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/**@file
Initialize Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
Copyright (c) 2017 - 2020, Advanced Micro Devices. All rights reserved.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
//
// The package level header files this module uses
//
#include <IndustryStandard/Q35MchIch9.h>
#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
#include <Library/HobLib.h>
#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
#include <Library/PcdLib.h>
#include <PiPei.h>
#include <Register/Amd/Msr.h>
#include <Register/Intel/SmramSaveStateMap.h>
#include "Platform.h"
/**
Initialize SEV-ES support if running as an SEV-ES guest.
**/
STATIC
VOID
AmdSevEsInitialize (
VOID
)
{
UINT8 *GhcbBase;
PHYSICAL_ADDRESS GhcbBasePa;
UINTN GhcbPageCount;
UINT8 *GhcbBackupBase;
UINT8 *GhcbBackupPages;
UINTN GhcbBackupPageCount;
SEV_ES_PER_CPU_DATA *SevEsData;
UINTN PageCount;
RETURN_STATUS PcdStatus, DecryptStatus;
IA32_DESCRIPTOR Gdtr;
VOID *Gdt;
if (!MemEncryptSevEsIsEnabled ()) {
return;
}
PcdStatus = PcdSetBoolS (PcdSevEsIsEnabled, TRUE);
ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
//
// Allocate GHCB and per-CPU variable pages.
// Since the pages must survive across the UEFI to OS transition
// make them reserved.
//
GhcbPageCount = mMaxCpuCount * 2;
GhcbBase = AllocateReservedPages (GhcbPageCount);
ASSERT (GhcbBase != NULL);
GhcbBasePa = (PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN) GhcbBase;
//
// Each vCPU gets two consecutive pages, the first is the GHCB and the
// second is the per-CPU variable page. Loop through the allocation and
// only clear the encryption mask for the GHCB pages.
//
for (PageCount = 0; PageCount < GhcbPageCount; PageCount += 2) {
DecryptStatus = MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask (
0,
GhcbBasePa + EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (PageCount),
1,
TRUE
);
ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (DecryptStatus);
}
ZeroMem (GhcbBase, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (GhcbPageCount));
PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdGhcbBase, GhcbBasePa);
ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdGhcbSize, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (GhcbPageCount));
ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO,
"SEV-ES is enabled, %lu GHCB pages allocated starting at 0x%p\n",
(UINT64)GhcbPageCount, GhcbBase));
//
// Allocate #VC recursion backup pages. The number of backup pages needed is
// one less than the maximum VC count.
//
GhcbBackupPageCount = mMaxCpuCount * (VMGEXIT_MAXIMUM_VC_COUNT - 1);
GhcbBackupBase = AllocatePages (GhcbBackupPageCount);
ASSERT (GhcbBackupBase != NULL);
GhcbBackupPages = GhcbBackupBase;
for (PageCount = 1; PageCount < GhcbPageCount; PageCount += 2) {
SevEsData =
(SEV_ES_PER_CPU_DATA *)(GhcbBase + EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (PageCount));
SevEsData->GhcbBackupPages = GhcbBackupPages;
GhcbBackupPages += EFI_PAGE_SIZE * (VMGEXIT_MAXIMUM_VC_COUNT - 1);
}
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO,
"SEV-ES is enabled, %lu GHCB backup pages allocated starting at 0x%p\n",
(UINT64)GhcbBackupPageCount, GhcbBackupBase));
AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, GhcbBasePa);
//
// The SEV support will clear the C-bit from non-RAM areas. The early GDT
// lives in a non-RAM area, so when an exception occurs (like a #VC) the GDT
// will be read as un-encrypted even though it was created before the C-bit
// was cleared (encrypted). This will result in a failure to be able to
// handle the exception.
//
AsmReadGdtr (&Gdtr);
Gdt = AllocatePages (EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES ((UINTN) Gdtr.Limit + 1));
ASSERT (Gdt != NULL);
CopyMem (Gdt, (VOID *) Gdtr.Base, Gdtr.Limit + 1);
Gdtr.Base = (UINTN) Gdt;
AsmWriteGdtr (&Gdtr);
}
/**
Function checks if SEV support is available, if present then it sets
the dynamic PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask with memory encryption mask.
**/
VOID
AmdSevInitialize (
VOID
)
{
UINT64 EncryptionMask;
RETURN_STATUS PcdStatus;
//
// Check if SEV is enabled
//
if (!MemEncryptSevIsEnabled ()) {
return;
}
//
// Set Memory Encryption Mask PCD
//
EncryptionMask = MemEncryptSevGetEncryptionMask ();
PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask, EncryptionMask);
ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SEV is enabled (mask 0x%lx)\n", EncryptionMask));
//
// Set Pcd to Deny the execution of option ROM when security
// violation.
//
PcdStatus = PcdSet32S (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy, 0x4);
ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
//
// When SMM is required, cover the pages containing the initial SMRAM Save
// State Map with a memory allocation HOB:
//
// There's going to be a time interval between our decrypting those pages for
// SMBASE relocation and re-encrypting the same pages after SMBASE
// relocation. We shall ensure that the DXE phase stay away from those pages
// until after re-encryption, in order to prevent an information leak to the
// hypervisor.
//
if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdSmmSmramRequire) && (mBootMode != BOOT_ON_S3_RESUME)) {
RETURN_STATUS LocateMapStatus;
UINTN MapPagesBase;
UINTN MapPagesCount;
LocateMapStatus = MemEncryptSevLocateInitialSmramSaveStateMapPages (
&MapPagesBase,
&MapPagesCount
);
ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (LocateMapStatus);
if (mQ35SmramAtDefaultSmbase) {
//
// The initial SMRAM Save State Map has been covered as part of a larger
// reserved memory allocation in InitializeRamRegions().
//
ASSERT (SMM_DEFAULT_SMBASE <= MapPagesBase);
ASSERT (
(MapPagesBase + EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (MapPagesCount) <=
SMM_DEFAULT_SMBASE + MCH_DEFAULT_SMBASE_SIZE)
);
} else {
BuildMemoryAllocationHob (
MapPagesBase, // BaseAddress
EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (MapPagesCount), // Length
EfiBootServicesData // MemoryType
);
}
}
//
// Check and perform SEV-ES initialization if required.
//
AmdSevEsInitialize ();
}