Merge changes I5458127b,Ib36bf44c,I481548e8,I449de193
* changes:
libsnapshot: Propagate io_uring enablement to daemon
snapuserd: Cut down worker threads
snapuserd: Terminate daemon spin up during first stage init
snapuserd: Avoid checking system properties when daemon launched from fist stage init and during selinux transition
diff --git a/fastboot/fastboot.cpp b/fastboot/fastboot.cpp
index fde1dab..39d86f9 100644
--- a/fastboot/fastboot.cpp
+++ b/fastboot/fastboot.cpp
@@ -1084,7 +1084,11 @@
// Rewrite vbmeta if that's what we're flashing and modification has been requested.
if (g_disable_verity || g_disable_verification) {
- if (partition == "vbmeta" || partition == "vbmeta_a" || partition == "vbmeta_b") {
+ // The vbmeta partition might have additional prefix if running in virtual machine
+ // e.g., guest_vbmeta_a.
+ if (android::base::EndsWith(partition, "vbmeta") ||
+ android::base::EndsWith(partition, "vbmeta_a") ||
+ android::base::EndsWith(partition, "vbmeta_b")) {
rewrite_vbmeta_buffer(buf, false /* vbmeta_in_boot */);
} else if (!has_vbmeta_partition() &&
(partition == "boot" || partition == "boot_a" || partition == "boot_b")) {
diff --git a/fs_mgr/fs_mgr.cpp b/fs_mgr/fs_mgr.cpp
index 8ce961b..960173a 100644
--- a/fs_mgr/fs_mgr.cpp
+++ b/fs_mgr/fs_mgr.cpp
@@ -2256,7 +2256,8 @@
#if ALLOW_ADBD_DISABLE_VERITY == 0
// Allowlist the mount point if user build.
static const std::vector<const std::string> kAllowedPaths = {
- "/odm", "/odm_dlkm", "/oem", "/product", "/system_ext", "/vendor", "/vendor_dlkm",
+ "/odm", "/odm_dlkm", "/oem", "/product",
+ "/system_dlkm", "/system_ext", "/vendor", "/vendor_dlkm",
};
static const std::vector<const std::string> kAllowedPrefixes = {
"/mnt/product/",
diff --git a/init/Android.bp b/init/Android.bp
index 66427dc..c39d163 100644
--- a/init/Android.bp
+++ b/init/Android.bp
@@ -162,12 +162,15 @@
"libavb",
"libc++fs",
"libcgrouprc_format",
+ "libfsverity_init",
"liblmkd_utils",
+ "libmini_keyctl_static",
"libmodprobe",
"libprocinfo",
"libprotobuf-cpp-lite",
"libpropertyinfoserializer",
"libpropertyinfoparser",
+ "libsigningutils",
"libsnapshot_cow",
"libsnapshot_init",
"libxml2",
@@ -178,6 +181,7 @@
"libbacktrace",
"libbase",
"libbootloader_message",
+ "libcrypto",
"libcutils",
"libdl",
"libext4_utils",
@@ -192,6 +196,7 @@
"libprocessgroup_setup",
"libselinux",
"libutils",
+ "libziparchive",
],
bootstrap: true,
visibility: [":__subpackages__"],
diff --git a/init/first_stage_init.cpp b/init/first_stage_init.cpp
index c7b7b0c..3cd0252 100644
--- a/init/first_stage_init.cpp
+++ b/init/first_stage_init.cpp
@@ -254,6 +254,9 @@
// stage init
CHECKCALL(mount("tmpfs", kSecondStageRes, "tmpfs", MS_NOEXEC | MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV,
"mode=0755,uid=0,gid=0"))
+
+ // First stage init stores Mainline sepolicy here.
+ CHECKCALL(mkdir("/dev/selinux", 0744));
#undef CHECKCALL
SetStdioToDevNull(argv);
diff --git a/init/property_service.cpp b/init/property_service.cpp
index f2b2cda..7a34849 100644
--- a/init/property_service.cpp
+++ b/init/property_service.cpp
@@ -1172,6 +1172,9 @@
// Don't check for failure here, since we don't always have all of these partitions.
