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/*
* Copyright (C) 2017 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "security.h"
#include "util.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fstream>
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android-base/properties.h>
#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
using android::base::unique_fd;
using android::base::SetProperty;
namespace android {
namespace init {
static bool SetHighestAvailableOptionValue(const std::string& path, int min, int max) {
std::ifstream inf(path, std::fstream::in);
if (!inf) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot open for reading: " << path;
return false;
}
int current = max;
while (current >= min) {
// try to write out new value
std::string str_val = std::to_string(current);
std::ofstream of(path, std::fstream::out);
if (!of) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot open for writing: " << path;
return false;
}
of << str_val << std::endl;
of.close();
// check to make sure it was recorded
inf.seekg(0);
std::string str_rec;
inf >> str_rec;
if (str_val.compare(str_rec) == 0) {
break;
}
current--;
}
inf.close();
if (current < min) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to set minimum option value " << min << " in " << path;
return false;
}
return true;
}
#define MMAP_RND_PATH "/proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits"
#define MMAP_RND_COMPAT_PATH "/proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits"
static bool SetMmapRndBitsMin(int start, int min, bool compat) {
std::string path;
if (compat) {
path = MMAP_RND_COMPAT_PATH;
} else {
path = MMAP_RND_PATH;
}
return SetHighestAvailableOptionValue(path, min, start);
}
// Set /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits and potentially
// /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits to the maximum supported values.
// Returns an error if unable to set these to an acceptable value.
//
// To support this sysctl, the following upstream commits are needed:
//
// d07e22597d1d mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR
// e0c25d958f78 arm: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
// 8f0d3aa9de57 arm64: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
// 9e08f57d684a x86: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
// ec9ee4acd97c drivers: char: random: add get_random_long()
// 5ef11c35ce86 mm: ASLR: use get_random_long()
Result<void> SetMmapRndBitsAction(const BuiltinArguments&) {
// values are arch-dependent
#if defined(USER_MODE_LINUX)
// uml does not support mmap_rnd_bits
return {};
#elif defined(__aarch64__)
// arm64 supports 14 - 33 rnd bits depending on page size and ARM64_VA_BITS.
// The kernel (6.5) still defaults to 39 va bits for 4KiB pages, so shipping
// devices are only getting 24 bits of randomness in practice.
if (SetMmapRndBitsMin(33, 24, false) && (!Has32BitAbi() || SetMmapRndBitsMin(16, 16, true))) {
return {};
}
#elif defined(__riscv)
// TODO: sv48 and sv57 have both been added to the kernel, but the kernel
// still doesn't support more than 24 bits.
// https://github.com/google/android-riscv64/issues/1
if (SetMmapRndBitsMin(24, 24, false)) {
return {};
}
#elif defined(__x86_64__)
// x86_64 supports 28 - 32 rnd bits, but Android wants to ensure that the
// theoretical maximum of 32 bits is always supported and used; except in
// the case of the x86 page size emulator which supports a maximum
// of 30 bits for 16k page size, or 28 bits for 64k page size.
int max_bits = 32 - (static_cast<int>(log2(getpagesize())) - 12);
if (SetMmapRndBitsMin(max_bits, max_bits, false) &&
(!Has32BitAbi() || SetMmapRndBitsMin(16, 16, true))) {
return {};
}
#elif defined(__arm__) || defined(__i386__)
// check to see if we're running on 64-bit kernel
bool h64 = !access(MMAP_RND_COMPAT_PATH, F_OK);
// supported 32-bit architecture must have 16 bits set
if (SetMmapRndBitsMin(16, 16, h64)) {
return {};
}
#else
LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown architecture";
#endif
LOG(FATAL) << "Unable to set adequate mmap entropy value!";
return Error();
}
#define KPTR_RESTRICT_PATH "/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict"
#define KPTR_RESTRICT_MINVALUE 2
#define KPTR_RESTRICT_MAXVALUE 4
// Set kptr_restrict to the highest available level.
//
// Aborts if unable to set this to an acceptable value.
Result<void> SetKptrRestrictAction(const BuiltinArguments&) {
std::string path = KPTR_RESTRICT_PATH;
if (!SetHighestAvailableOptionValue(path, KPTR_RESTRICT_MINVALUE, KPTR_RESTRICT_MAXVALUE)) {
LOG(FATAL) << "Unable to set adequate kptr_restrict value!";
return Error();
}
return {};
}
// Test for whether the kernel has SELinux hooks for the perf_event_open()
// syscall. If the hooks are present, we can stop using the other permission
// mechanism (perf_event_paranoid sysctl), and use only the SELinux policy to
// control access to the syscall. The hooks are expected on all Android R
// release kernels, but might be absent on devices that upgrade while keeping an
// older kernel.
//
// There is no direct/synchronous way of finding out that a syscall failed due
// to SELinux. Therefore we test for a combination of a success and a failure
// that are explained by the platform's SELinux policy for the "init" domain:
// * cpu-scoped perf_event is allowed
// * ioctl() on the event fd is disallowed with EACCES
//
// Since init has CAP_SYS_ADMIN, these tests are not affected by the system-wide
// perf_event_paranoid sysctl.
//
// If the SELinux hooks are detected, a special sysprop
// (sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks) is set, which translates to a modification of
// perf_event_paranoid (through init.rc sysprop actions).
//
// TODO(b/137092007): this entire test can be removed once the platform stops
// supporting kernels that precede the perf_event_open hooks (Android common
// kernels 4.4 and 4.9).
Result<void> TestPerfEventSelinuxAction(const BuiltinArguments&) {
// Special case: for *development devices* that boot with permissive
// SELinux, treat the LSM hooks as present for the effect of lowering the
// perf_event_paranoid sysctl. The sysprop is reused for pragmatic reasons,
// as there no existing way for init rules to check for permissive boot at
// the time of writing.
if (ALLOW_PERMISSIVE_SELINUX) {
if (!security_getenforce()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Permissive SELinux boot, forcing sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks to 1.";
SetProperty("sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks", "1");
return {};
}
}
// Use a trivial event that will be configured, but not started.
struct perf_event_attr pe = {
.type = PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE,
.size = sizeof(struct perf_event_attr),
.config = PERF_COUNT_SW_TASK_CLOCK,
.disabled = 1,
.exclude_kernel = 1,
};
// Open the above event targeting cpu 0. (EINTR not possible.)
unique_fd fd(static_cast<int>(syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, &pe, /*pid=*/-1,
/*cpu=*/0,
/*group_fd=*/-1, /*flags=*/0)));
if (fd == -1) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected perf_event_open error";
return {};
}
int ioctl_ret = ioctl(fd.get(), PERF_EVENT_IOC_RESET);
if (ioctl_ret != -1) {
// Success implies that the kernel doesn't have the hooks.
return {};
} else if (errno != EACCES) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected perf_event ioctl error";
return {};
}
// Conclude that the SELinux hooks are present.
SetProperty("sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks", "1");
return {};
}
} // namespace init
} // namespace android