tree db9b3b41c4ebafadeedf41b59d52f7b8c3345d9e
parent 5ef40c60f67e9060b33f02f49b366f508c0d09fa
author David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> 1503551381 -0700
committer CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> 1503591262 +0000

Don't reauthenticate on renegotiation.

We currently forbid the server certificate from changing on
renegotiation. This means re-verifying the certificate is pointless and
indeed the callback being called again seems to surprise consumers more
than anything else.

Carry over the initial handshake's SCT lists and OCSP responses (don't
enforce they don't change since the server may have, say, picked up new
OCSP responses in the meantime), ignore new ones received on
renegotiation, and don't bother redoing verification.

For our purposes, TLS 1.2 renegotiation is an overcomplicated TLS 1.3
KeyUpdate + post-handshake auth. The server is not allowed to change
identity.

Bug: 126
Change-Id: I0dae85bcf243943b1a5a97fa4f30f100c9e6e41e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19665
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>