server.cc - third_party/roughtime - Git at Google

 /* Copyright 2016 The Roughtime Authors.
  *
  * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
  * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
  * You may obtain a copy of the License at
  *
  *   http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
  * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
  * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
  * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
  * limitations under the License. */

 #include <errno.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>

 #include <openssl/curve25519.h>

 #include "logging.h"
 #include "protocol.h"
 #include "server.h"

 namespace roughtime {

 static_assert(kMaxRecvPacketSize % 4 == 0,
               "kMaxRecvPacketSize must be a multiple of four");
 static_assert(kBatchSize != 0 && (kBatchSize & (kBatchSize - 1)) == 0,
               "kBatchSize must be a power of two");
 static_assert(1u << kBatchSizeLog2 == kBatchSize,
               "kBatchSizeLog2 is incorrect");
 static_assert(kMinRequestSize <= kMaxRecvPacketSize,
               "Miniumum request size must be <= to the maximum packet size");

 static_assert(kMaxResponseSize <= kMinRequestSize,
               "This design could be a DDoS amplifier");

 static_assert(ED25519_SIGNATURE_LEN == 64, "crypto constant mismatch");
 static_assert(ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN == 32, "crypto constant mismatch");
 static_assert(ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN == 64, "crypto constant mismatch");

 Server::Server(std::unique_ptr<Identity> identity,
                std::unique_ptr<TimeSource> time_source)
     : time_source_(std::move(time_source)),
       identity_(std::move(identity)),
       num_leaves_(0),
       to_be_signed_(to_be_signed_with_context_ + sizeof(kContextString)) {
   memcpy(to_be_signed_with_context_, kContextString, sizeof(kContextString));
 }

 bool Server::AddRequest(const uint8_t *packet, size_t len) {
   ROUGHTIME_DCHECK_LE(num_leaves_, kBatchSize);

   if (len < kMinRequestSize) {
     return false;
   }

   Parser request(packet, len);
   if (!request.is_valid()) {
     return false;
   }

   const uint8_t *nonce;
   if (!request.GetFixedLen(&nonce, kTagNONC, kNonceLength)) {
     return false;
   }

   // kTagPAD lives here too, but we don't bother to check for it.  The check
   // above against |kMinRequestSize| is sufficient.
   tree_.AddLeaf(num_leaves_++, nonce);

   return true;
 }

 bool Server::Sign() {
   ROUGHTIME_DCHECK_GT(num_leaves_, 0ul);

   // The signature is over the root hash and the timestamp---that's it!
   tree_.Build(num_leaves_);
   const auto interval = time_source_->Now();
   const rough_time_t now = interval.first;
   const uint32_t radius = interval.second;

   Builder to_be_signed(to_be_signed_, kToBeSignedSize, 3);
   size_t to_be_signed_len;

   static_assert(kTagRADI < kTagMIDP, "Tags must be written in order");
   static_assert(kTagMIDP < kTagROOT, "Tags must be written in order");
   if (!to_be_signed.AddTagData(kTagRADI,
                                reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(&radius),
                                sizeof(radius)) ||
       !to_be_signed.AddTagData(
           kTagMIDP, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(&now), sizeof(now)) ||
       !to_be_signed.AddTagData(kTagROOT, tree_.GetRoot(), kNonceLength) ||
       !to_be_signed.Finish(&to_be_signed_len)) {
     ROUGHTIME_LOG(ERROR) << "failed to construct to_be_signed";
     return false;
   }
   ROUGHTIME_CHECK_EQ(to_be_signed_len, kToBeSignedSize);

   if (!ED25519_sign(signature_, to_be_signed_with_context_,
                     sizeof(to_be_signed_with_context_),
                     identity_->private_key)) {
     ROUGHTIME_LOG(ERROR) << "signature failure";
     return false;
   }
   return true;
 }

 bool Server::MakeResponse(uint8_t *out_response, size_t *out_len,
                           uint32_t index) {
   ROUGHTIME_DCHECK_LT(index, num_leaves_);
   static_assert(kMaxResponseSize <= kMaxRecvPacketSize,
                 "Receive buffers are too small to use as send buffers");
   Builder response(out_response, kMaxResponseSize, 5);
   static_assert(kTagSIG < kTagPATH, "Tags must be written in order");
   static_assert(kTagPATH < kTagSREP, "Tags must be written in order");
   static_assert(kTagSREP < kTagCERT, "Tags must be written in order");
   static_assert(kTagCERT < kTagINDX, "Tags must be written in order");

   uint8_t *path;
   uint8_t *pindex = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(&index);
   if (!response.AddTagData(kTagSIG, signature_, sizeof(signature_)) ||
       !response.AddTag(&path, kTagPATH, kNonceLength * tree_.GetPathLength()) ||
       !response.AddTagData(kTagSREP, to_be_signed_, kToBeSignedSize) ||
       !response.AddTagData(kTagCERT, identity_->certificate, kCertSize) ||
       !response.AddTagData(kTagINDX, pindex, sizeof(index)) ||
       !response.Finish(out_len)) {
     ROUGHTIME_LOG(ERROR) << "failed to construct response";
     return false;
   }

   tree_.GetPath(path, index);
   return true;
 }

 // static
 bool CreateCertificate(uint8_t out_cert[kCertSize],
                        const uint8_t root_private_key[ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN],
                        rough_time_t start_time, rough_time_t end_time,
                        const uint8_t public_key[ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) {
   ROUGHTIME_CHECK_LT(start_time, end_time);
   uint8_t to_be_signed_bytes[sizeof(kCertContextString) + kToBeSignedCertSize];
   size_t to_be_signed_len;
   memcpy(to_be_signed_bytes, kCertContextString, sizeof(kCertContextString));

   Builder to_be_signed(to_be_signed_bytes + sizeof(kCertContextString),
                        kToBeSignedCertSize, 3);
   static_assert(kTagPUBK < kTagMINT, "Tags must be written in order");
   static_assert(kTagMINT < kTagMAXT, "Tags must be written in order");
   if (!to_be_signed.AddTagData(kTagPUBK, public_key, ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) ||
       !to_be_signed.AddTagData(kTagMINT,
                                reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(&start_time),
                                sizeof(start_time)) ||
       !to_be_signed.AddTagData(kTagMAXT, reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(&end_time),
                                sizeof(end_time)) ||
       !to_be_signed.Finish(&to_be_signed_len)) {
     ROUGHTIME_LOG(ERROR) << "failed to construct signed portion of certificate";
     return false;
   }
   ROUGHTIME_CHECK_EQ(to_be_signed_len, kToBeSignedCertSize);

   uint8_t signature[ED25519_SIGNATURE_LEN];
   if (!ED25519_sign(signature, to_be_signed_bytes, sizeof(to_be_signed_bytes),
                     root_private_key)) {
     ROUGHTIME_LOG(ERROR) << "failed to sign certificate";
     return false;
   }

   size_t cert_len;
   Builder cert(out_cert, kCertSize, 2);

   static_assert(kTagSIG < kTagDELE, "Tags must be written in order");
   if (!cert.AddTagData(kTagSIG, signature, sizeof(signature)) ||
       !cert.AddTagData(kTagDELE,
                        to_be_signed_bytes + sizeof(kCertContextString),
                        to_be_signed_len) ||
       !cert.Finish(&cert_len)) {
     ROUGHTIME_LOG(ERROR) << "failed to construct certificate";
     return false;
   }
   ROUGHTIME_CHECK_EQ(cert_len, kCertSize);
   return true;
 }

 void Tree::Build(size_t num_nodes) {
   ROUGHTIME_DCHECK_GT(num_nodes, 0ul);
   size_t level;
   for (level = 0; num_nodes > 1; level++, num_nodes /= 2) {
     // Even out the level with a dummy node, if need be.
     if (num_nodes % 2 == 1) {
       memset(tree_[level][num_nodes], 0, kNonceLength);
       num_nodes++;
     }
     for (size_t i = 0; i < num_nodes; i += 2) {
       HashNode(tree_[level + 1][i / 2], tree_[level][i], tree_[level][i + 1]);
     }
   }
   ROUGHTIME_DCHECK_EQ(1ul, num_nodes);  // Root node.
   levels_ = level + 1;
 }

 void Tree::GetPath(uint8_t *out_path, size_t index) {
   // At the lowest level, the client knows its own leaf hash, so send it only
   // that leaf's sibling, and so on up the tree.
   for (size_t level = 0; level < levels_ - 1; level++) {
     if (index % 2 == 1) {
       memcpy(out_path, tree_[level][index - 1], kNonceLength);
     } else {
       memcpy(out_path, tree_[level][index + 1], kNonceLength);
     }
     out_path += kNonceLength;
     index /= 2;
   }
   ROUGHTIME_DCHECK_EQ(0ul, index);
 }

 BrokenReplyGenerator::~BrokenReplyGenerator() {}

 uint16_t BrokenReplyGenerator::probability_1024() const {
   return probability_1024_;
 }

 void BrokenReplyGenerator::set_probability_1024(uint16_t probability) {
   probability_1024_ = probability;
 }

 }  // namespace roughtime
	/* Copyright 2016 The Roughtime Authors.
	*
	* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
	* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
	* You may obtain a copy of the License at
	*
	* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
	*
	* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
	* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
	* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
	* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
	* limitations under the License. */

	#include <errno.h>
	#include <stdint.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include <unistd.h>

	#include <openssl/curve25519.h>

	#include "logging.h"
	#include "protocol.h"
	#include "server.h"

	namespace roughtime {

	static_assert(kMaxRecvPacketSize % 4 == 0,
	"kMaxRecvPacketSize must be a multiple of four");
	static_assert(kBatchSize != 0 && (kBatchSize & (kBatchSize - 1)) == 0,
	"kBatchSize must be a power of two");
	static_assert(1u << kBatchSizeLog2 == kBatchSize,
	"kBatchSizeLog2 is incorrect");
	static_assert(kMinRequestSize <= kMaxRecvPacketSize,
	"Miniumum request size must be <= to the maximum packet size");

	static_assert(kMaxResponseSize <= kMinRequestSize,
	"This design could be a DDoS amplifier");

	static_assert(ED25519_SIGNATURE_LEN == 64, "crypto constant mismatch");
	static_assert(ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN == 32, "crypto constant mismatch");
	static_assert(ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN == 64, "crypto constant mismatch");

	Server::Server(std::unique_ptr<Identity> identity,
	std::unique_ptr<TimeSource> time_source)
	: time_source_(std::move(time_source)),
	identity_(std::move(identity)),
	num_leaves_(0),
	to_be_signed_(to_be_signed_with_context_ + sizeof(kContextString)) {
	memcpy(to_be_signed_with_context_, kContextString, sizeof(kContextString));
	}

	bool Server::AddRequest(const uint8_t *packet, size_t len) {
	ROUGHTIME_DCHECK_LE(num_leaves_, kBatchSize);

	if (len < kMinRequestSize) {
	return false;
	}

	Parser request(packet, len);
	if (!request.is_valid()) {
	return false;
	}

	const uint8_t *nonce;
	if (!request.GetFixedLen(&nonce, kTagNONC, kNonceLength)) {
	return false;
	}

	// kTagPAD lives here too, but we don't bother to check for it. The check
	// above against \|kMinRequestSize\| is sufficient.
	tree_.AddLeaf(num_leaves_++, nonce);

	return true;
	}

	bool Server::Sign() {
	ROUGHTIME_DCHECK_GT(num_leaves_, 0ul);

	// The signature is over the root hash and the timestamp---that's it!
	tree_.Build(num_leaves_);
	const auto interval = time_source_->Now();
	const rough_time_t now = interval.first;
	const uint32_t radius = interval.second;

	Builder to_be_signed(to_be_signed_, kToBeSignedSize, 3);
	size_t to_be_signed_len;

	static_assert(kTagRADI < kTagMIDP, "Tags must be written in order");
	static_assert(kTagMIDP < kTagROOT, "Tags must be written in order");
	if (!to_be_signed.AddTagData(kTagRADI,
	reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(&radius),
	sizeof(radius)) \|\|
	!to_be_signed.AddTagData(
	kTagMIDP, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(&now), sizeof(now)) \|\|
	!to_be_signed.AddTagData(kTagROOT, tree_.GetRoot(), kNonceLength) \|\|
	!to_be_signed.Finish(&to_be_signed_len)) {
	ROUGHTIME_LOG(ERROR) << "failed to construct to_be_signed";
	return false;
	}
	ROUGHTIME_CHECK_EQ(to_be_signed_len, kToBeSignedSize);

	if (!ED25519_sign(signature_, to_be_signed_with_context_,
	sizeof(to_be_signed_with_context_),
	identity_->private_key)) {
	ROUGHTIME_LOG(ERROR) << "signature failure";
	return false;
	}
	return true;
	}

	bool Server::MakeResponse(uint8_t out_response, size_t out_len,
	uint32_t index) {
	ROUGHTIME_DCHECK_LT(index, num_leaves_);
	static_assert(kMaxResponseSize <= kMaxRecvPacketSize,
	"Receive buffers are too small to use as send buffers");
	Builder response(out_response, kMaxResponseSize, 5);
	static_assert(kTagSIG < kTagPATH, "Tags must be written in order");
	static_assert(kTagPATH < kTagSREP, "Tags must be written in order");
	static_assert(kTagSREP < kTagCERT, "Tags must be written in order");
	static_assert(kTagCERT < kTagINDX, "Tags must be written in order");