// E.g. In case of recovery, the vendor partition will not have mounted and we
// still need the system / platform properties to function.
+ if (access("/dev/selinux/apex_property_contexts", R_OK) != -1) {
+ LoadPropertyInfoFromFile("/dev/selinux/apex_property_contexts", &property_infos);
+ }
if (access("/system_ext/etc/selinux/system_ext_property_contexts", R_OK) != -1) {
LoadPropertyInfoFromFile("/system_ext/etc/selinux/system_ext_property_contexts",
&property_infos);
@@ -1195,6 +1198,7 @@
LoadPropertyInfoFromFile("/vendor_property_contexts", &property_infos);
LoadPropertyInfoFromFile("/product_property_contexts", &property_infos);
LoadPropertyInfoFromFile("/odm_property_contexts", &property_infos);
+ LoadPropertyInfoFromFile("/dev/selinux/apex_property_contexts", &property_infos);
}
auto serialized_contexts = std::string();
diff --git a/init/selinux.cpp b/init/selinux.cpp
index 28cd012..c89c5ab 100644
--- a/init/selinux.cpp
+++ b/init/selinux.cpp
@@ -26,26 +26,29 @@
// The monolithic policy variant is for legacy non-treble devices that contain a single SEPolicy
// file located at /sepolicy and is directly loaded into the kernel SELinux subsystem.
-// The split policy is for supporting treble devices. It splits the SEPolicy across files on
-// /system/etc/selinux (the 'plat' portion of the policy) and /vendor/etc/selinux (the 'vendor'
-// portion of the policy). This is necessary to allow the system image to be updated independently
-// of the vendor image, while maintaining contributions from both partitions in the SEPolicy. This
-// is especially important for VTS testing, where the SEPolicy on the Google System Image may not be
-// identical to the system image shipped on a vendor's device.
+// The split policy is for supporting treble devices and updateable apexes. It splits the SEPolicy
+// across files on /system/etc/selinux (the 'plat' portion of the policy), /vendor/etc/selinux
+// (the 'vendor' portion of the policy), /system_ext/etc/selinux, /product/etc/selinux,
+// /odm/etc/selinux, and /dev/selinux (the apex portion of policy). This is necessary to allow
+// images to be updated independently of the vendor image, while maintaining contributions from
+// multiple partitions in the SEPolicy. This is especially important for VTS testing, where the
+// SEPolicy on the Google System Image may not be identical to the system image shipped on a
+// vendor's device.
// The split SEPolicy is loaded as described below:
// 1) There is a precompiled SEPolicy located at either /vendor/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy or
// /odm/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy if odm parition is present. Stored along with this file
-// are the sha256 hashes of the parts of the SEPolicy on /system, /system_ext and /product that
-// were used to compile this precompiled policy. The system partition contains a similar sha256
-// of the parts of the SEPolicy that it currently contains. Symmetrically, system_ext and
-// product paritition contain sha256 hashes of their SEPolicy. The init loads this
+// are the sha256 hashes of the parts of the SEPolicy on /system, /system_ext, /product, and apex
+// that were used to compile this precompiled policy. The system partition contains a similar
+// sha256 of the parts of the SEPolicy that it currently contains. Symmetrically, system_ext,
+// product, and apex contain sha256 hashes of their SEPolicy. Init loads this
// precompiled_sepolicy directly if and only if the hashes along with the precompiled SEPolicy on
-// /vendor or /odm match the hashes for system, system_ext and product SEPolicy, respectively.
-// 2) If these hashes do not match, then either /system or /system_ext or /product (or some of them)
-// have been updated out of sync with /vendor (or /odm if it is present) and the init needs to
-// compile the SEPolicy. /system contains the SEPolicy compiler, secilc, and it is used by the
-// OpenSplitPolicy() function below to compile the SEPolicy to a temp directory and load it.
