Backport of Win-specific suppression of potentially rogue construct that can engage
in directory traversal on the host.
Bug:209438553
Ignore-AOSP-First: Resolution for potential security exploit.
Test: Cursory test with adb.
Change-Id: Id47c567ad92ae4d9d7325a7a8589825a2ff4232b
Merged-In: Ie1f82db2fb14e1bdd183bf8d3d93d5e9f974be5d
(cherry picked from commit 505eeb7699173d3a80b47c346bfdb052b023edcd)
Merged-In: Id47c567ad92ae4d9d7325a7a8589825a2ff4232b
diff --git a/adb/client/file_sync_client.cpp b/adb/client/file_sync_client.cpp
index e686973..3374812 100644
--- a/adb/client/file_sync_client.cpp
+++ b/adb/client/file_sync_client.cpp
@@ -477,6 +477,17 @@
if (!ReadFdExactly(fd, buf, len)) return false;
buf[len] = 0;
+ // Address the unlikely scenario wherein a
+ // compromised device/service might be able to
+ // traverse across directories on the host. Let's
+ // shut that door!
+ if (strchr(buf, '/')
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+ || strchr(buf, '\\')
+#endif
+ ) {
+ return false;
+ }
callback(dent.mode, dent.size, dent.mtime, buf);
}
}