	uint8_t *path;
	uint8_t pindex = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t >(&index);
	if (!response.AddTagData(kTagSIG, signature_, sizeof(signature_)) \|\|
	!response.AddTag(&path, kTagPATH, kNonceLength * tree_.GetPathLength()) \|\|
	!response.AddTagData(kTagSREP, to_be_signed_, kToBeSignedSize) \|\|
	!response.AddTagData(kTagCERT, identity_->certificate, kCertSize) \|\|
	!response.AddTagData(kTagINDX, pindex, sizeof(index)) \|\|
	!response.Finish(out_len)) {
	ROUGHTIME_LOG(ERROR) << "failed to construct response";
	return false;
	}

	tree_.GetPath(path, index);
	return true;
	}

	// static
	bool CreateCertificate(uint8_t out_cert[kCertSize],
	const uint8_t root_private_key[ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN],
	rough_time_t start_time, rough_time_t end_time,
	const uint8_t public_key[ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) {
	ROUGHTIME_CHECK_LT(start_time, end_time);
	uint8_t to_be_signed_bytes[sizeof(kCertContextString) + kToBeSignedCertSize];
	size_t to_be_signed_len;
	memcpy(to_be_signed_bytes, kCertContextString, sizeof(kCertContextString));

	Builder to_be_signed(to_be_signed_bytes + sizeof(kCertContextString),
	kToBeSignedCertSize, 3);
	static_assert(kTagPUBK < kTagMINT, "Tags must be written in order");
	static_assert(kTagMINT < kTagMAXT, "Tags must be written in order");
	if (!to_be_signed.AddTagData(kTagPUBK, public_key, ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) \|\|
	!to_be_signed.AddTagData(kTagMINT,
	reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(&start_time),
	sizeof(start_time)) \|\|
	!to_be_signed.AddTagData(kTagMAXT, reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(&end_time),
	sizeof(end_time)) \|\|
	!to_be_signed.Finish(&to_be_signed_len)) {
	ROUGHTIME_LOG(ERROR) << "failed to construct signed portion of certificate";
	return false;
	}
	ROUGHTIME_CHECK_EQ(to_be_signed_len, kToBeSignedCertSize);

	uint8_t signature[ED25519_SIGNATURE_LEN];
	if (!ED25519_sign(signature, to_be_signed_bytes, sizeof(to_be_signed_bytes),
	root_private_key)) {
	ROUGHTIME_LOG(ERROR) << "failed to sign certificate";
	return false;
	}

	size_t cert_len;
	Builder cert(out_cert, kCertSize, 2);

	static_assert(kTagSIG < kTagDELE, "Tags must be written in order");
	if (!cert.AddTagData(kTagSIG, signature, sizeof(signature)) \|\|
	!cert.AddTagData(kTagDELE,
	to_be_signed_bytes + sizeof(kCertContextString),
	to_be_signed_len) \|\|
	!cert.Finish(&cert_len)) {
	ROUGHTIME_LOG(ERROR) << "failed to construct certificate";
	return false;
	}
	ROUGHTIME_CHECK_EQ(cert_len, kCertSize);
	return true;
	}

	void Tree::Build(size_t num_nodes) {
	ROUGHTIME_DCHECK_GT(num_nodes, 0ul);
	size_t level;
	for (level = 0; num_nodes > 1; level++, num_nodes /= 2) {
	// Even out the level with a dummy node, if need be.
	if (num_nodes % 2 == 1) {
	memset(tree_[level][num_nodes], 0, kNonceLength);
	num_nodes++;
	}
	for (size_t i = 0; i < num_nodes; i += 2) {
	HashNode(tree_[level + 1][i / 2], tree_[level][i], tree_[level][i + 1]);
	}
	}
	ROUGHTIME_DCHECK_EQ(1ul, num_nodes); // Root node.
	levels_ = level + 1;
	}

	void Tree::GetPath(uint8_t *out_path, size_t index) {
	// At the lowest level, the client knows its own leaf hash, so send it only
	// that leaf's sibling, and so on up the tree.
	for (size_t level = 0; level < levels_ - 1; level++) {
	if (index % 2 == 1) {
	memcpy(out_path, tree_[level][index - 1], kNonceLength);
	} else {
	memcpy(out_path, tree_[level][index + 1], kNonceLength);
	}
	out_path += kNonceLength;
	index /= 2;
	}
	ROUGHTIME_DCHECK_EQ(0ul, index);
	}

	BrokenReplyGenerator::~BrokenReplyGenerator() {}

	uint16_t BrokenReplyGenerator::probability_1024() const {
	return probability_1024_;
	}

	void BrokenReplyGenerator::set_probability_1024(uint16_t probability) {
	probability_1024_ = probability;
	}

	} // namespace roughtime