library/ecdsa.c - third_party/github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls - Git at Google

 /*
  *  Elliptic curve DSA
  *
  *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
  *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
  *
  *  This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the
  *  GNU General Public License v2.0 or later.
  *
  *  **********
  *  Apache License 2.0:
  *
  *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
  *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
  *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
  *
  *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
  *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
  *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
  *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
  *  limitations under the License.
  *
  *  **********
  *
  *  **********
  *  GNU General Public License v2.0 or later:
  *
  *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
  *  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
  *  (at your option) any later version.
  *
  *  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  *  GNU General Public License for more details.
  *
  *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
  *  with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
  *  51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
  *
  *  **********
  */

 /*
  * References:
  *
  * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg
  */

 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
 #include "mbedtls/config.h"
 #else
 #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
 #endif

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)

 #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
 #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"

 #include <string.h>

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
 #include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
 #endif

 /*
  * Derive a suitable integer for group grp from a buffer of length len
  * SEC1 4.1.3 step 5 aka SEC1 4.1.4 step 3
  */
 static int derive_mpi( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *x,
                        const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen )
 {
     int ret;
     size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
     size_t use_size = blen > n_size ? n_size : blen;

     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( x, buf, use_size ) );
     if( use_size * 8 > grp->nbits )
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( x, use_size * 8 - grp->nbits ) );

     /* While at it, reduce modulo N */
     if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( x, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( x, x, &grp->N ) );

 cleanup:
     return( ret );
 }

 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
 /*
  * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3)
  * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message)
  */
 static int ecdsa_sign_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
                                 mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
                                 const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
                                 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
                                 void *p_rng,
                                 int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
                                                    size_t),
                                 void *p_rng_blind )
 {
     int ret, key_tries, sign_tries, blind_tries;
     mbedtls_ecp_point R;
     mbedtls_mpi k, e, t;

     /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
     if( grp->N.p == NULL )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );

     /* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */
     if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY );

     mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t );

     sign_tries = 0;
     do
     {
         /*
          * Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair
          * and set r = xR mod n
          */
         key_tries = 0;
         do
         {
             MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &k, f_rng, p_rng ) );

             MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, &R, &k, &grp->G,
                                               f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind ) );
             MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( r, &R.X, &grp->N ) );

             if( key_tries++ > 10 )
             {
                 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
                 goto cleanup;
             }
         }
         while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 0 ) == 0 );

         /*
          * Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message
          */
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );

         /*
          * Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
          * avoiding a potential timing leak.
          *
          * This loop does the same job as mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey() and it is
          * replaced by a call to it in the mainline. This change is not
          * necessary to backport the fix separating the blinding and ephemeral
          * key generating RNGs, therefore the original code is kept.
          */
         blind_tries = 0;
         do
         {
             size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
             MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng_blind,
                                                       p_rng_blind ) );
             MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &t, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );

             if( ++blind_tries > 30 )
                 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
         }
         while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &t, 1 ) < 0 ||
                mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &t, &grp->N ) >= 0 );

         /*
          * Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
          */
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, r, d ) );
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) );
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) );
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &k, &k, &t ) );
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &k, &k, &grp->N ) );
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, &k, &grp->N ) );
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) );
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) );

         if( sign_tries++ > 10 )
         {
             ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
             goto cleanup;
         }
     }
     while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 );

 cleanup:
     mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
     mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t );

     return( ret );
 }

 int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
                         const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf,
                         size_t blen,
                         int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
                         void *p_rng )
 {
     /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
     return( ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng,
                                  f_rng, p_rng ) );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
 static int ecdsa_sign_det_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
                                     mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
                                     const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
                                     mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
                                     int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
                                                        size_t),
                                     void *p_rng_blind )
 {
     int ret;
     mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
     unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
     size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
     const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
     mbedtls_mpi h;
     /* Variables for deterministic blinding fallback */
     const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
     mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;

     if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );

     mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
     mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
     mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );

     /* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
     mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );

     if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
         ret = ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
                                    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx,
                                    f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind );
     else
     {
         /*
          * To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
          * second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
          * reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
          * risk that they leak this way.
          */

         mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx_blind, md_info,
                                     data, 2 * grp_len );
         ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( &rng_ctx_blind,
                                             (const unsigned char*) blind_label,
                                             strlen( blind_label ) );
         if( ret != 0 )
             goto cleanup;

         /*
          * Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
          * message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
          * through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
          * won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
          * be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
          */
         ret = ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
                                    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx,
                                    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx_blind );