+// /vendor or /odm match the hashes for system, system_ext, product, and apex SEPolicy,
+// respectively.
+// 2) If these hashes do not match, then either /system or /system_ext /product, or apex (or some of
+// them) have been updated out of sync with /vendor (or /odm if it is present) and the init needs
+// to compile the SEPolicy. /system contains the SEPolicy compiler, secilc, and it is used by
+// the OpenSplitPolicy() function below to compile the SEPolicy to a temp directory and load it.
// That function contains even more documentation with the specific implementation details of how
// the SEPolicy is compiled if needed.
@@ -58,19 +61,25 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fstream>
+#include <CertUtils.h>
#include <android-base/chrono_utils.h>
#include <android-base/file.h>
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android-base/parseint.h>
#include <android-base/result.h>
+#include <android-base/scopeguard.h>
#include <android-base/strings.h>
#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
#include <fs_avb/fs_avb.h>
#include <fs_mgr.h>
+#include <fsverity_init.h>
#include <libgsi/libgsi.h>
#include <libsnapshot/snapshot.h>
+#include <mini_keyctl_utils.h>
#include <selinux/android.h>
+#include <ziparchive/zip_archive.h>
#include "block_dev_initializer.h"
#include "debug_ramdisk.h"
@@ -247,6 +256,7 @@
precompiled_sepolicy + ".system_ext_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256"},
{"/product/etc/selinux/product_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256",
precompiled_sepolicy + ".product_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256"},
+ {"/dev/selinux/apex_sepolicy.sha256", precompiled_sepolicy + ".apex_sepolicy.sha256"},
};
for (const auto& [actual_id_path, precompiled_id_path] : sepolicy_hashes) {
@@ -325,7 +335,7 @@
// * vendor -- policy needed due to logic contained in the vendor image,
// * mapping -- mapping policy which helps preserve forward-compatibility of non-platform policy
// with newer versions of platform policy.
- // * (optional) policy needed due to logic on product, system_ext, or odm images.
+ // * (optional) policy needed due to logic on product, system_ext, odm, or apex.
// secilc is invoked to compile the above three policy files into a single monolithic policy
// file. This file is then loaded into the kernel.
@@ -421,6 +431,12 @@
if (access(odm_policy_cil_file.c_str(), F_OK) == -1) {
odm_policy_cil_file.clear();
}
+
+ // apex_sepolicy.cil is default but optional.
+ std::string apex_policy_cil_file("/dev/selinux/apex_sepolicy.cil");
+ if (access(apex_policy_cil_file.c_str(), F_OK) == -1) {
+ apex_policy_cil_file.clear();
+ }
const std::string version_as_string = std::to_string(SEPOLICY_VERSION);
// clang-format off
@@ -463,6 +479,9 @@
if (!odm_policy_cil_file.empty()) {
compile_args.push_back(odm_policy_cil_file.c_str());
}
+ if (!apex_policy_cil_file.empty()) {
+ compile_args.push_back(apex_policy_cil_file.c_str());
+ }
compile_args.push_back(nullptr);
if (!ForkExecveAndWaitForCompletion(compile_args[0], (char**)compile_args.data())) {
@@ -489,6 +508,197 @@
return true;
}
+constexpr const char* kSigningCertRelease =
+ "/system/etc/selinux/com.android.sepolicy.cert-release.der";
+constexpr const char* kFsVerityProcPath = "/proc/sys/fs/verity";
+const std::string kSepolicyApexMetadataDir = "/metadata/sepolicy/";
+const std::string kSepolicyApexSystemDir = "/system/etc/selinux/apex/";
+const std::string kSepolicyZip = "SEPolicy.zip";
+const std::string kSepolicySignature = "SEPolicy.zip.sig";
+
+const std::string kTmpfsDir = "/dev/selinux/";
+
+// Files that are deleted after policy is compiled/loaded.
+const std::vector<std::string> kApexSepolicyTmp{"apex_sepolicy.cil", "apex_sepolicy.sha256"};
+// Files that need to persist because they are used by userspace processes.
+const std::vector<std::string> kApexSepolicy{"apex_file_contexts", "apex_property_contexts",
+ "apex_service_contexts", "apex_seapp_contexts",
+ "apex_test"};
+
+Result<void> PutFileInTmpfs(ZipArchiveHandle archive, const std::string& fileName) {
+ ZipEntry entry;
+ std::string dstPath = kTmpfsDir + fileName;
+
+ int ret = FindEntry(archive, fileName, &entry);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ // All files are optional. If a file doesn't exist, return without error.
+ return {};
+ }
+
+ unique_fd fd(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(
+ open(dstPath.c_str(), O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_CLOEXEC, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR)));
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ return Error() << "Failed to open " << dstPath;
+ }
+
+ ret = ExtractEntryToFile(archive, &entry, fd);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return Error() << "Failed to extract entry \"" << fileName << "\" ("
+ << entry.uncompressed_length << " bytes) to \"" << dstPath
+ << "\": " << ErrorCodeString(ret);
+ }
+
+ return {};
+}
+
+Result<void> GetPolicyFromApex(const std::string& dir) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Loading APEX Sepolicy from " << dir + kSepolicyZip;
+ unique_fd fd(open((dir + kSepolicyZip).c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC));
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ return ErrnoError() << "Failed to open package " << dir + kSepolicyZip;
+ }
+
+ ZipArchiveHandle handle;
+ int ret = OpenArchiveFd(fd.get(), (dir + kSepolicyZip).c_str(), &handle,
+ /*assume_ownership=*/false);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return Error() << "Failed to open package " << dir + kSepolicyZip << ": "
+ << ErrorCodeString(ret);
+ }
+
+ auto handle_guard = android::base::make_scope_guard([&handle] { CloseArchive(handle); });
+
+ for (const auto& file : kApexSepolicy) {
+ auto extract = PutFileInTmpfs(handle, file);
+ if (!extract.ok()) {
+ return extract.error();
+ }
+ }
+ for (const auto& file : kApexSepolicyTmp) {
+ auto extract = PutFileInTmpfs(handle, file);
+ if (!extract.ok()) {
+ return extract.error();
+ }
+ }
+ return {};
+}
+
+Result<void> LoadSepolicyApexCerts() {
+ key_serial_t keyring_id = android::GetKeyringId(".fs-verity");
+ if (keyring_id < 0) {
+ return Error() << "Failed to find .fs-verity keyring id";
+ }
+
+ // TODO(b/199914227) the release key should always exist. Once it's checked in, start
+ // throwing an error here if it doesn't exist.
+ if (access(kSigningCertRelease, F_OK) == 0) {
+ LoadKeyFromFile(keyring_id, "fsv_sepolicy_apex_release", kSigningCertRelease);
+ }
+ return {};
+}
+
+Result<void> SepolicyFsVerityCheck() {
+ return Error() << "TODO implementent support for fsverity SEPolicy.";
+}
+
+Result<void> SepolicyCheckSignature(const std::string& dir) {
+ std::string signature;
+ if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(dir + kSepolicySignature, &signature)) {
+ return ErrnoError() << "Failed to read " << kSepolicySignature;
+ }
+
+ std::fstream sepolicyZip(dir + kSepolicyZip, std::ios::in | std::ios::binary);
+ if (!sepolicyZip) {
+ return Error() << "Failed to open " << kSepolicyZip;
+ }
+ sepolicyZip.seekg(0);
+ std::string sepolicyStr((std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(sepolicyZip)),
+ std::istreambuf_iterator<char>());
+
+ auto releaseKey = extractPublicKeyFromX509(kSigningCertRelease);
+ if (!releaseKey.ok()) {
+ return releaseKey.error();
+ }
+
+ return verifySignature(sepolicyStr, signature, *releaseKey);
+}
+
+Result<void> SepolicyVerify(const std::string& dir, bool supportsFsVerity) {
+ if (supportsFsVerity) {
+ auto fsVerityCheck = SepolicyFsVerityCheck();
+ if (fsVerityCheck.ok()) {
+ return fsVerityCheck;
+ }
+ // TODO(b/199914227) If the device supports fsverity, but we fail here, we should fail to
+ // boot and not carry on. For now, fallback to a signature checkuntil the fsverity
+ // logic is implemented.
+ LOG(INFO) << "Falling back to standard signature check. " << fsVerityCheck.error();
+ }
+
+ auto sepolicySignature = SepolicyCheckSignature(dir);
+ if (!sepolicySignature.ok()) {
+ return Error() << "Apex SEPolicy failed signature check";
+ }
+ return {};
+}
+
+void CleanupApexSepolicy() {
+ for (const auto& file : kApexSepolicyTmp) {
+ std::string path = kTmpfsDir + file;
+ unlink(path.c_str());
+ }
+}
+
+// Updatable sepolicy is shipped within an zip within an APEX. Because
+// it needs to be available before Apexes are mounted, apexd copies
+// the zip from the APEX and stores it in /metadata/sepolicy. If there is
+// no updatable sepolicy in /metadata/sepolicy, then the updatable policy is
+// loaded from /system/etc/selinux/apex. Init performs the following
+// steps on boot:
+//
+// 1. Validates the zip by checking its signature against a public key that is
+// stored in /system/etc/selinux.
+// 2. Extracts files from zip and stores them in /dev/selinux.
+// 3. Checks if the apex_sepolicy.sha256 matches the sha256 of precompiled_sepolicy.
+// if so, the precompiled sepolicy is used. Otherwise, an on-device compile of the policy
+// is used. This is the same flow as on-device compilation of policy for Treble.
+// 4. Cleans up files in /dev/selinux which are no longer needed.
+// 5. Restorecons the remaining files in /dev/selinux.
+// 6. Sets selinux into enforcing mode and continues normal booting.
+//
+void PrepareApexSepolicy() {
+ bool supportsFsVerity = access(kFsVerityProcPath, F_OK) == 0;
+ if (supportsFsVerity) {
+ auto loadSepolicyApexCerts = LoadSepolicyApexCerts();
+ if (!loadSepolicyApexCerts.ok()) {
+ // TODO(b/199914227) If the device supports fsverity, but we fail here, we should fail
+ // to boot and not carry on. For now, fallback to a signature checkuntil the fsverity
+ // logic is implemented.
+ LOG(INFO) << loadSepolicyApexCerts.error();
+ }
+ }
+ // If apex sepolicy zip exists in /metadata/sepolicy, use that, otherwise use version on
+ // /system.
+ auto dir = (access((kSepolicyApexMetadataDir + kSepolicyZip).c_str(), F_OK) == 0)
+ ? kSepolicyApexMetadataDir
+ : kSepolicyApexSystemDir;
+
+ auto sepolicyVerify = SepolicyVerify(dir, supportsFsVerity);
+ if (!sepolicyVerify.ok()) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Error: " << sepolicyVerify.error();
+ // If signature verification fails, fall back to version on /system.
+ // This file doesn't need to be verified because it lives on the system partition which
+ // is signed and protected by verified boot.
+ dir = kSepolicyApexSystemDir;
+ }
+
+ auto apex = GetPolicyFromApex(dir);
+ if (!apex.ok()) {
+ // TODO(b/199914227) Make failure fatal. For now continue booting with non-apex sepolicy.
