For the currently used signature algorithms the buffer to store any signature
+ * must be at least of size MAX(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN
+#else
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+
void mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_csr ) );
@@ -159,7 +169,7 @@
size_t sig_oid_len = 0;
unsigned char *c, *c2;
unsigned char hash[64];
- unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char sig[SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char tmp_buf[2048];
size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len;
size_t len = 0;
diff --git a/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c b/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
index 47a098a..bdedca4 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
@@ -61,6 +61,16 @@
#include <string.h>
+/*
+ * For the currently used signature algorithms the buffer to store any signature
+ * must be at least of size MAX(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN
+#else
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+
int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
{
FILE *f;
@@ -70,7 +80,7 @@
mbedtls_entropy_context entropy;
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg;
unsigned char hash[32];
- unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char buf[SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
char filename[512];
const char *pers = "mbedtls_pk_sign";
size_t olen = 0;
diff --git a/tests/data_files/Makefile b/tests/data_files/Makefile
index c2daf86..669b406 100644
--- a/tests/data_files/Makefile
+++ b/tests/data_files/Makefile
@@ -803,6 +803,14 @@
# The use of 'Server 1' in the DN is intentional here, as the DN is hardcoded in the x509_write test suite.'
+###
+### A generic SECP521R1 private key
+###
+
+secp521r1_prv.der:
+ $(OPENSSL) ecparam -genkey -name secp521r1 -noout -out secp521r1_prv.der
+all_final += secp521r1_prv.der
+
################################################################
### Generate CSRs for X.509 write test suite
################################################################
diff --git a/tests/data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem b/tests/data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5141e30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIIcex4mqXsQamUKTVf8vXmTAJrQvGjh5mXG8p9+OR4xAoAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAEqJ2HQjPpc6fDwE/vSa6U35USXawkTo98y4U6NsAl+rOGuqMPEFXf
+P1Srm/Jrzwa/RuppRL5kgyAsGJTUmwZEzQ==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem b/tests/data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..427b7ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHcAgEBBEIAOXdk7W+Hf5L7Hc9fKe44wmpaRNs5ERFTkv5CrlXv/Bu3y28M673q
+vBNo7a/UE/6NNQHu2pQODEYFpMg6R34b5SigBwYFK4EEACOhgYkDgYYABAFUMHXV
+KPA4vkMgq+pFgDoH96XoM517gF2GJFV6h2gLhykzIHL/otAyEpAStw7MBvbU0V21
+ixB+hjqzO7Snxaj9mwB8g87OKxm5eGfsqvJNPdJ0RZ/EKy06Ukg6KThlhQeyrtIk
+g5PTCrPnNszlffAy6/jCOe3Moi59g15H13sSzwfX6g==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/secp521r1_prv.der b/tests/data_files/secp521r1_prv.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d342bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/secp521r1_prv.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index 4c1611b..3678cc4 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -590,6 +590,23 @@
#### Build and test many configurations and targets
################################################################
+component_test_large_ecdsa_key_signature () {
+
+ SMALL_MPI_MAX_SIZE=136 # Small enough to interfere with the EC signatures
+
+ msg "build: cmake + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE=${SMALL_MPI_MAX_SIZE}, gcc, ASan" # ~ 1 min 50s
+ scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE $SMALL_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+ CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
+ make
+
+ INEVITABLY_PRESENT_FILE=Makefile
+ SIGNATURE_FILE="${INEVITABLY_PRESENT_FILE}.sig" # Warning, this is rm -f'ed below
+
+ msg "test: pk_sign secp521r1_prv.der for MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE=${SMALL_MPI_MAX_SIZE} (ASan build)" # ~ 5s
+ if_build_succeeded programs/pkey/pk_sign tests/data_files/secp521r1_prv.der $INEVITABLY_PRESENT_FILE
+ rm -f $SIGNATURE_FILE
+}
+
component_test_default_out_of_box () {
msg "build: make, default config (out-of-box)" # ~1min
make
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
index 22d92b6..0e7283b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
@@ -74,6 +74,31 @@
mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &grp, &m, &m, &m,
NULL, sizeof( buf ),
valid_md ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( NULL, &m, &m, &m,
+ buf, sizeof( buf ),
+ valid_md,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, NULL, &m, &m,
+ buf, sizeof( buf ),
+ valid_md,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &m, NULL, &m,
+ buf, sizeof( buf ),
+ valid_md,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &m, &m, NULL,
+ buf, sizeof( buf ),
+ valid_md,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &m, &m, &m,
+ NULL, sizeof( buf ),
+ valid_md,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
@@ -330,6 +355,16 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &r, &r_check ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &s, &s_check ) == 0 );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &r, &s, &d, hash, hlen,
+ md_alg, rnd_std_rand, NULL )
+ == 0 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &r, &r_check ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &s, &s_check ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &d ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data
index 84c99c9..ffa59e5 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
ECJPAKE selftest
ecjpake_selftest:
+ECJPAKE fail read corrupt MD
+read_bad_md:"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"
+
ECJPAKE round one: client, valid
read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"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":0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function
index d267295..38f190d 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function
@@ -237,6 +237,27 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+void read_bad_md( data_t *msg )
+{
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_context corrupt_ctx;
+ const unsigned char * pw = NULL;
+ const size_t pw_len = 0;
+ int any_role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT;
+
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &corrupt_ctx );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &corrupt_ctx, any_role,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, pw, pw_len ) == 0 );
+ corrupt_ctx.md_info = NULL;
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &corrupt_ctx, msg->x,
+ msg->len ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &corrupt_ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
void read_round_one( int role, data_t * msg, int ref_ret )
{
mbedtls_ecjpake_context ctx;
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data
index c8ff177..e0101cc 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data
@@ -30,10 +30,18 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_prv.sec1.pem"
+Private key write check EC 256 bits (top bit set)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem"
+
Private key write check EC 521 bits
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_521_prv.pem"
+Private key write check EC 521 bits (top byte is 0)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
+pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem"
+
Private key write check EC Brainpool 512 bits
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_bp512_prv.pem"