     }

 cleanup:
     mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
     mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
     mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );

     return( ret );
 }

 /*
  * Deterministic signature wrappers
  */
 int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
                             mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
                             const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
                             mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
 {
     return( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
                                      NULL, NULL ) );
 }

 int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
                                 mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
                                 const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
                                 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
                                 int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
                                                    size_t),
                                 void *p_rng_blind )
 {
     return( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
                                      f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind ) );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */

 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
 /*
  * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4)
  * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message)
  */
 int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
                   const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
                   const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s)
 {
     int ret;
     mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2;
     mbedtls_ecp_point R;

     mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 );

     /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
     if( grp->N.p == NULL )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );

     /*
      * Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1
      */
     if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( r, &grp->N ) >= 0 ||
         mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( s, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
     {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
         goto cleanup;
     }

     /*
      * Additional precaution: make sure Q is valid
      */
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, Q ) );

     /*
      * Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message
      */
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );

     /*
      * Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n
      */
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &s_inv, s, &grp->N ) );

     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u1, &e, &s_inv ) );
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u1, &u1, &grp->N ) );

     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u2, r, &s_inv ) );
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u2, &u2, &grp->N ) );

     /*
      * Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q
      *
      * Since we're not using any secret data, no need to pass a RNG to
      * mbedtls_ecp_mul() for countermesures.
      */
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( grp, &R, &u1, &grp->G, &u2, Q ) );

     if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &R ) )
     {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
         goto cleanup;
     }

     /*
      * Step 6: convert xR to an integer (no-op)
      * Step 7: reduce xR mod n (gives v)
      */
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &R.X, &R.X, &grp->N ) );

     /*
      * Step 8: check if v (that is, R.X) is equal to r
      */
     if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, r ) != 0 )
     {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
         goto cleanup;
     }

 cleanup:
     mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
     mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 );

     return( ret );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */

 /*
  * Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1
  */
 static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
                                     unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen )
 {
     int ret;
     unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN];
     unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof( buf );
     size_t len = 0;

     MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, s ) );
     MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, r ) );

     MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, buf, len ) );
     MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, buf,
                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) );

     memcpy( sig, p, len );
     *slen = len;

     return( 0 );
 }

 /*
  * Compute and write signature
  */
 int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
                            const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
                            unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
                            int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
                            void *p_rng )
 {
     int ret;
     mbedtls_mpi r, s;

     mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
                                               hash, hlen, md_alg,
                                               f_rng, p_rng ) );
 #else
     (void) md_alg;

     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
                          hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */

     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );

 cleanup:
     mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
     mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );

     return( ret );
 }

 #if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \
     defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
 int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
                                const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
                                unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
                                mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
 {
     return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen,
                                    NULL, NULL ) );
 }
 #endif

 /*
  * Read and check signature
  */
 int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
                           const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
                           const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen )
 {
     int ret;
     unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig;
     const unsigned char *end = sig + slen;
     size_t len;
     mbedtls_mpi r, s;

     mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );

     if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
                     MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
     {
         ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
         goto cleanup;
     }

     if( p + len != end )
     {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA +
               MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
         goto cleanup;
     }

     if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &r ) ) != 0 ||
         ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &s ) ) != 0 )
     {
         ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
         goto cleanup;
     }

     if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
                               &ctx->Q, &r, &s ) ) != 0 )
         goto cleanup;

     /* At this point we know that the buffer starts with a valid signature.
      * Return 0 if the buffer just contains the signature, and a specific
      * error code if the valid signature is followed by more data. */
     if( p != end )
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;

 cleanup:
     mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
     mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );

     return( ret );
 }

 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT)
 /*
  * Generate key pair
  */
 int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid,
                   int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
 {
     int ret = 0;
     ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, gid );
     if( ret != 0 )
         return( ret );

    return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d,
                                     &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */

 /*
  * Set context from an mbedtls_ecp_keypair
  */
 int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key )
 {
     int ret;

     if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &ctx->grp, &key->grp ) ) != 0 ||
         ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->d, &key->d ) ) != 0 ||
         ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Q, &key->Q ) ) != 0 )
     {
         mbedtls_ecdsa_free( ctx );
     }

     return( ret );
 }

 /*
  * Initialize context
  */
 void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx )
 {
     mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx );
 }

 /*
  * Free context
  */
 void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx )
 {
     mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ctx );
 }

 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
	/*
	* Elliptic curve DSA
	*
	* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
	* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
	*
	* This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the
	* GNU General Public License v2.0 or later.
	*
	* **********
	* Apache License 2.0:
	*
	* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
	* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
	* You may obtain a copy of the License at
	*
	* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
	*
	* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
	* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
	* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
	* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
	* limitations under the License.
	*
	* **********
	*
	* **********
	* GNU General Public License v2.0 or later:
	*
	* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
	* with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
	* 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
	*
	* **********
	*/

	/*
	* References:
	*
	* SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg
	*/

