| Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is a feature found on AMD processors. | |
| SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running encrypted | |
| virtual machine (VMs) under the control of KVM. Encrypted VMs have their pages | |
| (code and data) secured such that only the guest itself has access to the | |
| unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is associated with a unique encryption | |
| key; if its data is accessed to a different entity using a different key the | |
| encrypted guests data will be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible | |
| data. | |
| The key management of this feature is handled by separate processor known as | |
| AMD secure processor (AMD-SP) which is present in AMD SOCs. Firmware running | |
| inside the AMD-SP provide commands to support common VM lifecycle. This | |
| includes commands for launching, snapshotting, migrating and debugging the | |
| encrypted guest. Those SEV command can be issued via KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP | |
| ioctls. | |
| Launching | |
| --------- | |
| Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before guest can be booted. | |
| MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images :LAUNCH_START, | |
| LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, LAUNCH_MEASURE and LAUNCH_FINISH. These four commands | |
| together generate a fresh memory encryption key for the VM, encrypt the boot | |
| images and provide a measurement than can be used as an attestation of the | |
| successful launch. | |
| LAUNCH_START is called first to create a cryptographic launch context within | |
| the firmware. To create this context, guest owner must provides guest policy, | |
| its public Diffie-Hellman key (PDH) and session parameters. These inputs | |
| should be treated as binary blob and must be passed as-is to the SEV firmware. | |
| The guest policy is passed as plaintext and hypervisor may able to read it | |
| but should not modify it (any modification of the policy bits will result | |
| in bad measurement). The guest policy is a 4-byte data structure containing | |
| several flags that restricts what can be done on running SEV guest. | |
| See KM Spec section 3 and 6.2 for more details. | |
| The guest policy can be provided via the 'policy' property (see below) | |
| # ${QEMU} \ | |
| sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x1...\ | |
| Guest owners provided DH certificate and session parameters will be used to | |
| establish a cryptographic session with the guest owner to negotiate keys used | |
| for the attestation. | |
| The DH certificate and session blob can be provided via 'dh-cert-file' and | |
| 'session-file' property (see below | |
| # ${QEMU} \ | |
| sev-guest,id=sev0,dh-cert-file=<file1>,session-file=<file2> | |
| LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA encrypts the memory region using the cryptographic context | |
| created via LAUNCH_START command. If required, this command can be called | |
| multiple times to encrypt different memory regions. The command also calculates | |
| the measurement of the memory contents as it encrypts. | |
| LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of encrypted | |
| memory. This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that can be | |
| sent to the guest owner as an attestation that the memory was encrypted | |
| correctly by the firmware. The guest owner may wait to provide the guest | |
| confidential information until it can verify the attestation measurement. | |
| Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at boot, the | |
| attestation measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner | |
| expects. | |
| LAUNCH_FINISH command finalizes the guest launch and destroy's the cryptographic | |
| context. | |
| See SEV KM API Spec [1] 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the | |
| complete flow chart. | |
| To launch a SEV guest | |
| # ${QEMU} \ | |
| -machine ...,memory-encryption=sev0 \ | |
| -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1 | |
| Debugging | |
| ----------- | |
| Since memory contents of SEV guest is encrypted hence hypervisor access to the | |
| guest memory will get a cipher text. If guest policy allows debugging, then | |
| hypervisor can use DEBUG_DECRYPT and DEBUG_ENCRYPT commands access the guest | |
| memory region for debug purposes. This is not supported in QEMU yet. | |
| Snapshot/Restore | |
| ----------------- | |
| TODO | |
| Live Migration | |
| ---------------- | |
| TODO | |
| References | |
| ----------------- | |
| AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper: | |
| http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf | |
| Secure Encrypted Virtualization Key Management: | |
| [1] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf | |
| KVM Forum slides: | |
| http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf | |
| AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual: | |
| http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf | |
| SME is section 7.10 | |
| SEV is section 15.34 |