+ LOG(ERROR) << apex.error();
+ }
+}
+
void ReadPolicy(std::string* policy) {
PolicyFile policy_file;
@@ -740,9 +950,12 @@
LOG(INFO) << "Opening SELinux policy";
+ PrepareApexSepolicy();
+
// Read the policy before potentially killing snapuserd.
std::string policy;
ReadPolicy(&policy);
+ CleanupApexSepolicy();
auto snapuserd_helper = SnapuserdSelinuxHelper::CreateIfNeeded();
if (snapuserd_helper) {
@@ -760,6 +973,13 @@
snapuserd_helper = nullptr;
}
+ // This restorecon is intentionally done before SelinuxSetEnforcement because the permissions
+ // needed to transition files from tmpfs to *_contexts_file context should not be granted to
+ // any process after selinux is set into enforcing mode.
+ if (selinux_android_restorecon("/dev/selinux/", SELINUX_ANDROID_RESTORECON_RECURSE) == -1) {
+ PLOG(FATAL) << "restorecon failed of /dev/selinux failed";
+ }
+
SelinuxSetEnforcement();
// We're in the kernel domain and want to transition to the init domain. File systems that
diff --git a/libcutils/include/private/android_filesystem_config.h b/libcutils/include/private/android_filesystem_config.h
index 23d1415..8e6b81c 100644
--- a/libcutils/include/private/android_filesystem_config.h
+++ b/libcutils/include/private/android_filesystem_config.h
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@
#define AID_UWB 1083 /* UWB subsystem */
#define AID_THREAD_NETWORK 1084 /* Thread Network subsystem */
#define AID_DICED 1085 /* Android's DICE daemon */
+#define AID_DMESGD 1086 /* dmesg parsing daemon for kernel report collection */
/* Changes to this file must be made in AOSP, *not* in internal branches. */
#define AID_SHELL 2000 /* adb and debug shell user */
diff --git a/libgrallocusage/Android.bp b/libgrallocusage/Android.bp
index f31b5f1..16103d2 100644
--- a/libgrallocusage/Android.bp
+++ b/libgrallocusage/Android.bp
@@ -44,4 +44,9 @@
shared_libs: ["android.hardware.graphics.allocator@2.0"],
header_libs: ["libhardware_headers"],
min_sdk_version: "29",
+ apex_available: [
+ "//apex_available:platform",
+ "com.android.media.swcodec",
+ "test_com.android.media.swcodec",
+ ],
}
diff --git a/libutils/Android.bp b/libutils/Android.bp
index 234638b..53f6065 100644
--- a/libutils/Android.bp
+++ b/libutils/Android.bp
@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@
cflags: ["-fvisibility=protected"],
shared_libs: [
- "libprocessgroup",
"libvndksupport",
],
diff --git a/libutils/Threads.cpp b/libutils/Threads.cpp
index 3bf5779..4dacdc6 100644
--- a/libutils/Threads.cpp
+++ b/libutils/Threads.cpp
@@ -84,14 +84,6 @@
delete t;
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, prio);
- // A new thread will be in its parent's sched group by default,
- // so we just need to handle the background case.
- // currently set to system_background group which is different
- // from background group for app.
- if (prio >= ANDROID_PRIORITY_BACKGROUND) {
- SetTaskProfiles(0, {"SCHED_SP_SYSTEM"}, true);
- }
-
if (name) {
androidSetThreadName(name);
free(name);
@@ -307,27 +299,16 @@
int androidSetThreadPriority(pid_t tid, int pri)
{
int rc = 0;
- int lasterr = 0;
int curr_pri = getpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, tid);
if (curr_pri == pri) {
return rc;
}
- if (pri >= ANDROID_PRIORITY_BACKGROUND) {
- rc = SetTaskProfiles(tid, {"SCHED_SP_SYSTEM"}, true) ? 0 : -1;
- } else if (curr_pri >= ANDROID_PRIORITY_BACKGROUND) {
- rc = SetTaskProfiles(tid, {"SCHED_SP_FOREGROUND"}, true) ? 0 : -1;
- }
-
- if (rc) {
- lasterr = errno;
- }
-
if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, tid, pri) < 0) {
rc = INVALID_OPERATION;
} else {
- errno = lasterr;
+ errno = 0;
}
return rc;