	#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
	#include "mbedtls/config.h"
	#else
	#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
	#endif

	#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)

	#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
	#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"

	#include <string.h>

	#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
	#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
	#endif

	/*
	* Derive a suitable integer for group grp from a buffer of length len
	* SEC1 4.1.3 step 5 aka SEC1 4.1.4 step 3
	*/
	static int derive_mpi( const mbedtls_ecp_group grp, mbedtls_mpi x,
	const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen )
	{
	int ret;
	size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
	size_t use_size = blen > n_size ? n_size : blen;

	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( x, buf, use_size ) );
	if( use_size * 8 > grp->nbits )
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( x, use_size * 8 - grp->nbits ) );

	/* While at it, reduce modulo N */
	if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( x, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( x, x, &grp->N ) );

	cleanup:
	return( ret );
	}

	#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
	/*
	* Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3)
	* Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message)
	*/
	static int ecdsa_sign_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group grp, mbedtls_mpi r,
	mbedtls_mpi s, const mbedtls_mpi d,
	const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
	int (f_rng)(void , unsigned char *, size_t),
	void *p_rng,
	int (f_rng_blind)(void , unsigned char *,
	size_t),
	void *p_rng_blind )
	{
	int ret, key_tries, sign_tries, blind_tries;
	mbedtls_ecp_point R;
	mbedtls_mpi k, e, t;

	/* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
	if( grp->N.p == NULL )
	return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );

	/* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */
	if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 \|\| mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
	return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY );

	mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
	mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t );

	sign_tries = 0;
	do
	{
	/*
	* Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair
	* and set r = xR mod n
	*/
	key_tries = 0;
	do
	{
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &k, f_rng, p_rng ) );

	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, &R, &k, &grp->G,
	f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind ) );
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( r, &R.X, &grp->N ) );

	if( key_tries++ > 10 )
	{
	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
	goto cleanup;
	}
	}
	while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 0 ) == 0 );

	/*
	* Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message
	*/
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );

	/*
	* Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
	* avoiding a potential timing leak.
	*
	* This loop does the same job as mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey() and it is
	* replaced by a call to it in the mainline. This change is not
	* necessary to backport the fix separating the blinding and ephemeral
	* key generating RNGs, therefore the original code is kept.
	*/
	blind_tries = 0;
	do
	{
	size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng_blind,
	p_rng_blind ) );
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &t, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );

	if( ++blind_tries > 30 )
	return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
	}
	while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &t, 1 ) < 0 \|\|
	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &t, &grp->N ) >= 0 );

	/*
	* Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
	*/
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, r, d ) );
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) );
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) );
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &k, &k, &t ) );
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &k, &k, &grp->N ) );
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, &k, &grp->N ) );
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) );
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) );

	if( sign_tries++ > 10 )
	{
	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
	goto cleanup;
	}
	}
	while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 );

	cleanup:
	mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
	mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t );

	return( ret );
	}

	int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group grp, mbedtls_mpi r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
	const mbedtls_mpi d, const unsigned char buf,
	size_t blen,
	int (f_rng)(void , unsigned char *, size_t),
	void *p_rng )
	{
	/* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
	return( ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng,
	f_rng, p_rng ) );
	}
	#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */

	#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
	static int ecdsa_sign_det_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group grp, mbedtls_mpi r,
	mbedtls_mpi s, const mbedtls_mpi d,
	const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
	mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
	int (f_rng_blind)(void , unsigned char *,
	size_t),
	void *p_rng_blind )
	{
	int ret;
	mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
	unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
	size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
	const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
	mbedtls_mpi h;
	/* Variables for deterministic blinding fallback */
	const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
	mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;

	if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
	return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );

	mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
	mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
	mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );

	/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
	mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );

	if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
	ret = ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
	mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx,
	f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind );
	else
	{
	/*
	* To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
	* second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
	* reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
	* risk that they leak this way.
	*/

	mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx_blind, md_info,
	data, 2 * grp_len );
	ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( &rng_ctx_blind,
	(const unsigned char*) blind_label,
	strlen( blind_label ) );
	if( ret != 0 )
	goto cleanup;

	/*
	* Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
	* message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
	* through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
	* won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
	* be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
	*/
	ret = ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
	mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx,
	mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx_blind );

	}

	cleanup:
	mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
	mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
	mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );

	return( ret );
	}

	/*
	* Deterministic signature wrappers
	*/
	int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group grp, mbedtls_mpi r,
	mbedtls_mpi s, const mbedtls_mpi d,
	const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
	mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
	{
	return( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
	NULL, NULL ) );
	}

	int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group grp, mbedtls_mpi r,
	mbedtls_mpi s, const mbedtls_mpi d,
	const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
	mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
	int (f_rng_blind)(void , unsigned char *,
	size_t),
	void *p_rng_blind )
	{
	return( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
	f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind ) );
	}
	#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */

	#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
	/*
	* Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4)
	* Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message)
	*/
	int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
	const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
	const mbedtls_ecp_point Q, const mbedtls_mpi r, const mbedtls_mpi *s)
	{
	int ret;
	mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2;
	mbedtls_ecp_point R;

	mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
	mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 );

	/* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
	if( grp->N.p == NULL )
	return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );

	/*
	* Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1
	*/
	if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 1 ) < 0 \|\| mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( r, &grp->N ) >= 0 \|\|
	mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 1 ) < 0 \|\| mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( s, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
	{
	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
	goto cleanup;
	}

	/*
	* Additional precaution: make sure Q is valid
	*/
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, Q ) );

	/*
	* Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message
	*/
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );

	/*
	* Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n
	*/
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &s_inv, s, &grp->N ) );

	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u1, &e, &s_inv ) );
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u1, &u1, &grp->N ) );

	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u2, r, &s_inv ) );
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u2, &u2, &grp->N ) );

	/*
	* Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q
	*
	* Since we're not using any secret data, no need to pass a RNG to
	* mbedtls_ecp_mul() for countermesures.
	*/
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( grp, &R, &u1, &grp->G, &u2, Q ) );

	if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &R ) )
	{
	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
	goto cleanup;
	}

	/*
	* Step 6: convert xR to an integer (no-op)
	* Step 7: reduce xR mod n (gives v)
	*/
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &R.X, &R.X, &grp->N ) );

	/*
	* Step 8: check if v (that is, R.X) is equal to r
	*/
	if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, r ) != 0 )
	{
	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
	goto cleanup;
	}

	cleanup:
	mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
	mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 );

	return( ret );
	}
	#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */

	/*
	* Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1
	*/
	static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi r, const mbedtls_mpi s,
	unsigned char sig, size_t slen )
	{
	int ret;
	unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN];
	unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof( buf );
	size_t len = 0;

	MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, s ) );
	MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, r ) );

	MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, buf, len ) );
	MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, buf,
	MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED \| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) );

	memcpy( sig, p, len );
	*slen = len;

	return( 0 );
	}

	/*
	* Compute and write signature
	*/
	int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
	const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
	unsigned char sig, size_t slen,
	int (f_rng)(void , unsigned char *, size_t),
	void *p_rng )
	{
	int ret;
	mbedtls_mpi r, s;

	mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
	mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );

	#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
	hash, hlen, md_alg,
	f_rng, p_rng ) );
	#else
	(void) md_alg;

	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
	hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
	#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */

	MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );

	cleanup:
	mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
	mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );

	return( ret );
	}

	#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \
	defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
	int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
	const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
	unsigned char sig, size_t slen,
	mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
	{
	return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen,
	NULL, NULL ) );
	}
	#endif

	/*
	* Read and check signature
	*/
	int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
	const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
	const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen )
	{
	int ret;
	unsigned char p = (unsigned char ) sig;
	const unsigned char *end = sig + slen;
	size_t len;
	mbedtls_mpi r, s;

	mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
	mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );

	if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
	MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED \| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
	{
	ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
	goto cleanup;
	}

	if( p + len != end )
	{
	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA +
	MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
	goto cleanup;
	}

	if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &r ) ) != 0 \|\|
	( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &s ) ) != 0 )
	{
	ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
	goto cleanup;
	}

	if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
	&ctx->Q, &r, &s ) ) != 0 )
	goto cleanup;

	/* At this point we know that the buffer starts with a valid signature.
	* Return 0 if the buffer just contains the signature, and a specific
	* error code if the valid signature is followed by more data. */
	if( p != end )
	ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;

	cleanup:
	mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
	mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );

	return( ret );
	}

	#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT)
	/*
	* Generate key pair
	*/
	int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid,
	int (f_rng)(void , unsigned char , size_t), void p_rng )
	{
	int ret = 0;
	ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, gid );
	if( ret != 0 )
	return( ret );

	return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d,
	&ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) );
	}
	#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */

	/*
	* Set context from an mbedtls_ecp_keypair
	*/
	int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair key )
	{
	int ret;

	if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &ctx->grp, &key->grp ) ) != 0 \|\|
	( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->d, &key->d ) ) != 0 \|\|
	( ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Q, &key->Q ) ) != 0 )
	{
	mbedtls_ecdsa_free( ctx );
	}

	return( ret );
	}

	/*
	* Initialize context
	*/
	void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx )
	{
	mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx );
	}

	/*
	* Free context
	*/
	void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx )
	{
	mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ctx );
	}

	#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */